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Terms  of  Reference  
The   Independent   Commission   Against   Corruption   (ICAC)   was   established   by   the   NSW  
Government   in   1989.   The   ICAC's   principal   functions   are   set   out   in   the   Independent  
Commission  Against  Corruption  Act  1988.  
Ensuring   that   the   ICAC   has   the   powers   and   resources   required   to   fulfil   its   functions   is   a  
priority  for  the  NSW  Government.  
In  light  of  the  decision  of  the  High  Court  of  Australia  in  ICAC  v  Cunneen  [2015]  HCA  14,  the  
Panel  is  commissioned  to  consider,  and  report  to  the  Governor  on  or  before  31  July  2015  on:  
•   the  appropriate  scope  for  the  ICAC’s  jurisdiction,  
•   any  legislative  measures  required  to  provide  the  ICAC  with  the  appropriate  powers  to  
prevent,   investigate   and   expose   serious   corrupt   conduct   and/or   systemic   corrupt  
conduct  involving,  or  affecting,  public  authorities  and/or  public  officials,  and  
•   whether  any   limits  or  enhancements,  substantive  or  procedural,  should  be  applied   to  
the  exercise  of  the  ICAC’s  powers,  
taking  into  account:  
1.   the   jurisdiction,   responsibilities   and   roles   of   other   public   authorities   and/or   public  
officials   in   the   prevention,   detection,   investigation,   determination,   exposure   and  
prosecution  of  corrupt  conduct,  and  
2.   any  report  of  the  Inspector  of  the  ICAC  completed  and  available  during  the  course  of  
this  inquiry  which  includes  consideration  of:  
(a)   the  conduct  of  past  and  current  investigations  of  the  ICAC,  
(b)   whether   the   ICAC’s  powers,   and   its   exercise  of   its   powers,   are   consistent  with  
principles  of  justice  and  fairness,  
(c)   the  extent   to  which   ICAC  investigations  give  rise   to  prosecution  and  conviction,  
and  
(d)   whether   any   limits   or   enhancements,   substantive   or   procedural,   should   be  
applied  to  the  exercise  of  the  ICAC’s  powers.  
The  Panel  may  conduct  targeted  consultation  at  its  discretion  to  inform  its  inquiry.  





























































Scope  of  jurisdiction  
The   Independent   Commission   Against   Corruption   Act   1988   (“the   Act”)   established   a  
Commission   (“the   ICAC”)   upon   which   it   conferred   extraordinary   powers   to   investigate,  
expose  and   prevent   corruption.   The   powers   of   investigation,  which  may  override   common  
law  rights  and  privileges  extensively,  include  the  holding  of  public  inquiries,  and  the  making  
of   findings   including   findings  of  corrupt  conduct.  Of  central   importance   to   the  scope  of   the  
ICAC’s   jurisdiction   is   the   Act’s   definition   (by   way   of   description   of   the   general   nature)   of  
corrupt  conduct.  
The  Act  does  not  set  out  to  deal  with  corruption  generally.  It  does  not  deal  with  corruption  in  
private   enterprise,   or   educational   institutions,   or   industrial   organisations,   or   charities,   or  
personal  behaviour  unless   it   falls  within   the   topic  which   is   the   focus  of   the  Act’s  attention.  
That   topic   is  public  administration  and  corruption  connected  with  public  administration.  The  
justification   that   was   advanced   for   the   creation   of   the   ICAC   and   the   conferral   of   its  
extraordinary   powers   was   that   it   was   necessary   to   restore   and  maintain   the   integrity   and  
reputation  of  public  administration  in  this  State.    
Insofar  as  the  Act’s  definition  of  corrupt  conduct  applies  to  the  conduct  of  public  officials,  or  
the   conduct   of   private   citizens   who   procure,   or   attempt   to   procure,   misconduct   by   public  
officials,   its   practical   operation   has   been   reasonably   predictable.   There   was,   however,  
unpredictability   in   that   part   of   the   definition   concerning   conduct   (including   the   conduct   of  
private  citizens)  which   “adversely  affects”   the  exercise  of  official   functions.  The  use  of   that  
expression  in  section  8(2)  of  the  Act  created  uncertainty.  If  given  its  widest  literal  meaning  it  
extended  far  beyond  the  ordinary  understanding  of  the  concept  of  corruption.  
In   the   case   of   Independent   Commission   Against   Corruption   v   Cunneen1   (“Cunneen”),  
decided  on  15  April  2015,  the  High  Court  of  Australia  interpreted  section  8(2)  as  referring  to  
adverse  effects  on  the  probity  of  the  exercise  of  official  functions.  
This   produces   a   coherent   statutory   policy,   resting   on   a   widely   accepted   understanding   of  
corruption,   and  a   jurisdictional   foundation   that  would   support   almost  all   (but   not   all)   of   the  
investigations  that  the  ICAC  has  undertaken  in  the  past.  However,  the  Panel  accepts  that  it  
leaves  beyond  the  scope  of  corrupt  conduct  some  matters  which  should  be  covered.  
The  Panel  does  not   recommend  dealing  with   the  problem  by   legislating   to  give   “adversely  
affects”  its  widest  literal  meaning  (the  efficacy  approach).  This  produces  consequences  that  
are  artificial  and  inappropriate.  Section  8(2)  has  now  been  interpreted  authoritatively  and  the  
uncertainty  of   the  expression   “adversely  affects”  has  been   resolved.  That  provision  should  
be  left  unamended  and  without  further  elaboration.  
The  Panel  recommends  adding  to  section  8  a  new  subsection  which  deals  with  conduct,  not  
in,  but  connected  with,  public  administration  by  reference  to  the  rationale  for  making  public  
administration   the   focus   of   the   Act’s   attention:   the   need   to   preserve   and   maintain   the  
integrity   and   reputation   of   public   administration.   Certain   kinds   of   fraudulent   conduct,   not  




































































treated   as   corrupt   conduct   where   they   impair   or   could   impair   confidence   in   public  
administration.  
The  Panel  also  recommends  that  the  jurisdictional  basis  for  the  ICAC’s  advisory,  educational  
and  prevention   functions  should  be  widened  so  as   to   free   them  from  the  constraints  which  
(properly)  accompany  the  functions  of  investigating  and  making  findings  of  corrupt  conduct.  
Electoral   and   lobbying   laws   raise   a   particular   question.   Some   breaches   of   those   laws,  
including   some   very   serious   examples   of   conduct   that   would   ordinarily   be   regarded   as  
corrupt,  are  not  within  the  definition  of  corrupt  conduct,  either  as  it  presently  stands,  or  as  it  
would  have  stood  on  the  interpretation  advanced  by  the  ICAC  in  Cunneen,  or  as  it  will  stand  
if  the  Panel’s  recommendation  as  to  a  new  subsection  in  section  8  is  adopted.  This  is  for  the  
reason   identified   above.   The  Act   does   not   address,   and   has   never   attempted   to   address,  
corruption  unconnected  with  public  administration.  Other  breaches  of  those  laws  could  easily  
involve   conduct   which   no-­one   could   regard   as   corrupt.   Some   conduct   could   constitute   a  
breach  of  one  or  other  of   the   laws  and  could  also   fall  within   the  Act’s  definition  of   corrupt  
conduct.   It   would   be   open   to   Parliament   to   take   the   view   that   the   ICAC   should   have   the  
jurisdiction   to   investigate   all   conduct   involving   possible   breaches   of   the   electoral   and  
lobbying   laws,   whether   or   not   they   constitute   corrupt   conduct,   but   that   the   definition   of  
corrupt  conduct  should  not  be  expanded  in  consequence.  The  result  would  be  that  findings  
of   fact   and   recommendations   for   prosecution   could   be   made,   but   any   findings   of   corrupt  
conduct  would  have  to  be  based  on  the  definition  in  sections  7,  8  and  9  of  the  Act.  
Powers  and  procedures  
The  question  whether  provision  should  be  made   in   the  Act,  or   in  other   legislation,  such  as  
the  Supreme  Court  Act   1970,   for   general  merits   review  of   findings  of   corrupt   conduct   has  
been   examined   by   the   Panel.   The   Panel   does   not   recommend   this   course,   which   would  
involve  an  inappropriate  confusion  of  administrative  and  judicial  powers.  
The   Panel   has   considered   whether   the   ICAC’s   power   to   hold   public   inquiries   should   be  
removed,  or  limited.  For  reasons  given  in  Chapter  9,  it  does  not  recommend  that  course.  
The  Panel  has  also  considered  whether  there  should  be  formal  oversight  or   internal  review  
of   decisions   to   hold   public   inquiries   or   decisions   as   to   what   witnesses   to   call   at   public  
inquiries.  It  does  not  recommend  that  course.  
The  Panel  recommends  that  the  power  to  make  findings  of  corrupt  conduct  should  exist  only  
in  cases  of  serious  corrupt  conduct.  It  has  proposed  a  legislative  amendment  to  give  effect  to  
this  recommendation.  
The  Panel   has   considered   the   issue  of   the   proportion   of   corrupt   conduct   findings   that   are  
ultimately  reflected  in  criminal  convictions.  It   is  relatively  low  and  underlines  the  differences  
between  an   investigative  process  and   the  administration  of  criminal   justice.  The  Panel  has  
also  considered   the   time   involved   in   commencement  of   prosecutions.  The  Panel  does  not  






The  Panel  recommends  the  following  amendments  to  the  Act:  
Recommendation  1:  Section  8  
The  Panel   recommends   that   the  Act  be  amended   to   include  within   the  definition  of  corrupt  
conduct   in  section  8  conduct  of  any  person  (whether  or  not  a  public  official)  that   impairs  or  
could   impair   public   confidence   in  public   administration  and  which   could   involve  any  of   the  
following  matters:  
(a)   collusive  tendering;;  
(b)   fraud   in   or   in   relation   to   applications   for   licences,   permits   or   clearances   under  
statutes   designed   to   protect   health   and   safety   or   designed   to   facilitate   the  
management  and  commercial  exploitation  of  resources;;  
(c)   dishonestly   obtaining   or   assisting   or   benefiting   from   the   payment   or   application   of  
public  funds  or  the  disposition  of  public  assets  for  private  advantage;;  
(d)   defrauding  the  revenue;;  
(e)   fraudulently  obtaining  or  retaining  employment  as  a  public  official.  
This  could  be  done  by  inserting  a  new  subsection  in  section  8  (perhaps  subsection  (2A))  and  
would  necessitate  a  consequential  amendment  to  section  7(2).  
If   section   8   is   amended   in   the   manner   recommended,   subsection   (3)   will   give   the  
amendment  application  to  conduct  that  occurred  previously,  so  long  as  the  words  “or,  in  the  
case   of   conduct   falling   within   [the   proposed   new   subsection]   the   commencement   of   that  
subsection”  are  added  after  “this  subsection”.  The  Panel  recommends  that  addition.  
The  Panel  also  recommends  that  the  words  “or  expanding”  be  added  to  section  8(6)  after  the  
word  “limiting”.  
Recommendation  2:  Section  13  
The  Panel  recommends  that  section  13(1)  be  amended  to  add  to  each  of  paragraphs  (e)  to  
(j)  a  reference  to  promoting  the  integrity  and  good  repute  of  future  administration.  
Recommendation  3:  Section  13  
If  Parliament  is  of  the  view  that  breaches  of  the  Parliamentary  Electorates  and  Elections  Act  
1912,   the   Election   Funding,   Expenditure   and   Disclosures   Act   1981   or   the   Lobbying   of  
Government  Officials  Act   2011   should   be  made   the   subject   of   the   ICAC’s   jurisdiction,   the  
Panel   recommends   that   this   be   done   by   inserting   a   subsection   in   section   13(1)   to   the  
following  effect:  
(ba)     to   investigate   any   allegation   or   complaint   that,   or   any   circumstances   which   in   the  
Commission’s  opinion  imply  that  there  has  been  a  breach  of  the  Parliamentary  Electorates  
and  Elections  Act  1912,   the  Election  Funding,  Expenditure  and  Disclosures  Act  1981   or  
the  Lobbying  of  Government  Officials  Act  2011.  





Recommendation  4:  Section  74B  
The  Panel  recommends  that  the  Act  be  amended  so  that  the  Commission’s  power  to  make  
findings   of   corrupt   conduct  may  be  exercised  only   in   the   case  of   serious   corrupt   conduct.  
This  could  be  achieved  by  the  insertion  of  a  new  section  74B(1A)  to  that  effect.  (A  number  of  
other  corresponding  amendments  would  need  to  be  made  to  section  74B  to  conform  to  the  





Chapter  1  –  Introduction  
1.1   Constitution  of  the  ICAC  
1.1.1   The   Independent   Commission   Against   Corruption   was   established   by   the  
Independent   Commission   Against   Corruption   Act   1988.   Its   creation   had   been   an  
election  undertaking  of   the   incoming  coalition  government,  although   the   legislation  
received  broad  cross-­party  support  when  introduced.  
1.1.2   In  the  Second  Reading  Speech  for  the  Independent  Commission  Against  Corruption  
Bill  1988,  the  then  Premier,  the  Hon.  Nick  Greiner,  said:2  
Let  me  make   it   absolutely   clear   that   this   initiative   is   a   component   of   the  Government’s  
program  to  restore  the  integrity  of  public  administration  and  public  institutions  in  this  State.  
Nothing   is   more   destructive   of   democracy   than   a   situation   where   the   people   lack  
confidence  in  those  administrators  and  institutions  that  stand  in  a  position  of  public  trust.  If  
a   liberal   and   democratic   society   is   to   flourish   we   need   to   ensure   that   the   credibility   of  
public   institutions   is   restored   and   safeguarded,   and   that   community   confidence   in   the  
integrity  of  public  administration  is  preserved  and  justified.  
1.1.3   The  Act  commenced  on  13  March  1989.  On  that  date  the  ICAC  came  into  existence  
and   Mr   Ian   Temby   AO   QC’s   appointment   as   the   first   Commissioner   took   effect.  
Since  then,  there  have  been  five  Commissioners,   the  Hon.  Barry  O’Keefe  AM  QC,  
Ms  Irene  Moss  AO,  the  Hon.  Jerrold  Cripps  QC,  the  Hon.  David  Ipp  AO  QC  and  the  
Hon.  Megan  Latham,  the  current  Commissioner.  
1.1.4   The  Act  has  been  amended  on  many  occasions  since  its  commencement,  generally  
for   minor   or   consequential   purposes.   Some   of   the   more   significant   amendments  
have  been  in  relation  to:  
•   the  ICAC’s  powers  to  make  and  report  findings  (1990);;3  
•   the  ICAC’s  discretion  to  determine  whether  to  conduct  a  hearing  in  public  or  in  
private  (1991);;4  
•   the   ICAC’s   jurisdiction   in   relation   to   Ministers   and   Members   of   Parliament,  
specifically  where  there  has  been  a  substantial  breach  of  an  applicable  Code  
of  Conduct  (1994);;5  
•   the  Principal  Objects  of  the  Act,  the  ICAC’s  intended  focus  on  serious  corrupt  
conduct  and  systemic  corrupt  conduct,  the  creation  of  the  office  of  Inspector  of  
the  ICAC  and  other  significant  amendments  enacted  in  response  to  the  2005  
report   on   the   independent   review   of   the   Act,   which   was   undertaken   by   Mr  
Bruce  McClintock  SC  (“2005  Report”)6  (2005).7  
1.1.5   Parliamentary   oversight   of   the   ICAC   is   provided   by   the   Parliamentary   Joint  































































2     New  South  Wales,  Parliamentary  Debates,  Legislative  Assembly,  26  May  1988,  673  (Nick  Greiner,  Premier).  
3     Independent  Commission  Against  Corruption  (Amendment)  Act  1990.  A  consequence  of  the  High  Court’s  decision  in  Balog  
v  Independent  Commission  Against  Corruption  (1990)  169  CLR  625.  
4     Independent  Commission  Against  Corruption  (Amendment)  Act  1991.  
5     Independent  Commission  Against  Corruption  (Amendment)  Act  1994.  
6     Bruce  McClintock,   Independent  review  of   the   Independent  Commission  Against  Corruption  Act  1988,  Final  Report   (2005)  
(“2005  Report”).  





Part  7  of  the  Act.  The  Committee’s  functions  are  set  out  in  section  64  of  the  Act  and  
include  monitoring  and  review  of  the  exercise  by  the  ICAC  and  the  Inspector  of  their  
respective  functions.  In  addition,  section  64A  gives  the  Committee  power  to  veto  the  
proposed  appointment  of  a  person  as  Commissioner  or  Inspector.  
1.1.6   While   the   ICAC’s   operations   have   been   subject   of   review   by   the   Parliamentary  
Committee,  the  2005  Review,  which  resulted  in  the  2005  Report  referred  to  above,  
has  been  the  only  independent  review  of  the  Act  and  its  operation  since  1988.  The  
following  recommendations  made  in  the  2005  Report  are  relevant  to  this  Review:8  
RECOMMENDATIONS  
CH  2  –  TERMS  OF  THE  ACT  
Objectives  and  principles  
R2.1   That  the  Act  be  amended  to  specify  that  the  objectives  of  the  Act  are:  
•   To   promote   the   integrity   and   accountability   of   public   administration   by  
establishing  ICAC  as  an  independent  and  accountable  body:  
°   to   investigate,   expose   and   prevent   corruption   involving   or   affecting  
public  authorities  and  public  officials;;  and    
°   to   educate   public   authorities,   public   officials   and   members   of   the  
public   about   corruption   and   its   detrimental   effects   on   public  
administration  and  upon  our  community.  
•   To  confer  on  ICAC  special  powers  to  inquire  into  allegations  of  corruption.  
R2.2   That  the  Act  be  amended  to  provide  that,  in  exercising  its  functions,  ICAC  is  to:  
•   direct  its  attention,  so  far  as  practicable,  towards  corruption  that  is  serious  or  
systemic;;  and  
•   have   regard   to   the   responsibility   that   public   authorities   and   public   officials  
have,   with   the   assistance   of   ICAC,   to   prevent   and   deal   effectively   with  
corruption.  
CH  3  –  FUNCTIONS    
Corruption  prevention  
R3.1   That  section  16(2)  of   the  Act  be  amended   to  add   the  Ombudsman   to   the   list  of  
persons  and  organisations  that   ICAC  is  required  to  co-­operate  with   in  exercising  
its  corruption  prevention  and  education  functions.  
Criminal  prosecutions  
R3.2   That,   consistent   with   the   current   practice   adopted   by   ICAC   and   the   Director   of  
Public  Prosecutions   (DPP),   the  Act  be  amended   to  provide  expressly   that   ICAC  
may,   after   considering   the   advice   of   the   DPP,   institute   criminal   proceedings  
arising  from  its  investigations.  
R3.3   That   section   74A   of   the   Act   be   amended   to   change   the   statement   about  
prosecution   that   ICAC   is   required   to   include   in   a   report   under   section   74   from  
‘whether   or   not   in   all   the   circumstances,   it   is   of   the   opinion   that   consideration  
should  be  given  to  prosecution’  to  ‘whether  or  not  in  all  the  circumstances  it  is  of  
the  opinion  that  the  advice  of  the  DPP  should  be  sought’.  
R3.4   That   if   administrative  measures   do   not   prove   effective   in   reducing   delay   in   the  




































































commence   criminal   proceedings   without   first   seeking   the   advice   of   the   DPP,  
where   ICAC   is   satisfied   that   there   are   reasonable   prospects   of   conviction   of   a  
person   for  offences  under   its  own  Act  or  under  Part  4A  of   the  Crimes  Act  1900  
(corruptly   receiving   commissions   and   other   corrupt   practices).   Parliament  might  
well   regard   twelve   months   as   an   appropriate   period   for   ICAC   and   the   DPP   to  
address  and  resolve  the  issues  in  question.  
CH  4  –  CORRUPT  CONDUCT  
Definition  of  corrupt  conduct  
R4.1   That,  subject  to  recommendation  R4.2  below,  no  substantial  amendments  to  the  
definition  of  corrupt  conduct  in  sections  7-­9  of  the  Act  be  made,  except  to  redraft  
the  provisions   to  more  clearly  distinguish  between  corruption  by  public  officials  
and  corruption  that  adversely  affects  the  performance  of  public  official  functions,  
without  involving  official  wrongdoing.  
R4.2   That   consideration   be   given   to   amending   section   9   so   as   to   clarify   the  
circumstances  in  which  the  definition  of  corrupt  conduct  applies  to  Ministers  and  
Members  of  Parliament  and  in  which  findings  of  corrupt  conduct  may  be  made,  
and,  if  sub-­sections  9(4)  and  (5)  are  not  repealed,  sub-­section  9(5)  be  amended  
to   clarify   the   meaning   of   the   words   ‘a   law’   by   limiting   it   to   criminal   law   and  
statutory  law.  
Findings  of  corruption  
R4.3   That  the  power  of  ICAC  to  make  findings  of  corrupt  conduct  be  retained,  but  the  
Act  amended  to  clarify  that:  
(a)   ICAC  may  only  make   findings  of   corrupt   conduct  where   satisfied  of   the  
existence  of  conduct  which  had  adversely  affected,  or  would  (if  engaged  
in)   adversely   affect   official   functions   or,   similarly,   was   or   would   be   a  
criminal   offence,   disciplinary   offence,   reasonable   grounds   for   dismissal,  
or  a  substantial  breach  of  an  applicable  code  of  conduct  and  
(b)   ICAC   has   a   discretion   to   decline   to   make   a   finding   of   corrupt   conduct  
even  where  the  relevant  conduct  technically  amounts  to  corruption.  
1.1.7   Parliament   implemented   recommendations   2.1,   2.2,   3.1,   3.3   and   4.3   but   not   3.2,  
3.4,   4.1   and   4.2.   The   amending   legislation   was   the   Independent   Commission  
Against  Corruption  Amendment  Act  2005.  
1.1.8   Each  of  the  recommendations  not  implemented  by  Parliament  involves  provisions  of  
the  Act  or  functions  of  the  ICAC  which  the  Panel’s  terms  of  reference  require  us  to  
consider.  
1.1.9   Of   those   recommendations,   the   most   significant   was   to   amend   section   8(2),   the  
provision  considered  by  the  High  Court  in  Cunneen.  The  2005  Report  dealt  with  that  
issue  in  the  following  way:  
4.3.2   Under   section   8(2),   corrupt   conduct   also   includes   conduct   of   any   person   that  
adversely  affects  (or  could  adversely  affect)  the  exercise  of  official  functions  by  
any   public   official   and   which   could   involve   bribery,   blackmail,   illegal   drug  
dealings   and   an   assortment   of   other   criminal   offences.   This   conduct   only  
amounts  to  corrupt  conduct  if  it  could  involve  any  of  the  matters  listed  in  section  
9  as  referred  to  above.  
4.3.3   Section  8(2)  corrupt  conduct  can  be  distinguished  from  section  8(1)  conduct  as  
it  requires  no  wrongdoing  on  behalf  of  the  public  official.  The  conduct  is  corrupt  
because  of  its  potential  to  adversely  affect  official  functions,  not  because  of  any  





fraudulent  action  by  person  A  that  caused  a  public  official  to  unknowingly  hand  
over   money   to   which   person   A   was   not   entitled.   This   amounts   to   corruption  
because   it   undermines   the   integrity   of   public   administration   by   the   wrongful  
payment  of  public  monies.  
4.3.4   There   are   two   problems   with   this   aspect   of   the   definition.   It   is   a   different  
category  of  corruption  as  it  requires  no  wrongdoing  on  behalf  of  a  public  official.  
Further,   it   is   circular   and   otiose   to   apply   section   9   to   section   8(2)   corrupt  
conduct,  given  the  lengthy  list  of  criminal  conduct  included  in  the  latter  section.  
4.3.5   For   these   reasons,   consideration   should   be   given   to   re-­drafting   section   8   to  
distinguish   more   clearly   between   corrupt   conduct   by   public   officials   and  
corruption  of  public  administration,  the  latter  being  conduct  that  does  not  require  
any   wrongdoing   on   the   part   of   a   public   official.   This   could   be   achieved   by  
section   8(2)   corruption   being   classified   as   indirect   corruption,   placed   in   a  
separate   section,   and   no   longer   being   subject   to   the   operation   of   section   9.  
Alternatively,  it  could  be  placed  in  a  separate  section,  the  list  of  items  of  criminal  
conduct  deleted  but  remain  subject  to  section  9.  
1.1.10   Lying  behind  those  words  was  a  concern  that  in  its  original  form  section  8(2)  of  the  
Act  was  imprecise  and  required  clarification.    
1.2     Functions  and  powers  of  the  ICAC  
1.2.1   The   ICAC   is   constituted   as   a   corporation   under   the   name   the   Independent  
Commission  Against  Corruption  by  section  4  of  the  Act.  
1.2.2   The   ICAC’s   functions   are   dealt   with   in   Part   4   of   the   Act.   Section   13   states   the  
principal  functions  of  the  ICAC.  Speaking  generally,  those  functions  are:  
•   to   investigate   any   allegation,   complaint   or   circumstance   that   in   the   ICAC’s  
opinion  may  imply  that  corrupt  conduct,  conduct  liable  to  allow,  encourage  or  
cause   the   occurrence   of   corrupt   conduct   or   conduct   connected  with   corrupt  
conduct  may  have  occurred,  be  occurring  or  be  about  to  occur;;9  
•   to  investigate  any  matter  referred  by  Parliament;;10  
•   to  communicate  to  appropriate  authorities  results  of  investigations;;11  
•   to   carry   out   a   range   of   educatory   and   advisory   activities   directed   towards  
reduction  and  elimination  of  corrupt  conduct.  
1.2.3   The  ICAC  has  wide  coercive  powers:  
•   to   obtain   by   notice   in   writing   information   from   a   public   authority   or   public  
official;;12  
•   to  require  any  person  to  produce  any  document  or  thing;;13  
•   to  enter  public  premises;;14  































































9     Independent  Commission  Against  Corruption  Act  1988  (“ICAC  Act”),  section  13(1)(a).  
10     Ibid  section  13(1)(b).  
11     Ibid  section  13(1)(c).  
12     Ibid  section  21.  
13     Ibid  section  22.  
14     Ibid  section  23.  





•   to  conduct  public  inquiries.16  
1.2.4   In   connection   with   compulsory   examinations   and   public   inquiries,   the   ICAC   has  
power   to   summon   any   person   to   give   evidence   and   to   produce   any   document   or  
thing.17  
1.2.5   Each  of  these  powers  is  supported  by  criminal  sanctions  for  non-­compliance.18  
1.3     Other  agencies  
1.3.1   The   terms   of   reference   require   the   Panel   to   take   into   account   “the   jurisdiction,  
responsibilities   and   roles   of   other   public   authorities   and/or   public   officials   in   the  
prevention,   detection,   investigation,   determination,   exposure   and   prosecution   of  
corrupt  conduct”.  
1.3.2   The  relevant  authorities  are:  
•   the  Crime  Commission;;  
•   the  Police  Integrity  Commission  (“PIC”);;  
•   the  New  South  Wales  Police;;  
•   the  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  (“DPP”).  
1.3.3   The  New  South  Wales  Crime  Commission  was  established  in  1986  and  is  presently  
regulated  by  the  Crime  Commission  Act  2012.  The  principal  objective  of  that  Act  is  
“to   reduce   the   incidence   of   organised   and   other   serious   crime”.19   Its   principal  
functions  include  investigation  of  relevant  criminal  activity  (that   is,  stated  generally,  
circumstances   implying   that   a   relevant   offence,   that   is,   one   punishable   by   life  
imprisonment  or  for  a  term  of  three  or  more  years,  may  have  been,  may  be  being,  or  
may   in   the   future   be,   committed)   and   serious   crime   concerns   referred   by   its  
Management  Committee,  the  assembly  and  referral  of  such  admissible  evidence  to  
the  appropriate  prosecution  authority  and  so  on.20  
1.3.4   While   the   Crime   Commission   may   hold   hearings   for   the   purposes   of   an  
investigation,   except   in   relation   to   sittings   involving   a   public   information   function,  
such  hearings  must  be  held  in  private.21  
1.3.5   The  PIC  was  established  in  1996  on  the  recommendation  of  the  Royal  Commission  
into  the  NSW  Police  Service,  commonly  known  as  the  Wood  Royal  Commission.  It  
is  governed  by  the  Police  Integrity  Commission  Act  1996.  
1.3.6   Its  principal  functions  are  to  detect,  investigate  and  prevent  police  misconduct  and,  
as   far   as   practicable,   it   is   required   to   turn   its   attention   to   serious   police  
misconduct.22   Its   functions   also   include   detection,   investigation   and   prevention   of  































































16     Ibid  section  31.  
17     Ibid  section  35.  
18     Ibid  Part  9.  
19     Crime  Commission  Act  2012,  section  3.  
20     Ibid  section  10(1).  
21       Ibid  Part  2,  Division  4  and  section  79.  
22     Police  Integrity  Commission  Act  1996  (“PIC  Act”),  section  13.  





1.3.7   The  office  of  the  DPP  was  created  by  the  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  Act  1986.  
The   Office   of   the   DPP   is   the   independent   prosecuting   authority   for   NSW.   Its  
principal  functions  are  to  institute  and  conduct,  on  behalf  of  the  Crown,  prosecutions  
for   indictable   offences   in   the  Supreme  Court   and  District  Court   and   conduct   (and  
institute  where   relevant)   appeals   in   relation   to   such  matters.24  The  DPP  may  also  
exercise   the  same  functions  as   the  Attorney  General   in   respect  of:   finding  a  bill  of  
indictment,  or  determining   that  no  bill  of   indictment  be   found,  where  a  person  has  
been   committed   for   trial;;   directing   that   no   further   proceedings   be   taken   against   a  
person  who  has  been  committed  for  trial  or  sentence;;  and  finding  a  bill  of  indictment  
in   respect   of   an   indictable  offence,   in   circumstances  where   the  person   concerned  
has  not  been  committed  for  trial.25  
1.3.8   While   charges   of   criminal   offences   arising   out   of   ICAC   investigations   are   formally  
commenced  by  an  ICAC  officer,  they  are  conducted  by  the  DPP.26  
1.4   Independent  Commission  Against  Corruption  v  Cunneen  [2015]  HCA  14  
1.4.1   Chapters  5  and  6  deal  with  the  issue  that  arose  in  this  case,  the  judicial  resolution  of  
that  issue,  and  its  effect  on  the  scope  of  the  ICAC’s  jurisdiction.  
1.5     Retrospective  legislation  –  Act  No  1  of  2015  
1.5.1   The  High  Court’s  decision   in  Cunneen  was  handed  down  on  15  April  2015.  On  20  
April  2015,  the  ICAC  released  a  public  statement  indicating  that  the  decision  would  
“substantially   damage   the   Commission's   ability   to   carry   out   its   corruption  
investigation  and  corruption  prevention  functions”.27  
1.5.2   In  response  to  Cunneen,  the  Government  introduced  the  Independent  Commission  
Against  Corruption  Amendment  (Validation)  Bill  2015  on  6  May  2015.  The  Bill  was  
passed  by  Parliament  and  received  assent  on  that  same  day.  
1.5.3   This   legislation   inserted   a   new   Part   13   into   Schedule   4   to   the   Act.   That   Part   is  
entitled  “Validation  relating  to  decision  on  15  April  2015  in  Independent  Commission  
Against  Corruption  v  Cunneen  [2015]  HCA  14”.  
1.5.4   Clause  35  of  that  new  Part  13  provides  that  anything  done  or  purported  to  be  done  
by   the   ICAC   before   15   April   2015   that   would   have   been   validly   done   if   corrupt  
conduct   included   “relevant  conduct”   (a  defined   term)   is   taken   to  have  been  validly  
done.  
1.5.5   “Relevant   conduct”   is   defined   to   mean   conduct   that   adversely   affects,   or   could  
adversely  affect,  the  efficacy  but  not  the  probity  of  the  exercise  of  official  functions.  
1.5.6   The   terms   of   reference   neither   require   nor   permit   the   Panel   to   deal   with   the  
amending  legislation.  
1.5.7   It  is  noted,  however,  that  the  validity  of  the  retrospective  validation  of  actions  of  the  































































24     Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  Act  1986,  section  7(1).  
25     Ibid  section  7(2).  
26     That  is  the  case  in  respect  of  offences  created  by  statute.  The  position  is  unclear  in  relation  to  common  law  crimes  such  as  
misconduct  in  public  office.  






25  May  2015,  Gageler   J   removed   into   the  High  Court   the   proceedings  which  give  
rise   to   that   challenge   and   they   are   listed   for   hearing   in   the   sittings   commencing  
4  August  2015.28  
1.6     The  Inspector’s  Report  
1.6.1   Chapter  11  deals  with  this  aspect  of  the  terms  of  reference.  
1.7     Scope  and  conduct  of  the  Review  
1.7.1   Following  the  passage  of  the  validation  legislation,  the  Government  also  established  
an   Independent  Panel  with   responsibility   for   reviewing   the   jurisdiction  of   the   ICAC  
(“Panel”).  The  Panel  was  appointed  on  27  May  2015  under  Letters  Patent  issued  by  
the  Governor  and  comprises   the  Hon.  Murray  Gleeson  AC  as  Chair  and  Mr  Bruce  
McClintock  SC.    
1.7.2   The  Panel’s   terms  of   reference,   extracted   at   the   beginning   of   this  Report,   require  
the  Panel  to  report  to  the  Governor  on  or  before  31  July  2015.  
1.7.3   As  required  by  its  terms  of  reference,  the  Panel  has  been  concerned  in  conducting  
this  review  with:  
•   the  appropriate  scope  for  the  ICAC’s  jurisdiction,    
•   any   legislative   measures   required   to   provide   the   ICAC   with   the   appropriate  
powers   to   prevent,   investigate   and   expose   serious   corrupt   conduct   and/or  
systemic   corrupt   conduct   involving,   or   affecting,   public   authorities   and/or  
public  officials,  and  
•   whether   any   limits   or   enhancements,   substantive   or   procedural,   should   be  
applied  to  the  exercise  of  the  ICAC’s  powers,  
taking  into  account  those  matters  specified  in  the  terms  of  reference.  
1.7.4   In   accordance   with   the   terms   of   reference,   the   Panel   has   conducted   targeted  
consultation.  Appendix  A   to   this  Report   contains  a   list  of   submissions   received  by  




































































Chapter   2   –   Statutory   Provisions   as   to  
the  ICAC’s  Jurisdiction  
2.1   Principal  objects  of  the  Act  
2.1.1     Section  2A  of  the  Act  provides:  
2A  Principal  objects  of  Act    
The  principal  objects  of  this  Act  are:    
(a)     to   promote   the   integrity   and   accountability   of   public   administration   by   constituting  
an   Independent   Commission   Against   Corruption   as   an   independent   and  
accountable  body:    
(i)     to   investigate,   expose   and   prevent   corruption   involving   or   affecting   public  
authorities  and  public  officials,  and    
(ii)     to  educate  public  authorities,  public  officials  and  members  of  the  public  about  
corruption   and   its   detrimental   effects   on   public   administration   and   on   the  
community,  and    
(b)     to   confer   on   the   Commission   special   powers   to   inquire   into   allegations   of  
corruption.  
2.2   Principal  functions  of  the  ICAC  
2.2.1   Section  13  of  the  Act  provides:  
13     Principal  functions    
(1)     The  principal  functions  of  the  Commission  are  as  follows:    
(a)     to  investigate  any  allegation  or  complaint  that,  or  any  circumstances  which  in  
the  Commission’s  opinion  imply  that:    
(i)     corrupt  conduct,  or    
(ii)     conduct  liable  to  allow,  encourage  or  cause  the  occurrence  of  corrupt  
conduct,  or    
(iii)     conduct  connected  with  corrupt  conduct,    
may  have  occurred,  may  be  occurring  or  may  be  about  to  occur,    
(b)     to   investigate   any   matter   referred   to   the   Commission   by   both   Houses   of  
Parliament,    
(c)     to  communicate  to  appropriate  authorities  the  results  of  its  investigations,    
(d)     to  examine  the   laws  governing,  and  the  practices  and  procedures  of,  public  
authorities   and  public   officials,   in   order   to   facilitate   the  discovery  of   corrupt  
conduct  and  to  secure  the  revision  of  methods  of  work  or  procedures  which,  
in  the  opinion  of  the  Commission,  may  be  conducive  to  corrupt  conduct,    
(e)     to   instruct,   advise   and   assist   any   public   authority,   public   official   or   other  
person  (on  the  request  of   the  authority,  official  or  person)  on  ways   in  which  
corrupt  conduct  may  be  eliminated,    
(f)     to   advise   public   authorities   or   public   officials   of   changes   in   practices   or  





Commission   thinks  necessary   to   reduce   the   likelihood  of   the  occurrence  of  
corrupt  conduct,    
(g)     to   co-­operate   with   public   authorities   and   public   officials   in   reviewing   laws,  
practices   and   procedures   with   a   view   to   reducing   the   likelihood   of   the  
occurrence  of  corrupt  conduct,    
(h)   to  educate  and  advise  public  authorities,  public  officials  and   the  community  
on  strategies  to  combat  corrupt  conduct,    
(i)     to   educate   and   disseminate   information   to   the   public   on   the   detrimental  
effects  of  corrupt  conduct  and  on  the  importance  of  maintaining  the  integrity  
of  public  administration,    
(j)     to  enlist  and  foster  public  support  in  combating  corrupt  conduct,    
(k)     to  develop,  arrange,  supervise,  participate  in  or  conduct  such  educational  or  
advisory   programs   as   may   be   described   in   a   reference   made   to   the  
Commission  by  both  Houses  of  Parliament.    
(1A)     Subsection  (1)  (d)  and  (f)-­(h)  do  not  extend  to  the  conduct  of  police  officers,  Crime  
Commission   officers   or   administrative   officers   within   the   meaning   of   the   Police  
Integrity  Commission  Act  1996  .    
(2)     The  Commission  is  to  conduct  its  investigations  with  a  view  to  determining:    
(a)     whether  any  corrupt  conduct,  or  any  other  conduct  referred  to  in  subsection  
(1)  (a),  has  occurred,  is  occurring  or  is  about  to  occur,  and    
(b)     whether  any  laws  governing  any  public  authority  or  public  official  need  to  be  
changed   for   the   purpose   of   reducing   the   likelihood   of   the   occurrence   of  
corrupt  conduct,  and    
(c)     whether  any  methods  of  work,  practices  or  procedures  of  any  public  authority  
or   public   official   did   or   could   allow,   encourage   or   cause   the   occurrence   of  
corrupt  conduct.    
(2A)     Subsection  (2)  (a)  does  not  require  the  Commission  to  make  a  finding,  on  the  basis  
of   any   investigation,   that   corrupt   conduct,   or   other   conduct,   has   occurred,   is  
occurring  or  is  about  to  occur.    
(3)     The  principal  functions  of  the  Commission  also  include:    
(a)     the  power  to  make  findings  and  form  opinions,  on  the  basis  of  the  results  of  
its   investigations,   in   respect   of   any   conduct,   circumstances   or   events   with  
which   its   investigations   are   concerned,   whether   or   not   the   findings   or  
opinions  relate  to  corrupt  conduct,  and    
(b)     the   power   to   formulate   recommendations   for   the   taking   of   action   that   the  
Commission  considers  should  be  taken  in  relation  to   its  findings  or  opinions  
or  the  results  of  its  investigations.    
(3A)     The  Commission  may  make  a  finding  that  a  person  has  engaged  or  is  engaging  in  
corrupt  conduct  of  a  kind  described  in  paragraph  (a),  (b),  (c)  or  (d)  of  section  9  (1)  
only   if   satisfied   that   a   person   has   engaged   in   or   is   engaging   in   conduct   that  
constitutes  or  involves  an  offence  or  thing  of  the  kind  described  in  that  paragraph.    
(4)     The   Commission   is   not   to   make   a   finding,   form   an   opinion   or   formulate   a  
recommendation  which   section   74B   (Report   not   to   include   findings   etc   of   guilt   or  
recommending  prosecution)  prevents  the  Commission  from  including  in  a  report,  but  
section  9   (5)  and   this   section  are   the  only   restrictions   imposed  by   this  Act  on   the  





(5)     The   following   are   examples   of   the   findings   and   opinions   permissible   under  
subsection  (3)  but  do  not   limit   the  Commission’s  power  to  make  findings  and  form  
opinions:    
(a)     findings  that  particular  persons  have  engaged,  are  engaged  or  are  about   to  
engage  in  corrupt  conduct,    
(b)   opinions  as  to:    
(i)     whether   the   advice   of   the  Director   of   Public   Prosecutions   should   be  
sought   in   relation   to   the   commencement   of   proceedings   against  
particular  persons  for  criminal  offences  against  laws  of  the  State,  or    
(ii)     whether  consideration  should  or  should  not  be  given   to   the   taking  of  
other  action  against  particular  persons,    
(c)     findings  of  fact.  
2.3   Investigations  
2.3.1   Section   20   of   the  Act   empowers   the   ICAC   to   conduct   an   investigation   on   its   own  
initiative,  on  a  complaint  made  to  it,  on  a  report  made  to  it  or  on  a  reference  made  to  
it.  
2.3.2   An  investigation  may  be  in  the  nature  of  a  preliminary  investigation.  
2.3.3   The   Act   gives   the   ICAC   extensive   investigative   powers   including   power   to   obtain  
information,  obtain  documents,  and  enter  public  premises.  
2.4   Compulsory  examinations  and  public  inquiries  
2.4.1   Section   30   empowers   the   ICAC,   for   the   purposes   of   an   investigation,   to   conduct  
compulsory  examinations  in  private.  
2.4.2   Section   31   empowers   the   ICAC,   for   the   purposes   of   an   investigation,   to   conduct  
public  inquiries.  
2.4.3   Section  31(2)  provides:  
31     Public  inquiries    
(2)     Without   limiting  the  factors  that   it  may  take   into  account   in  determining  whether  or  
not   it   is   in   the   public   interest   to   conduct   a   public   inquiry,   the   Commission   is   to  
consider  the  following:    
(a)     the  benefit  of  exposing  to  the  public,  and  making  it  aware,  of  corrupt  conduct,    
(b)     the  seriousness  of  the  allegation  or  complaint  being  investigated,    
(c)     any  risk  of  undue  prejudice  to  a  person’s  reputation  (including  prejudice  that  
might  arise  from  not  holding  an  inquiry),    
(d)     whether  the  public  interest  in  exposing  the  matter  is  outweighed  by  the  public  
interest  in  preserving  the  privacy  of  the  persons  concerned.  
2.4.4   The  Act  gives  the  ICAC  extensive  powers  for  the  purposes  of  public  inquiries.  
2.5   Reports  
2.5.1   Section   74   of   the   Act   empowers   the   ICAC   to   prepare   reports   in   relation   to   any  
matter  the  subject  of  an  investigation.  Such  reports  must  be  prepared  in  relation  to  





the   ICAC   has   conducted   a   public   inquiry,   subject   to   a   presently   immaterial  
qualification.  
2.6   Complaints  
2.6.1   Section  10  of  the  Act  provides  that  any  person  may  make  a  complaint  to  the  ICAC  
about  a  matter  that  concerns  or  may  concern  corrupt  conduct  and  the  ICAC  may  (or  
may  not)  investigate  such  a  complaint.  
2.6.2   Section  74A  authorises  the  ICAC  to  include  in  a  report  a  statement  as  to  any  of  its  
findings,  opinions  and  recommendations  and  a  statement  of  its  reasons.  
2.6.3   Sections  74A  and  74B  expressly  recognise  that  a  report  may  include  a  finding  that  a  
person  has  engaged  in  corrupt  conduct.    
2.7   Definition  of  corrupt  conduct  
2.7.1   The   concept   of   corrupt   conduct   is   central   to   the   Act’s   specification   of   the   ICAC’s  
functions  and  powers.  
2.7.2     Sections  7,  8  and  9  of  the  Act  provide:  
7     Corrupt  conduct    
(1)     For   the  purposes  of   this  Act,  corrupt  conduct   is  any  conduct  which   falls  within   the  
description  of  corrupt  conduct  in  either  or  both  of  subsections  (1)  and  (2)  of  section  
8,  but  which  is  not  excluded  by  section  9.    
(2)     Conduct   comprising  a  conspiracy  or  attempt   to   commit  or  engage   in   conduct   that  
would   be   corrupt   conduct   under   section   8   (1)   or   (2)   shall   itself   be   regarded   as  
corrupt  conduct  under  section  8  (1)  or  (2).    
(3)     Conduct   comprising   such  a   conspiracy  or   attempt   is   not   excluded  by   section  9   if,  
had  the  conspiracy  or  attempt  been  brought  to  fruition  in  further  conduct,  the  further  
conduct  could  constitute  or  involve  an  offence  or  grounds  referred  to  in  that  section.  
8     General  nature  of  corrupt  conduct    
(1)     Corrupt  conduct  is:    
(a)     any   conduct   of   any   person   (whether   or   not   a   public   official)   that   adversely  
affects,  or  that  could  adversely  affect,  either  directly  or  indirectly,  the  honest  
or   impartial  exercise  of  official   functions  by  any  public  official,  any  group  or  
body  of  public  officials  or  any  public  authority,  or    
(b)     any  conduct  of  a  public  official   that  constitutes  or   involves   the  dishonest  or  
partial  exercise  of  any  of  his  or  her  official  functions,  or    
(c)   any   conduct   of   a   public   official   or   former   public   official   that   constitutes   or  
involves  a  breach  of  public  trust,  or    
(d)     any   conduct   of   a   public   official   or   former   public   official   that   involves   the  
misuse  of  information  or  material  that  he  or  she  has  acquired  in  the  course  of  
his   or   her   official   functions,  whether   or   not   for   his   or   her   benefit   or   for   the  
benefit  of  any  other  person.    
(2)     Corrupt  conduct  is  also  any  conduct  of  any  person  (whether  or  not  a  public  official)  
that  adversely  affects,  or  that  could  adversely  affect,  either  directly  or  indirectly,  the  
exercise   of   official   functions   by   any   public   official,   any   group   or   body   of   public  





(a)   official   misconduct   (including   breach   of   trust,   fraud   in   office,   nonfeasance,  
misfeasance,  malfeasance,  oppression,  extortion  or  imposition),    
(b)     bribery,    
(c)     blackmail,    
(d)     obtaining  or  offering  secret  commissions,    
(e)     fraud,    
(f)   theft,    
(g)     perverting  the  course  of  justice,    
(h)     embezzlement,    
(i)     election  bribery,    
(j)     election  funding  offences,    
(k)     election  fraud,    
(l)     treating,    
(m)     tax  evasion,    
(n)     revenue  evasion,    
(o)     currency  violations,    
(p)   illegal  drug  dealings,    
(q)     illegal  gambling,    
(r)     obtaining  financial  benefit  by  vice  engaged  in  by  others,    
(s)     bankruptcy  and  company  violations,    
(t)     harbouring  criminals,    
(u)     forgery,    
(v)     treason  or  other  offences  against  the  Sovereign,    
(w)     homicide  or  violence,    
(x)     matters  of  the  same  or  a  similar  nature  to  any  listed  above,    
(y)     any  conspiracy  or  attempt  in  relation  to  any  of  the  above.    
(3)     Conduct  may  amount  to  corrupt  conduct  under  this  section  even  though  it  occurred  
before  the  commencement  of   this  subsection,  and  it  does  not  matter  that  some  or  
all   of   the  effects  or  other   ingredients  necessary   to  establish  such   corrupt   conduct  
occurred  before  that  commencement  and  that  any  person  or  persons  involved  are  
no  longer  public  officials.    
(4)     Conduct   committed   by   or   in   relation   to   a   person   who   was   not   or   is   not   a   public  
official   may   amount   to   corrupt   conduct   under   this   section   with   respect   to   the  
exercise  of  his  or  her  official  functions  after  becoming  a  public  official.    
(5)     Conduct  may  amount  to  corrupt  conduct  under  this  section  even  though  it  occurred  
outside  the  State  or  outside  Australia,  and  matters  listed  in  subsection  (2)  refer  to:    
(a)     matters  arising  in  the  State  or  matters  arising  under  the  law  of  the  State,  or    
(b)     matters  arising  outside  the  State  or  outside  Australia  or  matters  arising  under  
the  law  of  the  Commonwealth  or  under  any  other  law.    
(6)     The  specific  mention  of  a  kind  of  conduct  in  a  provision  of  this  section  shall  not  be  





9     Limitation  on  nature  of  corrupt  conduct    
(1)     Despite   section   8,   conduct   does   not   amount   to   corrupt   conduct   unless   it   could  
constitute  or  involve:    
(a)     a  criminal  offence,  or    
(b)   a  disciplinary  offence,  or    
(c)     reasonable   grounds   for   dismissing,   dispensing   with   the   services   of   or  
otherwise  terminating  the  services  of  a  public  official,  or    
(d)     in  the  case  of  conduct  of  a  Minister  of  the  Crown  or  a  member  of  a  House  of  
Parliament-­a  substantial  breach  of  an  applicable  code  of  conduct.    
(2)     It  does  not  matter  that  proceedings  or  action  for  such  an  offence  can  no  longer  be  
brought   or   continued,   or   that   action   for   such   dismissal,   dispensing   or   other  
termination  can  no  longer  be  taken.    
(3)     For  the  purposes  of  this  section:    
applicable  code  of  conduct  means,  in  relation  to:    
(a)     a  Minister  of  the  Crown-­a  ministerial  code  of  conduct  prescribed  or  adopted  
for  the  purposes  of  this  section  by  the  regulations,  or    
(b)     a  member  of  the  Legislative  Council  or  of  the  Legislative  Assembly  (including  
a  Minister  of  the  Crown)-­a  code  of  conduct  adopted  for  the  purposes  of  this  
section  by  resolution  of  the  House  concerned.    
criminal  offence  means  a  criminal  offence  under  the  law  of  the  State  or  under  any  
other  law  relevant  to  the  conduct  in  question.  
disciplinary  offence  includes  any  misconduct,  irregularity,  neglect  of  duty,  breach  
of   discipline   or   other   matter   that   constitutes   or   may   constitute   grounds   for  
disciplinary  action  under  any  law.    
(4)     Subject   to   subsection   (5),   conduct   of   a  Minister   of   the   Crown   or   a  member   of   a  
House  of  Parliament  which  falls  within  the  description  of  corrupt  conduct  in  section  
8   is   not   excluded   by   this   section   if   it   is   conduct   that   would   cause   a   reasonable  
person   to   believe   that   it   would   bring   the   integrity   of   the   office   concerned   or   of  
Parliament  into  serious  disrepute.    
(5)     Without  otherwise  limiting  the  matters  that  it  can  under  section  74A  (1)  include  in  a  
report   under   section  74,   the  Commission   is  not  authorised   to   include  a   finding  or  
opinion  that  a  specified  person  has,  by  engaging  in  conduct  of  a  kind  referred  to  in  
subsection  (4),  engaged  in  corrupt  conduct,  unless  the  Commission  is  satisfied  that  
the  conduct  constitutes  a  breach  of  a  law  (apart  from  this  Act)  and  the  Commission  
identifies  that  law  in  the  report.    
(6)     A   reference   to   a   disciplinary   offence   in   this   section   and   sections   74A   and   74B  
includes  a  reference  to  a  substantial  breach  of  an  applicable  requirement  of  a  code  
of   conduct   required   to   be   complied   with   under   section   440   (5)   of   the   Local  
Government   Act   1993   ,   but   does   not   include   a   reference   to   any   other   breach   of  
such  a  requirement.  
2.8   Some  features  of  the  jurisdictional  provisions  
2.8.1   The   power   to   investigate,   by   virtue   of   section   13,   is   based   upon   an   allegation   or  
complaint  or  opinion   that  corrupt  conduct,  or  conduct   liable   to  allow,  encourage  or  
cause   corrupt   conduct,   or   conduct   connected   with   corrupt   conduct,   “may”   have  





2.8.2   When  the  power  of  investigation  has  been  enlivened  by  an  allegation  or  an  opinion  
about   a   possibility   of   conduct   of   the   kind   referred   to   in   section   13(1)(a),   the  
investigation  may  become  concerned  with  conduct,  circumstances  or  events  which  
are   not   covered   by   the   definition   of   corrupt   conduct.29   The   legitimate   scope  of   an  
investigation   is   not   co-­extensive   with   the   ultimate   capacity   to   make   a   finding   of  
corrupt   conduct.  Findings  need  not   relate   to   corrupt   conduct   if   the   investigation   is  
otherwise  within  power.  
2.8.3   Section  7  brings  conspiracies  and  attempts   into   the  purview  of  corrupt  conduct  as  
defined.  Thus,   for  example,  an  attempt   to  bribe  a  public  official   is   corrupt  conduct  
even  if  the  public  official’s  immediate  response  is  to  report  the  matter  to  the  police.  
2.8.4   “Public  official”  and  “public  authorities”  are  defined  terms  which  embrace  the  whole  
of   NSW   public   administration,   and   cover   all   branches   of   government,   legislative,  
executive  and  judicial,  including  local  government.  
2.8.5   Although  the  focus  of  the  Act  is  on  public  administration  and  corruption  involving  or  
affecting   public   authorities   and   public   officials,   it   is   plain   that   persons   other   than  
public   officials   can   engage   in   corrupt   conduct  within   the   purview   of   the  Act.   Sub-­
sections   (1)   and   (2)   of   section   8   refer   to   “any   person   (whether   or   not   a   public  
official)”.   The   example   given   in   paragraph   2.8.3   is   an   obvious   example   of   corrupt  
conduct  by  what  might  conveniently  be  called  a  private  person  (a   term  that  will  be  
used  to  designate  persons  who  are  not  public  officials).  
2.8.6   There  is  an  overlap  between  subsection  (1)  and  subsection  (2)  of  section  8.  This  is  
recognised  in  subsection  (6).  
2.8.7   Leaving  to  one  side  paragraphs  (b),  (c)  and  (d)  of  section  9(1),  which  do  not  directly  
affect  the  main  issue  the  subject  of  this  report,  by  virtue  of  section  9  conduct  does  
not   amount   to   corrupt   conduct   unless   it   could   constitute   or   involve   a   criminal  
offence.  Similarly,  the  provisions  of  section  8(2),  which  list  a  number  of  matters  that  
involve   criminal   offences,   require   that,   for   conduct   to   satisfy   the   definition   there  
given,  the  conduct  must  be  conduct  as  described  in  the  first  four  lines  (the  chapeau)  
and  it  must  also  be  conduct  which  could  involve  one  of  the  listed  offences.  From  the  
earliest   days   of   the   legislation   courts   have   remarked   upon   a   logical   curiosity.   A  
conclusion   that  a  person  has  engaged   in  corrupt   conduct   is  based  upon  a   finding  
that   the   person   could   have   committed   a   criminal   offence.   An   unconditional  
conclusion  is  based  upon  a  conditional  premise.  
2.8.8   If   the   person   in   question   is   later   charged   with   the   relevant   criminal   offence   and  
acquitted,   the   finding  of  corrupt  conduct  stands.  The  same  applies   if   the  person   is  
never  charged  with  any  offence.  
2.8.9   The   ordinary   process   of   criminal   justice   is   available   in   respect   of   all   the   matters  
referred  to  specifically  in  section  8(2),  or  generally  in  section  9(1)(a).  In  practice,  that  
is   the   way   in   which   these  matters   are   dealt   with   in   the   overwhelming  majority   of  
cases.  
2.8.10   The   courts   have   held,   and   the   Act   is   administered   on   the   basis   that,   in   applying  
sections   8   and   9   to   a   potential   finding   of   corrupt   conduct,   and   to   a   finding   that  




































































whether,   on   the   basis   of   those   facts   (if   established   by   admissible   evidence),   a  
properly   instructed   jury  could  convict  of   the   relevant  offence.  This   is  similar   to   the  
test  applied  by  a  committing  magistrate  performing  the  function  of  deciding  whether  
a   person   accused   of   an   indictable   offence   should   be   sent   for   trial   (a   function  
traditionally   regarded   as   administrative).   Notwithstanding   that   similarity,   the  
following  should  be  observed:  
(a)   the  context  of  a  committal  proceeding  is  adversarial  and  the  magistrate  is  not  
part  of  the  same  organisation  that   investigates  the  offence,   lays  the  charges,  
and  conducts  the  prosecution;;  
(b)   the  magistrate  applies  the  rules  of  evidence;;  
(c)   the  proceedings  before  the  magistrate  do  not  result  in  any  findings  (beyond  a  
conclusion   that   the   case   is   a   proper   case   for   trial);;   in   particular   they   do   not  
conclude  with  a  denunciation  of  the  accused.  
2.8.11   By  virtue  of  section  13(1)(a),  the  power  to  investigate  (which  includes  the  power  to  
conduct   public   inquiries,   and   the   power   to   make   findings   and   reports)   extends  
beyond   corrupt   conduct,   to   conduct   connected   with   corrupt   conduct,   or   conduct  
liable   to   encourage   corrupt   conduct.   Investigations   and   findings   may   therefore  
extend  beyond  corrupt  conduct  as  defined  provided  there  is  a  relationship  to  corrupt  
conduct   of   the   kind   specified   in   13(1)(a).   An   investigation   may   have   a   sound  
jurisdictional   basis   even   though   findings   of   corrupt   conduct   could   be   made   in  
relation   to   part   only   of   the   subject  matter   of   the   investigation,   or   even   though   the  
only   findings   ultimately   made   do   not   relate   to   corrupt   conduct.30   It   would   be  
erroneous   to   think   that   the   inability   to  make  a   finding  of  corrupt  conduct  against  a  
person  involved  in  an  investigation  means  that  there  is  no  power  to  investigate,  and  
make  findings  concerning,  the  conduct  of  that  person.  
2.8.12   Section  8  is  headed:  “General  nature  of  corrupt  conduct”.  Although  it  is  a  definition  
section,  because  of   the   impossibility  of  giving  a  precise  meaning  to   the  concept  of  
corruption,  it  is  a  description  of  the  general  nature  of  its  subject  matter  rather  than  a  
categorical  formulation.  Similarly,  the  “matters”  listed  in  subsection  (2)  refer  to  kinds  
of  conduct  that  contravene  the  law  without  necessarily  stipulating  precise  offences.  




































































Chapter  3  –  Public  Inquiries  and  Reports  
3.1   Legislative  history  
3.1.1   Matters  investigated  by  the  ICAC  may  never  get  past  a  preliminary  stage,  and  such  
as  proceed  beyond  that  may  go  no  further  than  compulsory  examinations,  which  are  
conducted  in  private.  Investigations  of  this  kind  may,  or  may  not,  result  in  references  
to   the   police   for   further   investigation,   or   references   to   some   disciplinary   body   or  
some   other   appropriate   tribunal,   or   references   to   the   DPP   for   consideration   of   a  
prosecution  for  an  offence.  
3.1.2   The  Hong  Kong  Independent  Commission  Against  Corruption,  from  which  the  ICAC  
took   its   name,   is   a   major   investigative   organisation,   but   it   does   not   hold   public  
inquiries.  
3.1.3   In  the  1990  case  of  Balog  v  Independent  Commission  Against  Corruption  (“Balog”)  
the  High  Court  of  Australia  said  of  the  Act  in  its  original  form:31  
   The  Commission   is   primarily   an   investigative   body  whose   investigations   are   intended   to  
facilitate   the  actions  of   others   in   combating   corrupt   conduct.   It   is   not   a   law  enforcement  
agency  and  it  exercises  no  judicial  or  quasi-­judicial  function.  Its  investigative  powers  carry  
with  them  no  implication,  having  regard  to  the  manner  in  which  it  is  required  to  carry  out  its  
functions,  that  it  should  be  able  to  make  findings  against  individuals  of  corrupt  or  criminal  
behaviour  ...  
3.1.4   In  1990,  the  Act  was  amended  by  the  addition  to  section  13  of  a  new  subsection  (2)  
and  subsections  (3)  to  (5),  and  sections  74A  and  74B,  which  authorise  the  ICAC  to  
include   in   its   reports   findings   of   corrupt   conduct   (but   not   findings   that   a   criminal  
offence  has  been  committed).32  
3.1.5   In  introducing  the  amending  legislation,  the  then  Attorney  General  said:33  
The   commission   will   be   able   to   express   definite   conclusions   as   to   whether   or   not  
allegations   of   corruption   have  been   substantiated.   It  will   be   able   to   state   its   reasons   for  
those   conclusions   and   describe   the   respects   in   which   conduct   is   corrupt.   That   is,   the  
commission   will   have   the   authority   to   say   whether   a   public   official   misused   official  
information  or  acted  dishonestly  in  carrying  out  official  duties  or  has  committed  a  breach  of  
the   public   trust.   It   will   be   able   to   give   a   factual   account   of   what   occurred,   including   a  
description  of  the  behaviour  which  it  finds  is  corrupt.  The  amendments  made  by  the  bill  will  
clearly  allow   the  commission   to  examine   in   its   report   the  evidence  before   it  and  state   its  
opinion  as  to  the  weight  which  should  be  given  to  that  evidence.  It  will  be  able  to  comment  
on  the  credibility  of  witnesses.  
3.1.6   The   conclusions,   or   findings,   to  which   the  Attorney  General  was   referring   are   not  
binding  decisions  made  in  the  course  of  the  administration  of  civil  or  criminal  justice.  
They  are  statements  by  an   investigator  of  conclusions   formed  at   the  end  of  his  or  
her   investigation.  They  do  not  affect   legal   rights  or  obligations,  although   they  may  































































31     Balog  v  Independent  Commission  Against  Corruption  (1990)  169  CLR  625,  636.  
32      See,  in  particular,  ICAC  Act  section  13(5).  






3.2   Administrative  practice  
3.2.1   The  ICAC  performs   important  work  of  education  and  prevention,  but   the  activity  of  
holding   public   inquiries   and   making   reports   along   the   lines   envisaged   by   the  
Attorney  General  has  now  come  to  be  regarded  as  its  most  characteristic  function.  It  
would  be   regrettable   if   the  work  described  by   the  High  Court   in  Balog  came   to  be  
seen  as  of  secondary  importance  only.  
3.2.2   The  capacity  of  a  public  finding  of  corrupt  conduct  to  cause  reputational  damage  is  
too  obvious  to  require  elaboration.  It  should  be  noted,  also,  that  not  all  reputational  
damage  associated  with  a  public  inquiry  is  the  result  of  a  considered  and  reasoned  
conclusion  expressed  in  a  report.  When  the  case  of  Cunneen  was  before  the  New  
South  Wales  Court  of  Appeal,34  Basten  JA  referred  to  the  potential  for  harm  that  can  
arise   from   publicity   associated   with   the   conduct   of   proceedings   even   before   any  
ultimate  findings  are  made.35  
3.2.3   The  available  information  as  to  the  number  of  public  inquiries  held,  and  the  number  
of   findings   of   corrupt   conduct  made,   year   by   year,   since   the   establishment   of   the  
ICAC   shows   a   constant   development   of   this   part   of   the   ICAC’s   work.   In   the   five  
years   ended   30   June   2015   there   were   38   reports   making   findings   of   corrupt  
conduct.   In   the   five   years   ended   30   June   1995   (that   is,   the   first   five   years   post-­
Balog)  there  were  14.  
3.3   Nature  of  the  powers  associated  with  public  inquiries  
3.3.1   The  powers  associated  with  public  inquiries  overlap  with  the  powers  associated  with  
investigations  that  do  not  become  public.  
3.3.2   For   the   purposes   of   an   investigation   the   ICAC   may   require   public   authorities   or  
public   officials   to   produce   a   statement   of   information,36   it   may   require   a   person  
(whether   or   not   a   public   authority   or   public   official)   to   attend   and   produce   of  
specified  document  or  thing,37  and  it  may  enter  and  inspect  any  premises  occupied  
by  a  public  authority  or  public  official  in  that  capacity,  to  inspect  a  document  or  thing  
and  take  copies  of  a  document.38  Sections  24,  25  and  26  contain  restrictions  on  the  
exercise  of   these  powers,   for  example,  when  a  claim  of  privilege   is  made,  but  not  
where   there   is   an  objection  on   the  ground  of   public   interest   immunity   or   duties  of  
secrecy.   Section   26   deals   with   self-­incrimination.   It   provides,   for   example,   that  
where   a   person   objects   that   a   document   tends   to   incriminate   the   person   the  
document   may   be   used   for   purposes   of   the   investigation   but   not   in   other  
proceedings  (with  limited  exceptions).    
3.3.3   In   the   case   of   both   compulsory   examinations   (in   private)   and   public   inquiries,  
witnesses   can   be   compelled   to   give   evidence   and   a  witness   is   not   excused   from  
answering   a   question   or   producing   a   document   or   thing   on   the   ground   of   self-­































































34     Cunneen  v  Independent  Commission  Against  Corruption  [2014]  NSWCA  421  (5  December  2014).  
35     Ibid  [100]  (Basten  JA).    
36     ICAC  Act  section  21.  
37     Ibid  section  22.  
38     Ibid  section  23.  





but  the  answer  is  not  admissible  in  evidence  against  the  person  in  civil  or  criminal  or  
disciplinary  proceedings.  
3.3.4   The   judgment   of   the   majority   in   the   High   Court   in   Cunneen   said   that   the   wide  
interpretation   of   corrupt   conduct   for  which   the   ICAC  was   contending  would   cause  
the  Act  “to  override  basic  rights  and  freedoms  on  .  .  .  a  sweeping  scale”.40  
3.3.5   Proceedings  at  a  public  inquiry  are  not  adversarial.  In  this  aspect  of  its  function  the  
ICAC  is  like  a  standing  royal  commission.  The  Commissioner  conducting  the  public  
inquiry  will  also  have  taken  an  active  role  in  initiating  and  directing  the  investigation,  
perhaps  presiding  at  compulsory  examinations,  and  deciding  what  witnesses  will  be  
called.    
3.3.6   An  important  legal  qualification  on  the  powers  conferred  upon  the  ICAC  is  that  they  
are  to  be  used  for  the  purpose  for  which  they  are  given.  For  example,  the  power  to  
compel   a   person   to   give   testimony   is   conferred   for   the   purpose   of   furthering   an  
investigation,  not  as  a  method  of  providing  a  person  with  an  opportunity  to  commit  
an  offence  of  giving  false  evidence.  
3.3.7   What   is   often   called   the   inquisitorial   nature   of   the   process   at   a   public   inquiry   is   a  
potential  source  of  misunderstanding  in  at  least  three  ways:  
(a)   A  distinctive  feature  of  the  adversarial  process  in  the  administration  of  justice  
is  a  climactic  civil  or  criminal   trial,  conducted  as  a  contest  between  opposing  
parties  and  presided  over  by  a  neutral  judge  (or  judge  and  jury),  who  makes  a  
decision  affecting  rights  and  obligations.  A  public  inquiry  held  by  the  ICAC,  on  
the  other  hand,   is  a  further  development  of  an   investigative  process  that  has  
already  begun,  and  the  outcome  is  a  report  by  the   investigator,  not  a   judicial  
decision.  The  absence  of  features  that  are  customary  in  the  trial  process  does  
not,   on   that   account   alone,   make   it   inappropriate   or   unfair.   It   is   a   different  
process.  
(b)   There  are,  however,  some  superficial  similarities  between  a  public  inquiry  and  
court   process   that   may   lead   people   to   misunderstand   its   outcome   as   a  
judgment;;  especially  where  there  is  an  exercise  of  a  power,  not  only  to  make  
findings  of  fact,  but  also  to  characterise  conduct  as  corrupt.  
(c)   The  term  inquisitorial  can  be  misleading.  It  is  often  used  to  describe  a  judicial  
process   in   civil   law   jurisdictions.   What   occurs   at   a   public   inquiry   is   in   no  
respect  a  judicial  process,  either  adversarial  or  inquisitorial.  
3.3.8   In  a  submission  made  to  the  Panel,  the  Rule  of  Law  Institute  of  Australia  referred  to  
the  fact  that  a  public  inquiry  is,  more  often  than  not,  presided  over  by  a  former  judge  
sitting   in   court-­like   surroundings.   This   is   a   significant   point   and   is   relevant   to  
3.3.7(b).  The  Institute  proposed  that  public  inquiries  should  no  longer  be  part  of  the  
function  of  the  ICAC.  
3.3.9   The  Panel  does  not  intend  to  recommend  that  the  legislation  should  now  be  altered  





































































3.4   Judicial  review  
3.4.1   As   an   administrative   body,   the   ICAC   is   subject   to   the   supervisory   role   of   the  
Supreme  Court  of  New  South  Wales  exercised  under  the  Supreme  Court  Act  1970.  
The  Supreme  Court  has  both  an  inherent  and  a  statutory  jurisdiction  to  ensure  that  
the   ICAC  carries  out   its   functions  and  performs   its   duties   in   accordance  with   law.  
The  decision  in  Cunneen  was  an  exercise  of  that  jurisdiction.  
3.4.2   There   is   an   important   difference  between   the   kind   of   judicial   review   referred   to   in  
paragraph   3.4.1   and   an   appeal   of   the   kind   that   exists   in   respect   of   a   judicial  
decision.   The   presently   relevant   grounds   of   potential   judicial   review   of   an   ICAC  
report  were  summarised  by  McDougall  J  in  Duncan  v  ICAC  as  follows:41  
(1)   there  is  a  material  error  of  law  on  the  face  of  the  record  (which  includes  the  reasons  
given  for  the  decision…);;  
(2)   the  reasoning  is  not  objectively  reasonable,   in  the  sense  that  the  decision  was  not  
one   that   could   have   been   reached   by   a   reasonable   person   acquainted   with   all  
material   facts  and  having  a  proper  understanding  of   the  statutory   function,  or  was  
not  based  on  a  process  of  logical  reasoning  from  proven  facts  or  proper  inferences  
therefrom;;  
(3)   there  is  a  finding  that  is  not  supported  by  any  evidence  whatsoever  –  that  is  to  say,  
there  is  no  evidence  that  could  rationally  support  the  impugned  finding;;  
(4)   relevant  matters  have  not  been  taken  into  account,  or  irrelevant  matters  have  been  
taken  into  account;;  and  
(5)   there  has  been  a  material  denial  of  natural  justice.  
3.4.3   What  is  not  available  as  a  ground  of  review  is  the  most  common  ground  in  appeals  
from  a  court:   that   the  decision  was  wrong  because  it  was  affected  by  a  mistake  of  
fact.  In  brief,  there  is  no  merits  review  of  an  ICAC  finding.  
3.4.4   The  reason  no  merits  review  is  available  is  the  administrative  nature  of  the  process.  
What  is  involved  is  not  a  judicial  decision;;  it   is  an  investigator’s  report  of  his  or  her  
findings  and  opinions  at  the  conclusion  of  the  investigation.  
3.4.5   To  make  merits   review  available   in   respect  of   ICAC  reports  would   require  either  a  
substantial  alteration  to  the  character  of  the  Supreme  Court’s  jurisdiction  under  the  
Supreme  Court   Act,  which,   in   turn,  would   have   consequences   in   respect   of   other  
administrative  bodies,  or  the  creation  of  a  new  form  of  internal  or  external  review.    
3.4.6   The   New   South   Wales   Bar   Association   made   a   submission   to   the   Panel   which  
recognised  the  problem  referred  to  in  paragraphs  3.4.4  and  3.4.5.  It  argued  that  an  
appropriate   form   of   review   would   be   one   analogous   to   that   undertaken   by   the  
Federal  Court  of  Australia  under  the  Administrative  Decisions  (Judicial  Review)  Act  
1977   (Cth),   with   any   counterpart   of   section   5(1)(h)   framed   in   more   expansive  
language  such  as:   “the  decision  was  not   reasonably  supported  by   the  evidence  or  
other  material  before  the  Commission”.  
3.4.7   The   ground   in   section   5(1)(h)   is   “that   there  was   no   evidence   or   other  material   to  
justify   the   making   of   the   decision”.   That   is   not   merits   review.   What   is   proposed  




































































unreasonableness.42  It  appears  close  to  administrative  oversight  rather  than  judicial  
review.  
3.4.8   In  addition  to  the  risk  of  confusion  of  judicial  and  administrative  functions,  the  Panel  
considers   that   to   provide   for   merits   review   would   add   to   the   problem   of  
misunderstanding   as   to   the   ICAC’s   role.   It   would   make   it   look   even   more   like   a  
court.  
3.5   Decisions  to  hold  public  inquiries  
3.5.1   A   decision   to   hold   a   public   inquiry   is   a   discretionary   decision   of   the  Commission,  
and  to  that  extent  could  be  subject  to  judicial  review.43  
3.5.2   Before   amendments   to   the   Act   made   following   the   2005   Report,   there   was   an  
Operations   Review   Committee   (“ORC”).   The   principal   work   of   that   body   was  
considering   and   approving   decisions   not   to   pursue   investigations   either   at   all   or  
further.  For  reasons  given  in  the  2005  Report,44  which  recommended  the  creation  of  
the  office  of   Inspector,  once   the   Inspector   came   into  existence   the   function  of   the  
ORC  was  no  longer  necessary.  
3.5.3   The  Panel  has  considered  whether  some  corresponding  body  ought   to  be  created  
for   the   specific   purpose   of   providing   oversight   of   decisions   to   conduct   public  
inquiries,   or   decisions   about   public   inquiries,   such   as  what  witnesses   to   call.   The  
Inspector   performs   important   functions   of   audit   and   of   oversight,   including  
examining   complaints,   but   is   at   arm’s   length   from   the   Commission   and   is   not   a  
participant   in   the   investigative   process.   Decisions   to   hold   public   inquiries   can,   no  
doubt,  be  difficult.45  Nevertheless,  the  Panel  does  not  see  merit   in  adding  a  further  
layer  of  decision-­making  to  the  process.  
3.5.4   The  New  South  Wales  Bar  Association  proposed  that  there  should  be  an  oversight  
body   that   can   review   a   decision   to   hold   a   public   inquiry.   Such   a   body,   it   was  
suggested,   should   be   small,   and   made   up   of   people   not   associated   with   the  
executive  or  legislative  arms  of  government.  
3.5.5   In   the  days  of   the  ORC,   it  came   into   the  process  at  an  early  stage.  By   the   time  a  
decision   is   made   to   hold   a   public   inquiry,   an   investigation   is   likely   to   be   well  
advanced   and   there   will   be   a   substantial   body   of   material   to   be   evaluated.   To  
introduce  an  outside  oversight  body  at  that  stage  would  not  be  practical.  This  matter  
is  dealt  with  further  in  Chapter  9.  
3.6   Findings  
3.6.1   Section   13(1)(a)   identifies   the   potential   subject   matters   for   investigation   by  
reference  to  three  categories  of  conduct:  
(i)   corrupt  conduct;;  
(ii)   conduct  liable  to  allow,  encourage  or  cause  the  occurrence  of  corrupt  conduct;;  































































42     Associated  Provincial  Picture  Houses  Ltd  v  Wednesbury  Corporation  [1948]  1  KB  223.  
43     Cf  Cunneen  v  Independent  Commission  Against  Corruption  [2014]  NSWCA  421  (5  December  2014)  [97].  
44     2005  Report,  above  n  6,  [7.1.2]-­[7.1.5],  [7.3.48]-­[7.3.61]  and  [7.5.1]-­[7.5.40].  





3.6.2   Section   13(2)(a)   provides   that   investigations   are   to   be   conducted   with   a   view   to  
determining   whether   conduct   falling   within   one   of   those   three   categories   has  
occurred,  is  occurring,  or  is  about  to  occur.  
3.6.3   Subsections   (2A)   and   (5)  make   it   plain   that   the   ICAC  has  a  wide  discretion  as   to  
how  it  expresses  its  findings  and  may,  for  example,  confine  its  report  to  stating  facts  
it  has  found,  without  attributing  to  them  any  character.  
3.6.4   The   high-­impact   nature   of   a   finding   that   characterises   conduct   under   (i),   as  
compared  with  findings  under  (ii)  or  (iii),  or  bare  findings  of  fact,  is  an  aspect  of  the  
ICAC’s  work  that  has  now  come  to  be  regarded  as  definitive  of  its  role.  This  was  not  
inevitable,   and   has   its   own   consequences   in   terms   of   scrutiny   and   accountability.  
More  significantly  for  present  purposes,  it  has  consequences  in  terms  of  the  need  to  
define   corrupt   conduct   in   a   manner   that   bears   a   reasonable   relationship   to   the  
ordinary  understanding  of   that   term.  The  change   from  what   the  High  Court  said   in  
Balog,  as  set  out   in  paragraph  3.1.3,   to  what   the  Attorney  General   foreshadowed,  
as   set   out   in   paragraph  3.1.5,   was   not   accompanied   by   any   modification   or  
clarification  of  the  definition  of  corrupt  conduct.  
3.6.5   As   noted   earlier,   the   findings   in   a   report   are   an   investigator’s   statement   of   the  
results  of  his  or  her  investigation,  not  a  judgment  about  the  merits  of  a  dispute,  or  an  
adjudication  of  criminal  guilt.  They  are  not  subject   to  merits   review.  They  could  be  
wrong.   They   may   depend   upon   contestable   conclusions   about   the   evaluation   of  
evidence   and   the   credibility   of   witnesses.   People   are   free   to   argue   about,   and  
criticise,  the  quality  of  the  investigation,  or  the  quality  of  the  reasoning  in  the  report,  
or,   for   that  matter,   the  quality  of   the   investigator.46  Some  people  are  better  placed  
than   others   to   do   that.   This   may   be   for   a   number   of   reasons   including,   but   not  
limited  to,  resources.  
3.6.6   The  law  is  not  so  disconnected  from  reality  as  to  treat  an  anti-­corruption  commission  
finding,  after  a  public   inquiry,  that  a  person  has  engaged  in  corrupt  conduct,  as  no  
different   in   its   nature   and   effect   from   a   police   officer’s   report   as   to   whether  
somebody  was   at   fault   in   a   traffic   accident.   This   is  why   findings   are   amenable   to  
judicial   review,   even   though   they   cannot   be   set   aside   on   the   basis   that   they   are  




































































Chapter  4  –  The  Scope  of  Corrupt  
Conduct  
4.1   The  nature  of  corruption  
4.1.1   Corruption  takes   its  meaning  from  its  context.   In  one  context   it   refers  to  a  physical  
process.   In   another   it   refers   to   the   meaning   of   a   text.   The   context   of   present  
relevance  is  the  characterisation  of  the  conduct  of  an  individual.  
4.1.2   When  used  to  characterise  the  conduct  of  an  individual  in  one  context,  the  concept  
of  corruption  may  be  wide  enough  to  embrace  any  act  or  omission  that  constitutes  a  
serious  transgression  of  a  moral  precept.  However,  in  a  legal  context  it  usually  has  
a   narrower   meaning.   The   law   does   not   seek   to   enforce   all   the   requirements   of  
morality;;  and  not  all  breaches  of   the   law  involve  moral   turpitude.  In  a   legal  context  
the  word   corruption   is   often   used   as   a   general   or   summary   description,   or   rubric,  
applied  to  a  category  of  criminal  offences,  such  as  bribery,  abuse  of  office,  extortion,  
and   others,   each   of   which   has   its   own   established   elements   which   include   a  
requisite  state  of  mind,  such  as  knowledge  or  intention.  It  is  sometimes  a  convenient  
classification  of  crimes  which  have  their  own  individual  definitions.  
4.1.3   The  unifying  element  of  the  kinds  of  corrupt  conduct  referred  to  in  section  8(1)  of  the  
Act   is  deliberate  misuse  of  power,  authority  or  responsibility,  which  is  given  for  the  
public   benefit   and   is,   instead,   used   for   some   extraneous   and   wrongful   purpose,  
such   as   private   advantage.   This   accords   generally,   although   not   completely,   with  
Transparency  International’s  view  of  corruption  as  the  abuse  of  entrusted  power  for  
private  gain.47  
4.2   The  public  element  in  the  corruption  addressed  by  the  Act  
4.2.1   One   matter   about   which   the   Act   is   emphatic   is   that   it   is   concerned   with   what  
section  2A   describes   as   “corruption   involving   or   affecting   public   authorities   and  
public  officials”.  The  defined  terms  of  public  official  and  public  authority  are  central  
to  the  scheme  of  the  legislation.  
4.2.2   When  the  legislation  was  first  introduced,  the  then  Premier,  Mr  Greiner,  said  that  the  
ICAC   “has   a   very   specific   purpose   which   is   to   prevent   corruption   and   enhance  
integrity   in   the   public   sector”   and   that   “though   the   commission   will   be   able   to  
investigate  corrupt  conduct  of  private  individuals  which  affects  public  administration,  
the   focus   is   public   administration   and   corruption   connected   with   public  
administration”.48  
4.2.3   The  Explanatory  Note  to  the  Bill  for  the  ICAC  legislation  said:49  
The  object  of  this  Bill  is  to  constitute  an  Independent  Commission  Against  Corruption,  and  































































47     See  the  definition  provided  on  Transparency  International’s  website  at  https://www.transparency.org/what-­is-­
corruption/#define.  During  the  course  of  its  review,  the  Panel  met  with  the  Hon.  Roger  Gyles  AO  QC,  Chair  of  Transparency  
International  Australia.  
48     New  South  Wales,  Parliamentary  Debates,  Legislative  Assembly,  26  May  1988,  674,  675  (Nick  Greiner,  Premier).  





•   investigating   corruption   or   possible   corruption   where   public   officials   are   involved,  
either  on  a  complaint  or  reference  made  to  it  or  on  its  own  initiative;;  and  
•   educating  public  authorities  and  the  community  generally  on  the  detrimental  effects  
of  public  corruption  and  strategies  to  combat  it.  
4.2.4   Criminal  offences  that  are  commonly  included  under  the  generic  term  corruption  are  
not   confined   to   activities   in   and   around   public   administration.   Private   enterprise,  
educational   institutions,   industrial   organisations,   sporting   associations   and   even  
charities  may  provide   the  setting   for  corrupt  activities.  The  Serious  Fraud  Office   in  
the   United   Kingdom   does   not   limit   its   concerns   to   corruption   in   or   affecting   the  
United   Kingdom   public   sector.   Nor,   apparently,   does   the   Serious   Fraud   Office   in  
New  Zealand.50  The  Racketeer   Influenced  and  Corrupt  Organizations  Act   (“RICO”)  
in  the  United  States  covers  organisations  in  private  (criminal)  enterprise.  The  Hong  
Kong   ICAC   is   not   confined   to   dealing   with   corrupt   conduct   of   or   affecting   public  
officials.  Some  of   the  most  widely   known   instances  of  alleged  corruption  currently  
under  investigation  around  the  world  are  said  to  have  occurred  outside  government.  
What   is   the   rationale   for   the   Act’s   preoccupation   with   public   administration?   The  
most  likely  explanation  appears  to  be  historical.  
4.2.5   In  the  course  of  the  speech  referred  to  in  paragraph  4.2.2,  the  then  Premier  said:51  
Before  going  into  the  details  of  this  legislation,  I  want  to  say  something  about  the  rationale  
and   the   objectives   of   the   independent   commission.   There   has   been   considerable  
speculation  about  the  Government’s  reasons  for  setting  up  this  body.  I  indicated  before  our  
being  elected   to  Government   that   I  was  appalled  by   the  sort  of   reputation   this  State  had  
acquired  around  the  country,  and  indeed,  overseas.  There  was  a  general  perception  that  
people  in  high  office  in  this  State  were  susceptible  to  impropriety  and  corruption.  In  some  
cases  that  has  been  shown  to  be  true.  
In   recent   years   in  New  South  Wales  we   have   seen:   a  Minister   of   the  Crown  gaoled   for  
bribery;;  an  inquiry  into  a  second,  and  indeed  a  third,  former  Minister  for  alleged  corruption;;  
the   former   Chief   Stipendiary   Magistrate   gaoled   for   perverting   the   course   of   justice;;   a  
former   Commissioner   of   Police   in   the   courts   on   a   criminal   charge;;   the   former   Deputy  
Commissioner  of  Police   charged  with  bribery;;   a   series  of   investigations  and  court   cases  
involving   judicial   figures   including   a   High   Court   judge;;   and   a   disturbing   number   of  
dismissals,   retirements   and   convictions   of   senior   police   officers   for   offences   involving  
corrupt  conduct.    
No   government   can   maintain   its   claim   to   legitimacy   while   there   remains   the   cloud   of  
suspicion  and  doubt  that  has  hung  over  government  in  New  South  Wales...  
Let   me  make   it   absolutely   clear   that   this   initiative   is   a   component   of   the   Government’s  
program   to   restore   the   integrity   of   public   administration   and   public   institutions   in   this  
State...  
...This  legislation  is  a  crucial  part  of  the  Government’s  long-­term  strategy  for  restoring  the  
integrity  of  public  administration.    
4.2.6   For  the  reasons  given  in  paragraph  4.2.4,  an  object  of  restoring  and  maintaining  the  
integrity   of   public   administration   is   much   narrower   than   an   object   of   combating  































































50     It  is  indicated  on  the  website  of  New  Zealand’s  Serious  Fraud  Office  that  it  relies  on  the  following  definition  of  corruption  
used  by  the  Asian  Development  Bank:  “Behaviour  on  the  part  of  officials  in  the  public  or  private  sector  in  which  they  
improperly  and  unlawfully  enrich  themselves  or  those  close  to  them,  or  induce  others  to  do  so,  by  misusing  the  position  in  
which  they  are  placed”.  See  https://www.sfo.govt.nz/what-­is-­corruption.  





administration  may  come  from  outside  as  well  as  from  within.  Public  administration  
exists  to  interact  with  the  whole  community.  Even  a  specific  concern  with  morality  of  
public  officials  needs  to  recognise  that  potential  sources  of  compromise  may  come  
from  external  sources;;  hence  the  references  in  section  8  to  “conduct  of  any  person  
(whether  or  not  a  public  official)”.  Such  conduct   is  only   relevant  when   it  adversely  
affects  the  official  conduct  referred  to  in  the  section.  
4.2.7   In   the   framing  of   the   legislation,  and   in  particular   the  definition  of  corrupt  conduct,  
the   legislative   policy   of   taking,   as   the   focus   of   the  Act,   “public   administration   and  
corruption  connected  with  public  administration”  is  given  effect  by  having  (in  section  
8)  a  definition  of  corrupt  conduct  that  deals  with:  
(i)   conduct   of   a   public   official   that   is   of   a   certain   character   (paragraphs   (b),   (c)  
and  (d)  of  section  8(1));;  and  
(ii)   any  conduct  of  any  person  (whether  or  not  a  public  official)  that  has  or  could  
have   a   specified   kind   of   adverse   effect   on   the   exercise   of   official   functions  
(paragraph  (a)  of  section  8(1)))  or  any  conduct  of  any  person  (whether  or  not  a  
public  official)  that  could  involve  one  of  a  long  list  of  stated  offences  and  that  
has  or  could  have  an  (unspecified)  adverse  effect  on  official  functions.  
4.2.8   A  policy  decision  to  limit  the  scope  of  the  ICAC’s  jurisdiction,  through  the  definition  
of   corrupt   conduct,   to   “public   administration   and   corruption   connected   with   public  
administration”  raises  a  question:  what  kind  of  connection  with  public  administration  
is   in   contemplation?   Two   immediate   problems   arise.   First,   of   the   miscellany   of  
offences   listed   in   section   8(2),   most   are   usually   committed   in   circumstances   that  
have   nothing   to   do   with   the   legal,   and   the   popular,   understanding   of   corrupt  
conduct.  Secondly,  when  the  phrase  “adversely  affects”  is  linked,  as  it   is  in  section  
8(1)(a),   to   honesty   and   impartiality,   its   content   is   reasonably   clear.   On   the   other  
hand,  when   it   is   left  at   large,  as   it   is   in  section  8(2),   its  content  becomes  obscure.  
Common  types  of  adverse  effect  on  the  exercise  of  official  functions  include  waste,  
inefficiency  and  delay.  Such  effects  are  more  often  than  not  associated  with  causes  
that  have  nothing  to  do  with  corruption.  What  kind  of  adverse  effect  does  subsection  
(2)  have   in  contemplation?   If   the  answer   is   “any  kind”   then   the  consequences  are  
surprising.  Some  examples  of  this  will  be  referred  to  below.  The  definition  of  corrupt  
conduct  would  extend  far  beyond  what,  in  a  context  such  as  this,  would  ordinarily  be  
signified  by  the  expression.  
4.2.9   The   view  may  have  been   taken   that,   in   the   case  of   “an   investigative   body  whose  
investigations  are  intended  to  facilitate  the  actions  of  others  ...  [and  which]  exercises  
no   judicial   or   quasi-­judicial   function”,   which   also   has   important   education   and  
prevention   functions,   an   extended   definition   of   corrupt   conduct   is   acceptable.  
However,  when,  in  1990,  following  amendments  to  the  Act,  it  became  clear  that  one  
of  the  primary  functions  of  the  commission  was  to  make  public  findings  that  people  
had   engaged   in   corrupt   conduct,   then   the   relationship   between   the   definition   of  
corrupt  conduct  and  the  legal  and  public  understanding  of  that  term  took  on  a  new  
importance.  There  was,  however,  no  amendment  of  the  definition.  
4.2.10   From   the   outset,   the   policy   decision   to   confine   the   jurisdiction   of   the   ICAC   by  
reference   to   a   public   element   required   the   drawing   of   boundaries   reflecting   an  





Act  that  came  to  the  courts  there  was  judicial  comment  on  the  width  and  uncertainty  
of   the  definition  of  corrupt  conduct,  made  with  particular   reference   to   the  power   to  
make  and  publish  findings  that  conduct  was  corrupt.52  
4.2.11   Reports  of  the  Parliamentary  Committee  on  the  ICAC  have  reflected  concerns  with  
the  width  of   the  definition.53  There  were  some  suggestions   that,   for   the  purpose  of  
public  findings,  the  expression  “corrupt  conduct”  might  be  replaced  by  “misconduct”  
or   “improper   conduct”.54   Suggestions   such   as   this   were   never   taken   up,   but   they  
reflect   an   unease   with   the   definition   of   corrupt   conduct   where   the   public   would  
assume  that  a  finding  of  corrupt  conduct  meant  what  it  said,  and  was  not  based  on  
some  artificial  construct.  
4.2.12   Section  12A  of  the  Act  provides  that,  in  exercising  its  functions,  the  Commission  is,  
as  far  as  practicable,  to  direct  its  attention  to  serious  corrupt  conduct  and  systemic  
corrupt  conduct  and   is   to   take   into  account   the   responsibility  and   role  other  public  
authorities  have  in  the  prevention  of  corrupt  conduct.  If  any  of  the  offences  listed  in  
section  8(2),  when   they  have  any  kind  of   adverse  effect   on   the  exercise  of   public  
functions,   were   within   the   purview   of   the   ICAC   then   it   would,   in   effect,   have   a  
mandate  to  deal  with  almost  any  crime  of  which  an  officer  or  agency  of  the  State  of  
NSW   is   directly   or   indirectly   a   victim.   However,   there   is   no   sanction   for   failure   to  
observe   section   12A.   As  will   appear,   the  Panel   is   of   the   view   that   this   should   be  
tightened  up.  
4.2.13   The  problem  of  identifying  with  greater  precision  the  public  element  in  the  Act’s  idea  
of  corrupt  conduct  was  brought  to  a  head  in  2014  by  Cunneen  which,  it  was  argued,  
involved   conduct   that   was   not   corrupt   according   to   the   ordinary   legal   or   popular  
understanding   of   that   term,   not   serious,   and   not   systemic,   and   that   could   only   fit  
within   the   definition   in   section   8(2)   if   that   provision   were   given   its   widest   literal  
meaning.   The   question   whether   the   case   fell   within   section   12A   was   not   directly  
justiciable.  Whether   the  conduct  alleged  was  corrupt  depended  on   the  meaning  of  
section  8(2).    































































52     See,  for  example,  Balog  v  Independent  Commission  Against  Corruption  (1989)  18  NSWLR  356,  370-­372  (Mahoney  JA);;  
Balog  v  Independent  Commission  Against  Corruption  (1990)  169  CLR  625,  635-­636;;  Greiner  v  Independent  Commission  
Against  Corruption  (1992)  28  NSWLR  125,  129  (Gleeson  CJ),  167-­169  (Mahoney  JA),  180-­181  (Priestley  JA).  
53     See  Parliamentary  Committee  on  the  Independent  Commission  Against  Corruption,  Parliament  of  New  South  Wales,  
Review  of  the  ICAC  –  Stage  II:  Jurisdictional  Issues  (2001)  1-­3,  15-­24.  





Chapter  5  –  Independent  Commission  
Against  Corruption  v  Cunneen  [2015]  
HCA  14  
5.1   The  litigation  
5.1.1   The  litigation  arose  out  of  an  ICAC  investigation  that  never  reached  the  stage  of  a  
public  inquiry,  although  it  was  intended  for  one.  After  the  conclusion  of  the  litigation,  
and  after  the  constitution  of  this  Panel,  the  ICAC  investigation  came  to  an  end,  and  
the  matter   was   sent   to   the   DPP.   On   24   July   2015,   the   Solicitor   General   of   New  
South   Wales   announced   that   no   criminal   proceedings   would   be   commenced   in  
respect  of  the  matters  referred  by  the  ICAC  to  the  DPP.55  
5.1.2   At  first  instance  the  case  was  heard  by  a  judge  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  New  South  
Wales,  Hoeben  CJ  at  CL.56  The  plaintiff,  Ms  Cunneen,  was  unsuccessful  and  she  
appealed   to   the   New   South  Wales   Court   of   Appeal.   By  majority,   the   appeal   was  
allowed.57  The  ICAC  then  sought  special  leave  to  the  High  Court.  Special  leave  was  
granted  and,  by  majority,  the  appeal  was  dismissed.58  
5.2   The  alleged  facts  
5.2.1   Although   a   number   of   other   issues,   not   presently   material,   were   raised   in   the  
proceedings,   the   outcome   ultimately   turned   on   a   jurisdictional   issue,   which  
depended   upon   the   meaning   of   the   Act’s   definition   of   corrupt   conduct,   and   in  
particular  section  8(2).  The  Court  of  Appeal  declared  that   the  ICAC  was  exceeding  
its  jurisdiction  in  investigating  allegations  which  were  described  as:59  
…the  allegations  that,  on  31  May  2014,  the  first  and  second  appellants  [Ms  Cunneen  and  
her  son],  with  the  intention  to  pervert  the  course  of   justice,  counselled  the  third  appellant  
[the  son’s  girlfriend]   to  pretend   to  have  chest  pain,  and   that   the   third  appellant,  with   the  
intention   to   pervert   the   course   of   justice,   did   pretend   to   have   chest   pains,   to   prevent  
investigating  police  officers  from  obtaining  evidence  [of]  the  third  appellant’s  blood  alcohol  
level  at  the  scene  of  a  motor  vehicle  accident.    
The  Court  of  Appeal  also  declared  that  the  ICAC’s  decision  to  hold  a  public  inquiry  
into  the  allegations  was  invalid  and  a  nullity.  Those  declarations  were  upheld  by  the  
High  Court.  
5.2.2   The   facts   of   the   case   have   never   been   the   subject   of   any   finding,   judicial   or  
administrative.  The  motor   vehicle  accident  mentioned   involved  Ms  Cunneen’s   son  
and   her   son’s   girlfriend,   and   something   allegedly   said   to   the   girlfriend   after   the  
accident.   The   allegations   as   recorded   in   the   declarations   made   by   the   Court   of  
Appeal  do  not  include  any  alleged  wrongdoing  by,  or  any  alleged  attempt  to  procure  































































55     Department  of  Justice,  “Statement  from  NSW  Solicitor  General  regarding  a  referral  from  the  Independent  Commission  
Against  Corruption”  (Departmental  Media  Statement,  24  July  2015).  
56     Cunneen  v  Independent  Commission  Against  Corruption  [2014]  NSWSC  1571  (10  November  2014).  
57     Cunneen  v  Independent  Commission  Against  Corruption  [2014]  NSWCA  421  (5  December  2014).  
58     Independent  Commission  Against  Corruption  v  Cunneen  [2015]  HCA  14  (15  April  2015).  





5.2.3   Ms  Cunneen   is  a  Deputy  Senior  Crown  Prosecutor,  and   therefore  a  public  official.  
Her  son  and  her  son’s  girlfriend  are  not  public  officials.  The  conduct  of  Ms  Cunneen  
took  place  in  a  private  capacity,  and  she  was  not  exercising  any  official   function  in  
respect   of   the  motor   vehicle   accident.   The   fact   that   she   held   a   public   office   was  
regarded  by  both  the  Court  of  Appeal  and  the  High  Court  of  Australia  as  irrelevant  to  
the  question  of  jurisdiction.  Although  it  could  (this  was  the  subject  of  an  unresolved  
argument)  possibly  have  been  relevant  to  discretionary  decisions  by  the  ICAC  about  
how  to  deal  with  the  matter,  it  did  not  go  to  jurisdiction.  A  corollary  is  that  the  nature  
and   outcome   of   the   jurisdictional   arguments   were   unaffected   by   Ms   Cunneen’s  
official   status,   and   would   have   been   the   same   had   she   never   held   such   status.  
Another  corollary   is   that,  on   the   ICAC’s   jurisdictional  argument,   it  would  have  had  
jurisdiction  had  Ms  Cunneen  not   been   involved  at   all,   and   the  only   conduct   to   be  
investigated   was   that   of   her   son   (allegedly   counselling   the   pretence)   and   his  
girlfriend.   It   is   improbable   in   the   extreme   that   such   jurisdiction   would   have   been  
exercised,   but   the   theoretical   possibility   illustrates   the   problem   of   the  meaning   of  
section  8(2)  and  its  relationship  to  the  ordinary  understanding  of  corrupt  conduct  in  
a  context  such  as  this.  
5.3   The  competing  possibilities  
5.3.1   The  essence  of  the  problem  was  the  meaning  in  section  8(2)  of  “adversely  affects”.  
Although   another,   presently   irrelevant,   argument   was   put   and   rejected,   the   case  
was  decided  by  all  the  judges  on  the  basis  that  for  section  8(2)  to  be  satisfied,  two  
requirements   need   to   be   fulfilled:   first,   the   conduct   has   the   actual   or   potential  
adverse  effect  described   in   the  chapeau;;  secondly   it  could   involve  one  or  more  of  
the  matters   listed   in  paragraphs   (a)   to   (y).   It  was   the   first   requirement   that  was   in  
issue.  The  allegations  fell  within  (g)  and  (y).  
5.3.2   The  majority  judgment  commenced:60  
[2]  ‘Adversely  affect’   is  a  protean  expression.  In  this  context,  however,  there  are  only  two  
possibilities.  Either   it  means  adversely   affect   or   could  adversely   affect   the  probity   of   the  
exercise   of   an   official   function   by   a   public   official,   or   it  means   adversely   affect   or   could  
adversely  affect  the  efficacy  of  the  exercise  of  an  official  function  by  a  public  official  in  the  
sense  that  the  official  could  exercise  the  function  in  a  different  manner  or  make  a  different  
decision  from  that  which  would  otherwise  be  the  case.    
[3]   The   former  meaning   accords   with   the   ordinary   understanding   of   corruption   in   public  
administration  and  consequently  with  the  principal  objects  of  the  ICAC  Act  as  set  out  in  s  
2A.  The  latter  would  result  in  the  inclusion  in  ‘corrupt  conduct’  of  a  broad  array  of  criminal  
offences  and  other  unlawful  conduct  having  nothing  to  do  with  the  ordinary  understanding  
of  corruption  in  public  administration  or  the  principal  objects  of  the  ICAC  Act.  
Although   the   words   “probity”   and   “efficacy”   were   used   to   provide   a   general  
description   of   the   two   competing   possibilities,   they   were   not   used   as   words   of  
































































60     Independent  Commission  Against  Corruption  v  Cunneen  [2015]  HCA  14  (15  April  2015)  [2]-­[3]  (French  CJ,  Hayne,  Kiefel  





5.3.3   In  its  written  submissions  to  the  High  Court,  the  ICAC  had  argued:61  
What   is   involved   here   is   conduct  which  may   have   an   actual   or   potential   effect  which   is  
antagonistic  or  detrimental   to   the  exercise  of  public  powers  by  public  officials/authorities,  
or   which   is   actually   or   potentially   contrary   to   the   interests   or   desires   of   such   public  
officials/authorities  seeking  to  exercise  their  powers  properly  ...  ‘if  the  conduct  in  question  
limits   or   prevents   the   proper   performance   of   the   public   official’s   functions,   then   the   first  
limb  will  be  satisfied’.  
5.3.4   The  majority,   for  reasons  which  are  set  out   in  detail   in   the   judgment,  preferred  the  
first  of  the  two  possibilities  they  identified.  Gageler  J,  dissenting,  for  reasons  which  
he  gave  in  detail,  preferred  the  argument  of  the  ICAC.  
5.3.5   Nothing  is  to  be  served  by  canvassing  the  reasons  on  either  side  of  the  debate.  The  
High  Court   was   confronted  with   a   difficult   problem   of   statutory   interpretation.   The  
problem   arose   because   of   the   unfortunate,   but   long-­remarked,   obscurity   of  
section  8(2):  there  were  two  possible  approaches  to  its  meaning;;  on  one  approach  it  
meant  far  too  much;;  on  the  other  approach  it  meant  rather  little.  The  meaning  of  the  
provision   has   now   been   decided   authoritatively,   and   the   Panel   recommends   that  
Parliament  should  make  no  attempt  to  amend  it  or  to  use  it  as  a  basis  for  extending  
the  meaning   of   corrupt   conduct   in   section   8(2).   It   is   unpromising  material   for   that  
purpose,  in  particular  because  of  the  confusing  expression  “adversely  affects”.  
5.3.6   The  question  is  whether  the  decision  leaves  a  jurisdictional  gap  that  should  be  filled  
by  an  addition   to   the  definition  of  corrupt  conduct  and,   if  so,  how.  Relevant   to   that  
question  are  some  observations  made  by  the  majority,  and  by  Gageler  J,  as  to  the  
practical  consequences  of  the  competing  possibilities  under  consideration.  
5.4   Consequences  
5.4.1   On  both  sides  of  the  argument  anomalies  appeared.  The  majority  pointed  out,  that,  
if  the  ICAC’s  interpretation  prevailed,  the  following  would  be  some  examples  of  so-­
called  corrupt  conduct:62  
(a)   the  theft  of  a  motor  vehicle  used  by  a  local  council  to  collect  refuse;;  
(b)   any  form  of  revenue  evasion;;  
(c)   bankruptcy  and  company  offences  leading  to  a  reduced  return  in  insolvency  to  
a  public  authority;;  
(d)   any  unlawful  violence   inflicted  on  a  public  official   (for  example,  by  a   random  
act   of   brutality)   which   prevented   or   delayed   the   official’s   exercise   of   official  
functions  even  if  the  act  was  wholly  unrelated  to  the  official’s  status  or  duties.  
5.4.2   Many  other  examples  could  be  given.  Two  are  referred  to  in  paragraph  5.2.3.  These  
examples   are   beyond   the   ordinary   understanding   of   corrupt   conduct.   It   may   be  
added   that,   keeping   in   mind   that   judges   are   public   officials,   on   the   ICAC’s  
interpretation   a   plaintiff   in   an   action   for   damages   for   personal   injuries   who  
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5.4.3   On  the  other  hand  Gageler  J  said  the  majority  view  would  exclude  from  the  scope  of  
corrupt  conduct  fraud,  such  as:63  
(a)   widespread  collusion  among  tenderers  for  government  contracts;;  
(b)   serious  and  systemic  fraud  in  applications  for  licences,  permits  or  clearances  
under  statutes  designed  to  protect  health  or  safety  or  designed  to  facilitate  the  
management  and  commercial  exploitation  of  resources.  
He  accepted  that  treating  the  definition  as  including  an  isolated  case  of  telling  a  lie  
to  a  police  officer  was  an  “extreme  consequence”,  but  so,   in  his  view,  was  treating  
the  definition  as  not  covering  (a)  and  (b).64  
5.4.4   The   comments   of  Gageler   J   raise   an   important   issue.  His   examples   are   cases  of  
serious  fraud,  for  private  gain,  practised  upon  public  administration,  which  have  the  
potential   to   undermine   its   capacity   to   serve   or   protect   the   public   interest.   Is   this  
something   that   could,  and  should,  properly  be   regarded  as  corruption?  The  Panel  
would   answer   that   question   in   the   affirmative,   although   ultimately,   of   course,   the  
matter  is  one  for  Parliament.  It  is  agreed  on  all  sides  that  corrupt  conduct  under  the  
Act   is   not   limited   to   conduct   of   public   officials.   Insofar   as   it   applies   to   conduct   of  
public   officials,   it   is   not   limited   to   their   abuse   of   power   for   financial   gain.   Where  
section   2A   refers   to   corruption   affecting   public   authorities,   in   the   context   of   the  
integrity  and  accountability  of  public  administration,   its  meaning   is  wide  enough   to  
cover  the  examples  given  by  Gageler  J  provided  this  is  made  clear  in  the  provisions  
defining  corrupt  conduct.  
5.5   Legal  result  
5.5.1   The   case   is   authority   for   the   proposition   that,   on   the   true   construction   of   section  
8(2),  “adversely  affects”  means  to  adversely  affect  the  exercise  of  an  official  function  
by  a  public  official  in  such  a  way  that  the  exercise  constitutes  or  involves  conduct  of  
the  kind  identified  in  section  8(1)(b)-­(d).  
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Chapter  6  –  Effect  of  Independent  
Commission  Against  Corruption  v  
Cunneen  on  the  ICAC’s  Jurisdiction  
6.1   Relevant  aspects  of  the  ICAC’s  jurisdiction  
6.1.1   It  has  already  been  noted   that   the   ICAC’s   investigative  powers  extend  beyond   the  
power   to   investigate   corrupt   conduct,   and   include,   for   example,   the   power   to  
investigate   conduct   connected  with   corrupt   conduct.  Furthermore,   an   investigation  
of   possible   corrupt   conduct   may   examine   the   conduct   of   persons   other   than   the  
person  or  persons  ultimately  found  to  have  engaged  in  such  conduct,  and  findings  
about  such  conduct  may  be  made.    
6.1.2   In   the   case   of  Cunneen,   the   decision   of   the  High  Court   as   to   the   ICAC’s  want   of  
jurisdiction   was   based   upon   the   premise   that   it   was   accepted   that   there   was   no  
question   of   any   wrongdoing   by   a   public   official   (relevantly,   the   police   officers  
investigating   the   traffic   accident).   If,   however,   the   investigation   had   involved   the  
possibility   of   some   kind   of   police   involvement   in   the   alleged   deception   then   there  
would  have  been  jurisdiction  to   investigate,  and  make  findings  (but  not  necessarily  
findings   of   corrupt   conduct)   in   relation   to   everybody   else   who   participated   in   the  
deception.     
6.1.3   A  finding  that  a  person  has  engaged  in  corrupt  conduct  may  be  (and  not  infrequently  
is)  based  on  a  conclusion  that  the  case  falls  within  both  of  subsections  (1)  and  (2)  of  
section   8.   A   conclusion   that   reliance   on   subsection   (2)   is   unwarranted   does   not  
affect  the  finding  if  subsection  (1)  also  applies.  
6.2   Analysis  of  the  ICAC’s  public  inquiries  and  findings  
6.2.1   For  the  purpose  of  seeking  to  put  the  effect  of  the  Cunneen  decision  into  its  proper  
perspective,  the  Panel  sought  and  obtained  from  the  ICAC  summaries  of  the  subject  
matter  of  all  its  public  inquiries  in  which  corrupt  conduct  findings  were  made,  and  its  
findings,  since  December  1990  (after  the  post-­Balog  amendments).  
6.2.2   The   information   the   Panel   received   covered   the   period   from   December   1990   to  
3  June  2015.  Over  that  period,  the  total  number  of  reports  in  which  corrupt  conduct  
findings   were   made   was   125.   These   reports   covered   all   of   the   ICAC’s   public  
inquiries  over  the  period  in  respect  of  which  there  were  findings  of  corrupt  conduct.  
6.2.3   Most  of   the  reports   related   to  a  number  of  persons,  although  some  related  only   to  
one   individual.   In   the   period   2008-­2009   there   were   7   reports   in   which   corrupt  
conduct   findings   were   made   resulting   from   one   operation   (Operation   Monto  
covering  RailCorp).  
6.2.4   Of  the  125  public  inquiries  the  subject  of  the  reports  referred  to  in  paragraph  6.2.2,  
the  total  number  where  the  ICAC  would  have  lacked  jurisdiction  to  investigate  based  





6.2.5   In   order   to   explain   the   pattern   that   emerges   it   is   convenient   to   consider   in   more  
detail   the  50  of   the   reports   resulting   in   findings  of   corrupt  conduct  extending  back  
from   3   June   2015   (Operation   Jarah)   to   19   November   2008   (Operation   Monto   –  
Report  7).    
6.2.6   Of   these   50   reports,   there   were   two   in   which   the   ICAC   would   have   lacked  
jurisdiction   to   investigate,   conduct   public   inquiries,   and   report   on   the   basis   of   the  
Cunneen   decision.   They   were:   Operation   Charity   (report   31   August   2011)   and  
Operation  Columba   (report   9  December   2009).   The   other   two   of   the   four  matters  
referred  to  in  paragraph  6.2.4  were  Operation  Bosco  (report  3  December  2003)  and  
Operation  Squirrel  (report  6  November  2003).  
6.2.7   Of  the  50  reports  referred  to  in  paragraph  6.2.5,  the  number  of  reports  in  respect  of  
which  the  topic  the  subject  of  the  Cunneen  decision  was  completely  irrelevant  was  
28   (noting   that  Operation  Meeka   and  Operation  Cabot  were   dealt  with   in   the   one  
report).  
6.2.8   Of   the   remaining   matters,   other   than  Operation   Charity   and  Operation   Columba,  
they  were  all  operations  in  which  there  were  findings  against  a  public  official  based  
on   section   8(1)   (to   which  Cunneen   is   irrelevant)   or   findings   under   section   8(2)   in  
relation  to  conduct  which  affected  the  probity  of  the  exercise  of  official  functions.  In  
a   number   of   those   cases   there   were   findings   of   corrupt   conduct   against   persons  
where  the  findings  against  a  particular  person  were  based  both  on  section  8(1)  and  
section  8(2),   the   findings  under   section  8(2)   being  based  on   reasoning   vitiated  by  
Cunneen.  The  total  number  of  cases  in  which  the  findings  of  corrupt  conduct  against  
one  or  more  persons  depended  entirely  on  reasoning  vitiated  by  Cunneen  was  11.  
The  total  number  of  persons  the  subject  of  such  findings  was  26.  
6.3   The  four  matters  referred  to  in  paragraph  6.2.4  
6.3.1   Operation  Charity   (report  31  August  2011)  concerned  an   investigation   into  alleged  
fraud   on   two   Sydney   hospitals.   Two   persons   were   alleged   to   have   submitted  
requisitions   and   invoices   and   thereby   misled   public   officials   associated   with   the  
hospitals  and  the  management  of  hospital  funds.  No  impropriety  on  the  part  of  any  
public  official  appears  to  have  been  in  contemplation  as  a  possibility   in  the  inquiry.  
(If   there   had   been,   that   would   have   been   a   basis   for   jurisdiction   to   investigate).  
There  were   findings  of   corrupt   conduct   based  on  section  8(2)  and,  apparently,  on  
reasoning  of  a  kind  that  could  not  now  stand  with  Cunneen.  
6.3.2   Operation   Columba   (report   9   December   2009)   concerned   an   investigation   into  
allegations   that   persons   from   various   registered   training   organisations   may   have  
engaged  in  corrupt  conduct,  and/or  conduct  liable  to  allow,  encourage  or  cause  the  
occurrence  of  corrupt  conduct,   in  relation  to  the  delivery  of   training,   the  conduct  of  
assessments  and  the  issue  of  certificates  connected  with  approved  security  industry  
training  courses.  Public  officials  considering  security  licence  applications  were  said  
to  have  been  misled.  The  findings  of  corrupt  conduct  were  all  based  on  section  8(2)  
and,  apparently,  on  reasoning  of  a  kind  that  could  not  now  stand  with  Cunneen.  
6.3.3   Operation   Bosco   (report   3   December   2003)   concerned   a   person   who   was   said  
falsely   to   have   claimed   certain   academic   qualifications   when   applying   for   various  





misled  the  officials  required  to  deal  with  his  application.  This  was  a  case  of  a  person  
who  allegedly  became  a  public  official  by  fraudulent  means.  The  findings  of  corrupt  
conduct  were   based   on   section   8(2)   and,   apparently,   on   reasoning   of   a   kind   that  
could  not  now  stand  with  Cunneen.  
6.3.4   Operation   Squirrel   (report   6   November   2003)   concerned   the   authenticity   of  
qualifications  and  related  documents  submitted  as  part  of  certain  applications  to  the  
Department   of   Fair   Trading   for   building   and   trade   licences.   The   public   officials  
dealing  with  the  licence  applications  were  said  to  have  been  misled.  The  findings  of  
corrupt  conduct  were  based  on  section  8(2)  and,  apparently,  on  reasoning  of  a  kind  
that  could  not  now  stand  with  Cunneen.  





Chapter  7  –  The  Appropriate  Scope  for  
the  Jurisdiction  of  the  ICAC  
7.1   The  nature  of  the  jurisdiction  
7.1.1   Jurisdiction   is   the  authority   to  exercise  statutory   functions  and  powers.  Relevantly,  
that   includes   the   authority   to   investigate   (and   to   exercise   various   powers   for   that  
purpose),   to   hold   a   public   inquiry   as   part   of   the   investigation,   and   to   make   and  
report   findings,  which  may   include  a   finding   that  a  person  has  engaged   in  corrupt  
conduct.  
7.1.2   The  Panel’s   terms  of   reference   require   it   to  consider   the  appropriate  scope  of   the  
ICAC’s   jurisdiction   in   the   light   of   the   decision   in   Cunneen.   As   appears   from  
paragraph  5.2.1,  and  paragraph  5.1.2,  the  High  Court  upheld  the  Court  of  Appeal’s  
declaration   that   the   ICAC   was   exceeding   its   jurisdiction   in   investigating   the  
allegations  against   three  persons  including  Ms  Cunneen,  and  in  deciding  to  hold  a  
public   inquiry   into   the   allegations.   Since   the  matter   never   reached   the   stage   of   a  
public  inquiry  no  question  of  findings  arose.  
7.1.3   The  want  of  jurisdiction  resulted  from  the  conclusion  that  the  alleged  conduct  on  the  
part   of   the   three   named   persons   was   not   within   the   ambit   of   corrupt   conduct   as  
defined   in   sections   7,   8   and   9   of   the   Act,   keeping   in   mind   that   there   was   no  
allegation  of  any  other  kind  of  corrupt  conduct,  such  as  possible  wrongdoing  on  the  
part   of   a   police   officer   concerning   the   traffic   accident   in   question,   or   a   possible  
attempt  to  procure  such  wrongdoing.  
7.1.4   As   appears   from   section   13(1)(a)   of   the  Act,   the   ICAC’s   jurisdiction   to   investigate  
(which   includes   holding   public   inquiries,   and  may   lead   to   adverse   findings   and   a  
report)   extends   beyond   the   investigation   of   possible   corrupt   conduct   and   includes  
the   investigation   of   possible   conduct   liable   to   allow,   encourage   or   cause   corrupt  
conduct,  and  of  possible  conduct  connected  with  corrupt  conduct.  However,  absent  
any  suggestion  of  any  kind  of  actual,  or  potential,  or  connected  corrupt  conduct  on  
the   part   of   any   person   involved   in   the   investigation,   then   there   is   no   jurisdiction;;  
hence  the  importance  of  the  definition  of  corrupt  conduct.  
7.1.5   The  ICAC’s  authority  extends  beyond  the  matters  referred  to   in  section  13(1)(a).   It  
also   has   important   advisory,   educational   and   preventive   functions   as   set   out   in  
paragraphs   (e)   to   (j).   These   also   are   limited   by   reference   to   corrupt   conduct   as  
defined.   This   creates   a   certain   tension.   The   ICAC’s   powers   of   investigation   and  
making  findings,  as  courts  have  often  observed,  involve  substantial  interference  with  
the   common   law   rights   and   freedoms   of   citizens   and   therefore   the   scope   of   that  
aspect   of   its   jurisdiction   might   reasonably   be   expected   to   be   defined   with   some  
caution.  On  the  other  hand,  the  functions  referred  to  in  (e)  to  (j)  might  be  expected  
to  be  based  on  a  different  approach.  
7.1.6   One   appropriate   response   to   this   tension   would   be   to   loosen   the   connection  
between   the   formulation  of   the   functions  of  advice,  education  and  prevention,  and  
the  definition  of  corrupt  conduct.  So  far  as  the  Panel  can  see,  there  is  no  reason  of  





investigation   and   decision-­making   should   be   the   same   as   that   for   these   other  
important   functions.   The   Panel   recommends   that   this   aspect   of   the   legislative  
framework  should  be  reconsidered.  
7.1.7   The   Panel   recommends   that   section   13(1)   be   amended   to   add   to   each   of  
paragraphs  (e)  to  (j)  a  reference  to  promoting  the  integrity  and  good  repute  of  public  
administration.  
7.1.8   The  purpose  of  the  suggested  amendments  is  to  free  the  advisory,  educational  and  
prevention  functions  from  the  constraints  that  accompany,  or  should  as  a  matter  of  
principle   accompany,   the   investigative   jurisdiction   including   the   power   to   make  
findings  of  corrupt  conduct.  
7.2   Previous  proposals  
7.2.1   In  November  2001,  the  Parliamentary  Committee  on  the  ICAC  published  a  Review  
which  dealt,  among  other  things,  with  Jurisdictional  Issues.65  The  Commissioner  at  
the  time  was  Ms  Moss.  
7.2.2   The  Review  recorded  Ms  Moss  as  pointing  out  that  the  current  definition  of  corrupt  
conduct  was  obviously  an  effort  to  be  exhaustive  and  not  to  miss  anything,  but  that  
the   time   had   come   to   reconsider   that   approach   and   to   define   the   expression   “in  
such  a  way  as   to  adequately  cover   that  which   is  generally   regarded   to  be  corrupt,  
but  excludes  that  conduct  that  is  not  ordinarily  thought  of  in  that  way”.66  She  said:  
If   you   were   to   set   out   today   to   establish   a   new   anti   corruption   commission,   having   the  
benefit  of  the  lessons  of  our  experience  you  may  well  define  our  terms  and  jurisdiction  very  
differently.  However,  with  an  organisation  that  has  been  in  operation  for  12  years,  it  is  very  
hard   to   make   changes   in   these   areas   without   looking   like   you   are   weakening   the  
Commission’s  jurisdiction  and  its  ability  to  fight  corruption.  
7.2.3   In  its  account  of  the  history  of  the  legislation  the  Committee  said  of  the  definition  of  
corrupt  conduct:  “Its  focus  was  on  conduct  of  public  officials  or  those  who,  although  
not   public   officials,   acted   in   such   a   way   as   to   have   an   impact   on   public  
administration”.67  Accepting  that,  the  question  is:  what  kind  of  impact?  A  reading  of  
the  legislative  history  does  not  support  a  conclusion  that  any  kind  of  act  or  omission  
that  caused  a  public  official  to  act  in  a  manner  different  from  the  way  in  which  he  or  
she  otherwise  acted  would  be  taken  as  “having  an  impact  on  public  administration”  
if  such  an  impact  was  to  be  relevant  to  corruption.  
7.2.4   The  Committee   recommended  a   redefinition  which,   in   substance,   retained  section  
8(1)   and   section   9,   but   “streamlined”   section   (2).68   Unfortunately   (in   the   light   of  
Cunneen),  however,  the  proposed  redefinition  did  nothing  to  remedy  the  obscurity  of  
the  expression  “adversely  affects  ...   the  exercise  of  official   functions”.  Would  delay  
be  an  adverse  effect?  Or  waste  of  money?  A  central  problem  identified  by  Ms  Moss,  
and  the  Committee,  was  that  the  literal  meaning  of  the  definition  embraced  conduct  































































65     Parliamentary  Committee  on  the  Independent  Commission  Against  Corruption,  Parliament  of  New  South  Wales,  Review  of  
the  ICAC  –  Stage  II:  Jurisdictional  Issues  (2001).  
66     Ibid  2.  
67     Ibid  7.  





identified:  people  did  not  want  to  appear  to  be  weakening  the  anti-­corruption  effort.  
The  Committee’s  recommendation  was  never  taken  up  by  Parliament.  
7.2.5   The  2005  Report   recommended   some   re-­structuring  of   sections  7,   8  and  9   in   the  
interests  of  clarifying  section  8(2),  but  that  recommendation  was  not  adopted.  
7.2.6   Whatever   past   inhibitions   there   may   have   been   about   changing   the   definition   of  
corrupt  conduct  because  to  do  so  might  appear  to  manifest  an  attitude  of  insufficient  
firmness   towards   corruption,   they   cannot   have   survived  Cunneen.   If   no   change   is  
made  to   the  definition  (which   is  one  obvious  possibility)   then   its  scope   is  narrower  
than  the  ICAC  and,  perhaps,  the  Committee  had  previously  thought  it  to  be.  
7.3   Public  policy  considerations  
7.3.1   The  problem  with  which  the  Panel  is  concerned  would  disappear  if  Parliament  were  
to   alter   the   focus   of   the   Act’s   anti-­corruption   effort   from   corrupt   conduct   in   and  
around  public  administration   to  corruption  generally.  There  would   then  be  no  need  
to   work   out   how   to   relate   corruption   to   public   administration;;   there   would   be   no  
necessary  relationship  at  all.  There  would  still  be  a  problem  of  defining  corruption,  
but   it   would   not   be   the   same   as   the   problem   that   now   arises.   There   would,   of  
course,  be  other  problems  as  well,  including  issues  of  resources.  It  has  been  noted  
earlier   that   the   Hong   Kong   ICAC   has   a   general   anti-­corruption   role   and   is   not  
restricted   to   activities   in   and   around   the   public   sector.   However,   as   has   been  
pointed  out  to  the  Panel,  its  level  of  resources  is  very  different  from  that  of  the  NSW  
ICAC.  
7.3.2   The   Panel’s   terms   of   reference   reflect   an   assumption   that   the   policy   change  
mentioned  in  paragraph  7.3.1  is  not  in  contemplation.  However,  the  Panel  refers  to  
it,  not  merely  to  show  that  the  possibility  has  not  been  overlooked,  but  for  a  reason  
of   principle.   A   view   as   to   what   kind   of   relationship   ought   to   exist   between   the  
corruption  with  which  the  ICAC  is  concerned  and  public  administration  must  require  
some   consideration   as   to   why   there   should   be   a   requirement   for   any   such  
relationship   in  the  first  place.   If   it   is  simply  a  question  of  resources,   then  that  does  
not   take   the   matter   very   far.   If   it   is   based   on   the   historical   circumstances   that  
brought   the   ICAC   into   being   in   the   first   place,   that   is   another   matter.   There   is  
nothing  in  those  circumstances,  as  outlined  by  Premier  Greiner  to  Parliament,  which  
gives  any  ground  for  thinking  that  the  evil  to  be  addressed  by  creating  a  new  body  
with   extraordinary   powers   overriding   common   law   rights   and   privileges   was   a  
prevalence  of  administrative  errors  made  in  good  faith  by  public  officials  who  were  
being   misled   by   private   citizens   who   made   false   entries   in   returns   or   otherwise  
made  false  or  misleading  statements  to  officials.  
7.3.3   The  evil  which  was  said   to   justify   the  creation  of   the   ICAC  and   the  conferral  of   its  
extraordinary  powers  as  described   to  Parliament  and   the  public  was  of  a  kind   that  
nobody  would   have   difficulty   in   identifying   as   corruption.  What  was   said  was   that  
public   administration   in   this   State   had   been   brought   into   disrepute.   Extreme  
measures  were  said  to  be  necessary  to  secure  and  maintain  honest  and  reputable  
government.  The  integrity  of  public  administration  was  said  to  be  at  stake.  
7.3.4   As   will   appear   from   Chapter   10,   the   State   of   NSW   is   not   under-­supplied   with  





one  side   the  matters  mentioned   in  paragraphs   (b),   (c)  and   (d)  of   section  9   (which  
appear  directed  to  public  officials),  since,  by  hypothesis,  the  conduct  in  question  is  a  
criminal   offence,   then   there   is   a   law   against   it,   there   are   agents   of   the   executive  
government   to  enforce   those   laws,  and   there  are  courts   to  apply   them  and  punish  
offenders  according  to  due  process  of  law.  The  creation  of  the  ICAC  was  not  said  to  
be   justified   by   reason   of   some   kind   of   general   weakness   in   the   criminal   justice  
system.   If   there  were  such  a  general  weakness   then  Parliament  might  have  been  
expected  to  address  it.  
7.3.5   The  need  for  something  more  was  justified  on  the  basis  of  a  kind  of  sovereign  risk;;  
confidence   in   government  was   at   stake.  What   is   it   that   undermines   confidence   in  
government?  Not  any  opportunistic  lie  told  to  a  council  inspector;;  or  any  false  entry  
made   in  an  application   for  a   licence;;  or  any  non-­disclosure  of   the  value  of   taxable  
property.  Conduct  of  that  kind  could  occur  on  a  scale,  or  in  circumstances,  that  may  
bring   public   administration   into   disrepute,   but   that   adds   an   element   that   goes  
beyond  the  bare  fact  of  misleading  a  public  official.  The  addition  of  that  element  may  
give  rise  to  a  kind  of  adverse  effect  on  public  administration  that  might  be  thought  to  
warrant  the  attention  of  a  corruption-­fighting  body.  
7.3.6   As   things   stand   at   present,   following   Cunneen,   the   Act’s   definition   of   corrupt  
conduct   is   limited   to   conduct   (whether   of   a   public   official   or   a   private   citizen)   that  
touches   or   concerns   the   probity   of   a   public   official.   The   New   South   Wales   Bar  
Association  has  submitted,  as  a  preferred  option,  that  it  should  be  left  at  that.  
7.3.7   A  policy  choice  open  to  Parliament   is   to  do  nothing.  The  whole  of  section  8  would  
then   be   concerned   with   corruption   in   the   sense   of   a   form   of   official   misconduct  
(whether   actual   misconduct   or   misconduct   someone   is   seeking   to   procure).   That  
undoubtedly   produces   a   coherent   statutory   policy.   As   the   analysis   in   Chapter   6  
demonstrates,   it  also   leaves  a   jurisdictional   foundation   that  would  cover  almost  all  
(but  not  all)  of  the  investigations  that  the  ICAC  has  undertaken  in  the  past.  It  would  
mean  that  some  findings  of  corrupt  conduct  of  the  kind  made  in  the  past  would  have  
been   replaced  by   findings  of   fact   and   some  would   have  been   findings  of   conduct  
connected   with   corrupt   conduct.   The   number   of   matters   in   the   past   resulting   in  
public   inquiries  and   reports   that   have  not   involved  at   least   the  possibility   of   some  
misconduct,   or   an   attempt   to   procure   some   misconduct,   on   the   part   of   a   public  
official   is  small.  This   is  a  course  open  to  Parliament,  but   it   is  not   the  course  which  
the  Panel  recommends,  for  the  reason  that  it  would  fail  to  bring  within  the  scope  of  
corrupt  conduct  some  matters  which  should  be  there,  such  as  the  matters  referred  
to  in  paragraphs  5.43  and  5.4.4.  
7.3.8   Another  course,  which  the  Panel  does  not  recommend,  is  to  return  the  legislation  to  
the   artificially   wide   concept   of   corruption   that   has   troubled   courts,   and   the  
Committee   on   the   ICAC,   from   the   earliest   days   of   the   Act   by   reverting   to   the  
“efficacy”  approach.  This  would  be  unsatisfactory.  It  has  its  foundation  in  one  of  the  
two   choices   presented   by   the   uncertain   expression   “adversely   affects”   in   section  
8(2).  The  Panel  recommends  that  Parliament  should  now  rise  above  the  constraints  
imposed  by  that  expression  and  should  re-­examine,  and  re-­express,  its  policy  as  to  
conduct  which  does  not  involve  misbehaviour  by  public  officials.  
7.3.9   “Efficacy”   and   “probity”   were   terms   used   to   describe,   in   a   summary   fashion,   two  





“Efficacy”  was  not  used  by  anybody  as  a  term  of  commendation  of  legislative  policy.  
All  the  members  of  the  High  Court  accepted  that  the  expression  “adversely  affects”  
raised  difficulties  of  interpretation.  This  had  been  remarked  upon  for  many  years.  
7.3.10   The   inescapable   problem   of   treating   section   8(2)   as   the   source   of   a   meaning   of  
corrupt  conduct  that  covers  non-­involvement  of  public  officials  is  that  damage  to  the  
“efficacy”  of  public  administration  can  result  from  circumstances  or  causes  that  have  
nothing   to   do   with   even   the   widest   possible   view   of   corrupt   conduct.   This  
embarrassment   cannot   be   evaded   by   removing   some   of   the  matters   listed   in   the  
second   limb   of   section   8(2).   Reducing   that   list   can   spare   a   reader   of   the  Act   the  
necessity   of   having   to   explain   some  of   the   extreme   consequences   of   the   efficacy  
approach,  but  others  remain.  As  noted  earlier,  a  common  form  of  adverse  effect  on  
public  administration   is  delay.  Why  should  violence   that   impacts  on   the  efficacy  of  
the  exercise  of  official  functions  by  causing  delay  in  public  administration  be  defined  
as  corrupt?  To  do  so  distorts  the  meaning  of  corruption.    
7.3.11   It  is  not  a  sufficient  answer  to  a  criticism  of  an  artificial  definition  of  corrupt  conduct  
to  say  that  in  practice  it  is  unlikely  to  be  applied.  People  who  make  complaints  to  the  
ICAC,   and   who   make   allegations   of   corruption   elsewhere,   can   be   expected   to  
invoke   the   full   force  of   the  definition.  Furthermore,   it   is  evident   that   the   ICAC   itself  
attaches  great  importance  to  its  power  to  categorise  conduct  as  corrupt.  (The  Panel,  
on   asking,   was   informed   that   the   ICAC   has   never   made   a   finding   under  
section  13(1)(a)(iii)   (that   is,   of   conduct   connected   with   corrupt   conduct).   It   would  
seem  that  such  lower  impact  findings  are  simply  not  made  when  a  finding  of  corrupt  
conduct  is  regarded  as  available).  If  the  definition  of  corrupt  conduct  is  artificial  this  
undermines  the  educational  purpose  of  such  findings.  
7.3.12   If   Parliament   considers,   as   a   matter   of   policy,   that   the   scope   of   the   ICAC’s  
jurisdiction  as  defined  by  Cunneen   is   too  narrow,   it  would  be  a   retrograde  step   to  
seek  to  widen  it  by  continued  reliance  on  section  8(2),  and  the  concept  of  “adversely  
affects”.  A  problem  with  the  concept  of  efficacy   is   that   it  has  now  been  glossed  so  
as   to   refer   to   the   occurrence   of   any   outcome   in   the   exercise   of   a   power   different  
from  that  which  would  otherwise  have  occurred.  
7.4   The  Panel’s  recommendation  
7.4.1   The   Panel   considers   that,   consistently   with   the   reasons   advanced   for   the  
establishment   of   the   ICAC   and   the   conferral   of   its   extraordinary   powers   of  
investigation,   the   scope  of   the   jurisdiction  of   the   ICAC  could  be  extended  beyond  
that  as  defined  by  Cunneen  by   taking  a   fresh  approach  to   the   identification  of   that  
kind   of   corrupt   conduct   that   does   not   involve   wrongdoing   on   the   part   of   a   public  
official.  This  approach  could  be  based  on  the  concept  of  conduct  that  undermines  or  
could  undermine  confidence  in  public  administration.  
7.4.2   The  Panel  does  not   consider   that,   in  order   to  perform   its   functions  effectively,   the  
ICAC  needs   a   jurisdiction   based   upon   an   artificial  meaning   of   corrupt   conduct.   In  
particular,  the  Panel  does  not  consider  that  there  is  a  need  for  jurisdiction  based  on  
a  concept  of  corruption  that  extends  to  any  act  or  omission  that   is  both   illegal  or  a  
disciplinary  offence  or  a  breach  of  a  code  of  conduct  and  that  results  in  some  kind  of  
official   outcome   different   from   that   which   would   otherwise   have   occurred.   People  





provide   information   to   officials   in   many   different   circumstances   and   are   liable   to  
penalties   for   providing  misleading   information.   There   is   no   reason   to   believe   that  
there   is,   in   NSW,   some   kind   of   general   inadequacy   in   law   enforcement   which  
justifies   a   body   armed   with   extraordinary   investigative   powers,   and   a   function   of  
public  denunciation,   to  expose  and  deter  such  wrongdoing.  Nor   is   there   reason   to  
believe  that  an  anti-­corruption  body  can  operate  successfully  only  if  the  meaning  of  
corruption  is  taken  to  cover  all  such  conduct.  
7.4.3   An  artificially  wide  definition  of  corrupt  conduct  debases  the  currency  of  language.  It  
also   creates   injustice   in   the   selectivity,   or   randomness,   with   which   anti-­corruption  
legislation  is  applied.  It  results  in  a  large  number  of  criminal  offences,  or  disciplinary  
offences,  or  breaches  of  codes  of  conduct,  which  are  all  capable  of  being  dealt  with  
by   the   ordinary   process   of   law   or   administration,   but   which   become   technical  
corruption   in   circumstances  where   very   few  of   them  will   ever   be   treated   as   such.  
The  Panel  was  told  by  the  ICAC  that  in  2014-­2015  it  received  1843  complaints.  Of  
those,  only  42  were  referred  for  preliminary  investigation,  representing  2.28%  of  the  
complaints.   It  seems  reasonable  to  assume  that  most  of   the  complaints  were  from  
people   who   think   corruption   means   what   it   says.   If   the   public   were   aware   of   an  
artificially   wide   meaning   of   corruption   it   seems   likely   that   many   more   complaints  
would  be  made,  and  an  even  smaller  percentage  investigated.  Furthermore,  as  both  
the  Commissioner  of  Police  and  the  Chairperson  of  the  New  South  Wales  Electoral  
Commission   pointed   out   to   the   Panel,   there   are   people   with   obligations   to   report  
corrupt   conduct.69   It   does   not   assist   if   the   statutory   definition   is  much   wider   than  
ordinary   understanding.   Laws   are   meant   to   be   of   general   application,   and   to   be  
capable  of   consistent  enforcement.  An  anti-­corruption   law  based  upon  a  definition  
that   is  not   seriously  meant   to  be  applied  according   to   its   full   potential   reach,  or   is  
applied  only  when  it  is  decided  to  make  an  example  of  someone,  would  be  contrary  
to  principle.  
7.4.4   An  example  of   the  problem  of   treating  one  of   the  matters   listed   in  section  8(2)  as  
corrupt   conduct   every   time   it   has   an   effect   on   the   outcome   of   official   decision-­
making  is  tax  evasion.  When  an  individual  taxpayer  submits  a  return  which  contains  
false  information  this  leads  to  an  erroneous  assessment.  It  is  a  serious  offence,  and  
is   punishable   according   to   law.   However,   it   is   not   ordinarily   regarded   as   corrupt  
conduct.   Yet   it   would   clearly   fall   within   the  meaning   of   section   8(2)   for   which   the  
ICAC  unsuccessfully   contended   in  Cunneen.   If   all   tax   evasion   is   corrupt   conduct,  
why  has  it  never  been  the  subject  of  an  ICAC  investigation?  No  doubt  some  of  the  
ICAC’s  investigations  reveal  tax  evasion,  and  findings  to  that  effect  are  presumably  
acted  upon  by   the   relevant  authorities.  However,   if,  according   to  NSW   law,  all   tax  
evasion  is  corrupt  conduct  then  the  application  of  the  law  to  that  form  of  corruption  
appears  at  least  haphazard.  
7.4.5   On   the   other   hand,   there   have   been   examples   of   widespread   schemes   of   tax  
evasion,  such  as  bottom-­of-­the-­harbour  schemes,  which  both  involved  illegality  and  
were   of   such   a   nature   and   extent   that   they   undermined   confidence   in   public  
administration.  Although  this  may  be  open  to  dispute,  the  Panel  considers  that  such  




































































7.4.6   An  individual  act  of  forgery,  causing  an  official  to  make  an  incorrect  entry  in  a  public  
register,   would   not   ordinarily   be   called   corrupt.   However,   a   scheme   involving  
forgeries  may  bring  public  administration  into  disrepute,  and  could  be  corruption.  
7.4.7   In   its  submission  to  the  Panel,   the  ICAC  said:  “The  Commission   is  concerned  with  
investigating,   exposing   and   preventing   conduct   that   undermines,   or   could  
undermine   public   confidence   in   public   administration”.   The  New  South  Wales  Bar  
Association,  in  its  submission,  proposed,  as  an  alternative  to  doing  nothing,  framing  
a   test   of   conduct   that,   as   one   element,   undermines   or   could   undermine,   public  
confidence  in  public  administration  or  in  the  administration  of  justice.  (In  view  of  the  
Act’s   definitions   of   public   official   and   public   authority   the   Panel   would   regard   the  
administration  of  justice  as  included  in  public  administration).  These  ideas  reflect  the  
justification   that   has   always   been   advanced   for   the   creation   of   a   body   with   the  
extraordinary   powers   given   to   the   ICAC:   it   is   there   to   protect   and   maintain   the  
integrity  and  reputation  of  the  apparatus  of  government.  
7.4.8   Some   forms   of   criminal   behaviour   target   government   in   a   way   that   impairs   its  
integrity   and   reputation.   Governments,   like   private   enterprises   and   individual  
citizens,  may  be  victims  of  crime,  but  that  alone  does  not  bring  them  into  disrepute.  
That   is   why   the   example   given   by   the   High   Court   of   stealing   a   council   truck   as  
corruption  seems  so  absurd.  Defrauding  a  government-­owned   insurance  company  
is   unlikely   to   have   any   moral   or   legal   quality   different   from   defrauding   any   other  
insurer.   However,   some   kinds   of   fraudulent   practice   directed   towards   public  
authorities  can  be  of  such  a  nature  as   to  damage  confidence   in   the  administration  
itself.  
7.4.9   The   law   of   conspiracy   treats   the   combination   itself   as   a   threat   to   public   security.  
Similarly,   collusive   practices   and   combinations   to   defraud   can   threaten   public  
confidence.  The  scale  on  which  a   fraud   is  practised  may   justify   its   treatment  as  a  
form  of  corruption.  
7.4.10   The   two   examples   identified   by   Gageler   J   in   Cunneen   and   referred   to   in  
paragraph  5.4.3   are   both   kinds   of   conduct   that   not   only   reflect   serious   criminal  
behaviour  but  also  could  impair  confidence  in  the  integrity  of  public  administration  or  
its  capacity  to  serve  the  public  interest.  
7.4.11   Dishonestly  procuring  or  aiding  or  benefiting  from  the  wrongful  use  or  application  of  
public   property   or   public   funds   also   is   conduct   that,   depending   on   the  
circumstances,  could  impair  confidence  in  public  administration.  
7.4.12   In   the   practical   application   of   any   definition   of   corrupt   conduct,   section   9  must   be  
kept  in  mind.  
7.4.13   The  Panel  recommends  that  the  Act  be  amended  to  include  within  the  definition  of  
corrupt  conduct  in  section  8  conduct  of  any  person  (whether  or  not  a  public  official)  
that   impairs   or   could   impair   public   confidence   in   public   administration   and   which  
could  involve  any  of  the  following  matters:  
(a)   collusive  tendering;;  
(b)   fraud  in  or  in  relation  to  applications  for  licences,  permits  or  clearances  under  
statutes   designed   to   protect   health   and   safety   or   designed   to   facilitate   the  





(c)   dishonestly   obtaining   or   assisting   or   benefiting   from   the   payment   or  
application   of   public   funds   or   the   disposition   of   public   assets   for   private  
advantage;;  
(d)   defrauding  the  revenue;;  
(e)   fraudulently  obtaining  or  retaining  employment  as  a  public  official.  
The  nature  of   the  matters  covered   in  (a)   to  (e)  should  be  sufficient   to   indicate   that  
the  confidence  referred   to   is  not  confined   to   faith   in   the  probity  of   individual  public  
officials.  
7.4.14   This   could   be   done   by   inserting   a   new   subsection   in   section   8   (perhaps  
subsection  (2A))  and  would  necessitate  a  consequential  amendment  to  section  7.  
7.4.15   The  expression   “could   impair   public   confidence”   is   intended  as  a   reference   to   the  
tendency   of   the   conduct   arising   from   its   nature   or   the   circumstances   in   which   it  
occurs,  and  not  as  a   factual  prediction  of   its   likely  consequence.  The  Panel   takes  
this   to   be   consistent   with   the   use   of   the   expression   “could   adversely   affect”   in  
section  8(1)(a).  There,  for  example,  an  offer  of  a  bribe  to  a  public  official  would  be  
something  that  has  the  tendency  to  adversely  affect  the  honest  or  impartial  exercise  
of  official  functions  even  though  the  public  official  in  a  particular  case  is  a  person  of  
unimpeachable  honesty  and  is  in  fact  unlikely  to  accept  the  bribe.  
7.5   Other  matters  
7.5.1   If   section  8   is  amended   in   the  manner   recommended,   subsection   (3)  will   give   the  
amendment  application   to   conduct   that   occurred  previously,   so   long  as   the  words  
“or,   in   the   case   of   conduct   falling   within   [the   proposed   new   subsection]   the  
commencement   of   that   subsection”   are   added   after   “this   subsection”.   The   Panel  
recommends   that   addition.   The   Panel   also   recommends   that   the   words   “or  
expanding”  be  added  to  section  8(6)  after  the  word  “limiting”.  
7.5.2   The   retrospective   legislation   that   followed   the   decision   in   Cunneen   was   enacted  
before   this  Panel  was  constituted.  The  Panel’s   terms  of   reference  do  not   concern  
that   legislation.   The   Panel   makes   no   recommendation   beyond   that   in   paragraph  
7.5.1  concerning  any  retrospective  operation  of  the  changes  to  the  Act  it  proposes.  
This   is   in   any   event   a   matter   which   the   High   Court   will   be   considering   –   see  
paragraph  1.5.7  above.  
7.5.3   In   the   ICAC’s   submission   to   the   Panel,   reference  was  made   to   several   proposed  
changes   to   other   legislation,   as   well   as   certain   changes   to   the   Act,   which   were  
raised  by  the  ICAC  in  its  July  2014  submission  to  the  Parliamentary  Committee  and  
which   were   the   subject   of   a   discussion   paper   of   November   2014.   Those  matters  
have   no   connection   with   the   issue   of   the  meaning   of   corrupt   conduct.   Reference  
was   also   made   to   amending   the   Act   to   allow   greater   flexibility   in   the   use   of  
information  disclosed  under  section  111(4)(c)  of   the  Act   (which  allows  a  person   to  
divulge  certain  information  despite  the  secrecy  protections  contained  in  section  111  
in  circumstances  where  the  information  is  divulged  “in  accordance  with  a  direction  of  
the  Commissioner  or   Inspector,   if   the  Commissioner  or   Inspector  certifies   that   it   is  
necessary  to  do  so  in  the  public  interest”).  It  was  said  that  the  uniform  application  of  





that  information  may  be  used.  This  is  a  topic  on  which  none  of  the  parties  consulted  
by   the   Panel   has   had   anything   to   say,   probably   because   it   was   not   foreseen   as  
arising   under   the   terms   of   reference,   and   the   Panel   has   no   recommendation   to  
make.  





Chapter  8  –  Elections    
8.1   Operation  Spicer:  An  investigation  into  alleged  electoral  misconduct  
8.1.1   The   ICAC   has   suggested   that   it   is   precluded   from   continuing   to   investigate   and  
conclude   an   aspect   of   a   particular   investigation   because   of   the   High   Court’s  
construction  of  section  8(2)   in  Cunneen.  The   investigation   is  Operation  Spicer  and  
the   relevant   allegation   is   that   certain  members   of   Parliament   and   others   solicited  
and   failed   to   disclose   political   donations   from   companies,   including   prohibited  
donors,   contrary   to   the   Election   Funding,   Expenditure   and   Disclosures   Act   1981  
(“the  EFED  Act”).  
8.1.2   The  “Amended  Scope  and  Purpose”   for  Operation  Spicer   issued  on  12  September  
2014  refers  to  the  following  matters,  among  others:  
•   Whether   certain   members   of   Parliament   solicited,   received   and   failed   to  
disclose   political   donations   from   companies,   including   prohibited   donors  
contrary  to  the  EFED  Act.    
•   The   circumstances   in   which   the   2011   election   campaign   for   the   seat   of  
Newcastle  was  funded  by  the  Liberal  Party  and  whether  funds  were  solicited  
and  received  from  prohibited  donors.  
•   Whether  certain  members  of  Parliament  solicited  and  received  donations  from  
prohibited  donors   for  use   in   the  Liberal  Party  2011  State  election  campaign,  
including  in  the  seat  of  Newcastle.  
•   Whether  members  or  associates  of  the  Liberal  Party  used  or  attempted  to  use  
the  Free  Enterprise  Foundation  (an  “associated  entity”  within   the  meaning  of  
the  Commonwealth  Electoral  Act  1918  –   the   “association”   is  with   the   federal  
Liberal  and  National  parties)  as  a  means  of  receiving  and  disguising  donations  
from  prohibited  donors  in  the  lead  up  to  the  2011  State  election  campaign.  
•   Whether   two  named   individuals,  one  of  whom  was  a  member  of  Parliament,  
but   the   other   whom   was   not,   agreed   to   make   false   or   inaccurate   electoral  
funding  disclosures  in  2007  and  2011  and  whether  the  disclosures  were  made  
for  the  purpose  of  concealing  benefits  already  exchanged  or  to  be  exchanged  
with  persons  alleged  to  be  property  developers.  
8.1.3   On  5  December  2014,   following   the  decision  of   the  Court  of  Appeal   in  Cunneen,70  
the   ICAC  announced   that   it  would   not   complete   the   report   on  Operation  Spicer.71  
That   remains   the   position   following   the   High   Court’s   affirmation   of   the   Court   of  
Appeal  decision.    
8.1.4   Operation  Spicer  may  also  be  affected  by  proceedings  commenced  by  one  of   the  
persons   whose   conduct   was   under   investigation.   Mr   Jeffery   McCloy   commenced  
proceedings   against   the   State   of   NSW   and   the   ICAC   in   the   High   Court   seeking  
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constitutionally   invalid.72   Part   6   of   the   EFED  Act   regulates   political   donations   and  
electoral  expenditure   in   relation   to  State  elections  and   local  government  elections.  
Division   2A   of   Part   6   imposes   caps   on   political   donations   in   relation   to   State  
elections   and   makes   it   unlawful   for   anyone   to   accept   a   donation   that   exceeds   a  
prescribed  cap.  Division  4A  of  Part  6  of  the  Act  prohibits  the  making  and  acceptance  
of   political   donations   by   certain   classes   of   person,   including   property   developers.  
Section   96E   (in   Division   4   of   Part   6   of   the   Act)   prohibits   the   making   of   certain  
indirect  campaign  contributions,  such  as  waiving  payments   for  advertising  and   the  
provision   of   equipment   in   return   for   inadequate   payment.   The   High   Court   heard  
argument   in   the   matter   on   10   and   11   June   2015   and   reserved   its   decision.   The  
practical   effect   of   a   declaration   of   invalidity  would   be   to   prevent   continuation   of   a  
substantial  part  of  Operation  Spicer.  
8.1.5   Operation   Spicer   involves   conduct   of   varying   degrees   of   seriousness,   some   of  
which  if  established  as  fact  may  come  within  the  definition  of  corrupt  conduct  stated  
in  section  8(1)  of  the  Act.  That  aspect  of  the  investigation  is  unaffected  by  Cunneen  
although  it  may  be  affected  by  the  decision  in  McCloy.  
8.1.6   In  relation  to  other  aspects  of  the  investigation,  the  position  is  not  so  clear  –  some  of  
the   conduct   under   investigation   in   Operation   Spicer   could   have   been   “corrupt  
conduct”   if   the   ICAC’s   pre-­Cunneen   view   of   section   8(2),   that   is,   the   construction  
adopted  by  Gageler  J,  had  prevailed.  On  the  other  hand,  there  was  a  third  category  
of  conduct  which,  while  constituting  breaches  of  the  NSW  electoral  laws  (subject  to  
the  High  Court’s  decision  in  McCloy  and  if  found  to  have  taken  place),  may  not  have  
been   within   the   ICAC’s   jurisdiction   because   it   did   not   fall   within   any   aspect   of  
section   8’s   definition   of   “corrupt   conduct”.   The   ICAC   has   itself   pointed   out   to   the  
Panel  that:  
There  are  offences  under  the  Parliamentary  Electorates  and  Elections  Act  1912  (See  Part  
5,   Division   1),   Part   5   of   the   Lobbying   of   Government   Officials   Act   2011   and   under   the  
[EFED  Act]  (see  Division  4  and  4A  of  Part  6)  that  do  not  constitute  conduct  that  affects  the  
exercise  of  official   functions,  either  by  misleading  a  public  official  or  by   involving  a  public  
official  in  any  wrong-­doing.  
The  explanation  of  this  is  in  the  matters  discussed  in  Chapter  4.2.  
8.1.7   A   question   arises   whether   the   Act   should   be   amended   so   that   the   ICAC   has  
jurisdiction   to   investigate  and  make   findings  about   breaches  of   the  electoral   laws,  
whether  or  not  they  constitute  corrupt  conduct  and,  if  so,  how  that  change  should  be  
implemented.  
8.2   Relevant  electoral  legislation  
8.2.1   There  are  three  relevant  items  of  legislation:  
•   the  Parliamentary  Electorates  and  Elections  Act  1912  (“the  PE&E  Act”);;  
•   the  EFED  Act;;  
•   the  Lobbying  of  Government  Officials  Act  2011  (“the  LOGO  Act”).  
8.2.2   Division  17  of  Part  5  of  the  PE&E  Act,  “Bribery,  treating,  intimidation  etc”,  deals  with  




































































creates   a   criminal   offence   of   bribery   in   connection   with   voting   or   refraining   from  
voting   at   any   election.   Section   149   creates   an   offence   of   electoral   treating,  
constituted   by   a   candidate   at   an   election   offering   food,   drink,   entertainment,  
transport  and  certain  other  inducements  with  the  intention  of  corruptly  influencing  a  
person’s   election   conduct,   that   is,   whether   the   person   votes   at   all   or  whether   the  
person   votes   for   the   candidate.   Section   149(5)   declares   that   an   elector   who  
corruptly  accepts  such   inducements,  or  an  offer  of  such   inducements,   is   incapable  
of   voting   at   the   election.   Section   151   deals   with   intimidation   and,   in   summary,  
imposes   criminal   liability   on   the   use   of,   or   threatened   use,   of   various   means  
including   force,   violence,   restraint,   abduction,   duress   or   fraud   to   interfere   with   an  
elector’s   decision   to   vote   or   refrain   from   voting.   Each   of   these   offences   is  
punishable   by   a   fine   (100   penalty   units)   or   three   years’   imprisonment   or   both.  
Clearly   and   correctly,   Parliament   regards   such   conduct   as   serious,   as   the  
prescribed  penalty  indicates.  
8.2.3   There   are   other   criminal   offences   in   connection   with   elections   and   the   electoral  
process  set  out  in  the  PE&E  Act,  but  it  is  unnecessary  to  refer  them  specifically.    
8.2.4   Two   aspects   of   the   EFED   Act   should   be   mentioned.   The   first   is   Part   5,   which  
establishes  a  scheme  for  the  public  funding  of  electoral  communication  expenditure  
incurred   by   parties   and   candidates.   Division   2   of   Part   5   establishes   an   Election  
Campaigns   Fund   to   be   kept   by   the   Electoral   Commission   in   respect   of   State  
elections  and  regulates  payment   from  the  Fund  to  parties  and  candidates.  Section  
75,  which  appears  in  Division  3  of  Part  5,  amongst  other  things,  creates  a  criminal  
offence   of   making   a   false   statement   in   a   claim   submitted   to   the   Electoral  
Commission  punishable  by   fine   (400  penalty  units)  or   two  years’   imprisonment,  or  
both.  
8.2.5   Part   6   of   the   EFED   Act   regulates   political   donations   and   electorate   expenditure.  
Division  2  of  Part  6  requires  disclosure  of  political  donations  received  or  made  and  
electoral  expenditure  incurred  by  or  on  behalf  of  a  party,  elected  member,  a  group,  
a  candidate  and  certain  other  individuals  and  entities.  Division  2A  (under  challenge  
in   the  McCloy   litigation)   imposes   caps   on   political   donations   for   State   elections73  
and  makes  it  unlawful  for  a  person  to  accept  a  political  donation  to  a  party,  elected  
member,   group,   candidate   or   third   party   campaigner   if   the   donation   exceeds   the  
applicable  cap.74  Division  2B  imposes  caps  on  electoral  communication  expenditure  
for  State  election  campaigns  and  makes  it  unlawful  for  a  party,  group,  candidate  or  
third   party   campaigner   to   incur   electoral   communication   expenditure   in   excess   of  
the   applicable   cap.   Division   3,   “Management   of   donations   and   expenditure”,  
imposes  various  requirements  on  parties,  groups,  elected  members,  candidates  and  
third  party  campaigners  relating  to  political  donations  and  expenditure.  An  example  
is  section  96:  
96   Requirements  for  parties  
(1)   It   is   unlawful   for   political   donations   to   a   party   to   be   used   otherwise   than   for   the  
































































73     Election  Funding,  Expenditure  and  Disclosures  Act  1981  (“EFED  Act”),  section  95A.  





(2)   In  particular,  it   is  unlawful  for  political  donations  to  be  used  for  the  personal  use  of  
an  individual  acting  in  a  private  capacity.  
(3)   It   is   unlawful   for   a   party   to   make   payments   for   electoral   expenditure   for   a   State  
election  campaign  unless  the  payment  is  made  from  the  State  campaign  account  of  
the  party  kept  in  accordance  with  this  section.  
(4)   The  State   campaign   account   of   a   party   is   to   be   a   separate   account  with   a   bank,  
credit  union,  building  society  or  other  entity  prescribed  by  the  regulations.  
(5)   The  following  may  be  paid  into  the  State  campaign  account  of  a  party:  
(a)   political   donations   made   to   the   party   after   1   January   2011   (including   the  
proceeds  of   the   investment  or  disposal  of  any  political  donation  of  property  
after  that  date  that  is  held  as  an  asset  of  the  account),  
(b)   payments  made  to  the  party  under  Part  5  at  any  time,  
(c)   money  borrowed  by  the  party  at  any  time,  
(d)   a  bequest  to  the  party,  
(e)   money  belonging  to  the  party  on  1  January  2011  (including  the  proceeds  of  
the  investment  or  disposal  of  any  other  property  belonging  to  the  party  on  or  
before  that  date),  
(f)   any   other   money   of   a   kind   that   is   prescribed   by   the   regulations   for   the  
purposes  of  this  subsection.  
(6)   However,  the  following  may  not  be  paid  into  the  State  campaign  account  of  a  party:  
(a)   a  party   subscription   referred   to   in   section  95D,  other   than  any  amount   that  
exceeds   the   maximum   subscription   referred   to   in   that   section   and   that  
constitutes  a  political  donation  to  the  party,  
(b)   any  amount   of   a   political   donation   to   the  party   that   exceeds   the  applicable  
cap  on  political  donations  to  the  party  under  Division  2A,  
(c)   any  money  paid  to  the  party  under  Part  6A,  
(d)   any   other   money   of   a   kind   that   is   prescribed   by   the   regulations   for   the  
purposes  of  this  subsection.  
(7)   This   section   does   not   prevent   payments   being   made   out   of   the   State   campaign  
account  that  are  in  addition  to  the  payments  for  electoral  expenditure  referred  to  in  
subsection  (3).  
Division   4,   “Prohibition   of   certain   political   donations”,   makes   unlawful   the  
acceptance  of   political   donations   to   a   party,   elected  member,   group,   candidate   or  
third  party  campaigner  unless  certain  requirements  to  do  with  the  identification  of  a  
donor  are  met.  The  purpose   is   to   create   certainty  about  who   is  making  a  political  
donation  by  requiring  the  donor  to  be  properly  identified  and,  by  requiring  a  donor  to  
have  a  legitimate  link  to  Australia,  to  remove  a  perception  that  foreign  donors  could  
exert   influence   over   the   Australian   political   process.75   Division   4A,   “Prohibition   of  
donations  from  property  developers  or  tobacco,  liquor  or  gambling  industries”  (also  
under  challenge  in  McCloy)  renders  unlawful  donations  by  such  prohibited  donors.  
8.2.6   The  prohibitions  stated   in  Part  6  of   the  EFED  Act  and  referred   to   in   the  preceding  
paragraph   are   rendered   criminal   offences   by   a   series   of   provisions   in   Division   5,  




































































statements,   for   example,   in   required   disclosures   are   punishable   by   a   fine   (400  
penalty  units)  or  imprisonment  for  two  years,  or  both.76  A  person  who  does  any  act  
that   is   unlawful   under  Division  2A  or  2B   is  also  guilty   of   an  offence,   if   the  person  
was   aware   of   the   facts   that   result   in   the   act   being   unlawful,   punishable   by   a   fine  
(400  penalty  units)  or  imprisonment  for  two  years,  or  both.77  
8.2.7   One   of   the   offences,   entry   into   a   scheme   for   the   purpose   of   circumventing   a  
prohibition   or   requirement   of   Part   6   with   respect   to   political   donations   or   political  
expenditure,  is  punishable  by  imprisonment  for  10  years.78  
8.2.8   The   Lobbying   of   Government   Officials   Act,   as   its   name   suggests,   is   intended   to  
regulate   the  activities  of   lobbyists.   It  establishes  a  Lobbyists  Code  of  Conduct,79  a  
Register  of  Third  Party  Lobbyists80  and  bans  success  fees  for  lobbying.81  A  criminal  
sanction  is  imposed  for  giving  or  receiving  or  agreeing  to  give  or  receive  a  success  
fee,  punishable  by  a  fine.82  
8.3   Role  and  powers  of  the  New  South  Wales  Electoral  Commission  
8.3.1   The  New  South  Wales  Electoral  Commission   is   constituted   by   section   21A  of   the  
PE&E  Act.  Section  21C  provides   that   the  Electoral  Commission  has   the   functions  
conferred  on   it   by   the  PE&E  Act,   the  EFED  Act,   the  LOGO  Act   or   any  other  Act.  
Section  21C(2)  empowers  it  to  institute  proceedings  for  offences  under  each  of  the  
above-­named  Acts.  
8.3.2   Among  the  functions  conferred  by  the  EFED  Act  on  the  Electoral  Commission  is  the  
power,  exercisable  by  an   Inspector,   to   inspect,  make  copies  or   take  extracts   from  
records  kept  by  or  on  behalf  of,  or  any  bankers’  books  so  far  as  they  relate  to,  any  
party,  elected  member,  group  or  candidate  etc  and  bankers’  books.83  Section  110A  
empowers   the   Electoral   Commission   by   notice   in   writing   to   require   a   person   to  
provide   information,   produce  documents,   to   answer   questions   for   the   purposes   of  
enforcement   of   the   EFED   Act   and   to   attend   at   a   specified   place   to   answer  
questions.  Failure  to  comply  is  punishable  by  fine  (200  penalty  units).  The  provision  
of  documents,  information  or  answers  to  questions  which  are  knowingly  false  in  any  
material   particular   is   punishable   by   fine   (400   penalty   units),   or   two   years’  
imprisonment  or  both.  
8.4   Jurisdiction  of  the  ICAC  in  relation  to  electoral  and  lobbying  matters  
8.4.1   At  this  point  a  number  of  comments  may  be  made.  
8.4.2   First,   the   legislative  schemes  established  by   the  EFED  Act,   the  PE&E  Act  and  the  
LOGO  Act   and   set   out   above   are   intended   to  maintain   and   enhance   the   integrity  
and   transparency   of   the   electoral   process   and   the   activities   of   lobbyists.   The  































































76     Ibid  section  96H(2).  
77     Ibid  section  96HA.  
78     Ibid  section  96HB.  
79     Lobbying  of  Government  Officials  Act  2011,  Part  2.  
80     Ibid  Part  3.  
81     Ibid  Part  5.  
82     Ibid  section  15.  





Candidates   for   office  are  people  who  seek   to  become  public  officials,   but  most  of  
them  never  attain  that  status.  
8.4.3   Much   of   the   proscribed   conduct   does   not   fall   within   the   definition   of   “corrupt  
conduct”  in  section  8  of  the  Act.  An  example  would  be  payment  of  a  bribe  by  a  party  
officer  to  induce  an  elector  to  vote  for  his  party.  Another  example  would  be  payment  
of   a   success   fee   to   a   lobbyist   by   a   successful   client,   say,   a  mining   company   for  
obtaining  a  grant  of  a  mining  lease.    
8.4.4   While   the  Electoral  Commission  does  have  some  compulsory   investigative  powers  
as  set  out  at  paragraph  8.3.2  above,   they  are  not  as  extensive,  nor  as   likely   to  be  
effective   in   revealing   electoral   or   lobbying   misconduct,   as   the   powers   which   the  
ICAC  possesses.  
8.5   Should  the  ICAC  have  jurisdiction  over  electoral  and  lobbying  matters?  
8.5.1   The   Panel   consulted   with   the   Hon.   Keith   Mason   AC   QC,   the   Chairperson   of   the  
Electoral  Commission  who,  in  a  submission  to  the  Panel,  supported  amendment  of  
the  Act.  He  said:  
I  can  confirm   that   the  Commission  would  propose   the   insertion  of  a  new  subsection   into  
section  8  of   the   Independent  Commission  Against  Corruption  Act  1988   to   the  effect   that  
ICAC   has   authority   to   investigate   alleged   breaches   of   the   three   statutes   for   which   the  
Electoral  Commission  has   regulatory  oversight.  These  are   the  Parliamentary  Electorates  
and  Elections  Act  1912,  the  Election  Funding,  Expenditure  and  Disclosures  Act  1981  and  
the  Lobbying  of  Government  Officials  Act  2011.  
…  The  Electoral  Commission’s  interest  is  that  there  will  be  a  standing  body  possessed  of  
royal  commission  powers  and  adequate  resources  to  investigate  types  of  misconduct  that  
have  the  capacity  to  [wreak]  direct  evil  upon  our  democratic  system  and  the  capacity  for  it  
to   function   openly   and   fairly.   Investigating   isolated,   let   alone   systemic,   issues   touching  
electoral  probity  has  proved  entirely  beyond   the  resources  or   interest  of   the  police   force;;  
and,  to  date,  the  Electoral  Commission  has  not  been  given  the  resources  to  do  this  either.  
8.5.2   The  ICAC  has  responded  to  Mr  Mason’s  submission  in  the  following  terms:  
The  Commission   agrees  with  Mr  Mason's   submission   that   it   should   have   jurisdiction   to  
investigate   conduct   involving   alleged   breaches   of   election   funding   laws   and   conduct  
breaching   the   Parliamentary   Electorates   and   Elections   Act   1912   and   the   Lobbying   of  
Government   Officials   Act   2011.   Conduct   that   breaches   these   laws   may   have   serious  
consequences   not   only   for   public   administration   but   also   for   public   confidence   in   our  
system  of  government.  As  Mr  Mason  has  pointed  out,  conduct  involving  breaches  of  these  
Acts   has   ‘...the   capacity   to   [wreak]   direct   evil   upon   our   democratic   system   and   the  
capacity  for  it  to  function  openly  and  fairly’.  
There  are  offences  under  the  Parliamentary  Electorates  and  Elections  Act  1912  (see  Part  
5,  Division  17),  Part   5  of   the  Lobbying  of  Government  Officials  Act  2011   and  under   the  
Election  Funding,  Expenditure  and  Disclosures  Act  1981  (see  Division  4  and  4A  of  Part  6)  
that   do   not   constitute   conduct   that   affects   the   exercise   of   official   functions,   either   by  
misleading  a  public  official  or  by  involving  a  public  official  in  any  wrong-­doing.  Mr  Mason's  
proposal   represents   an   extension   to   the   Commission's   jurisdiction   which   is   a  matter   of  
policy.  The  Commission   is  of   the  view   that   the  extension  of   its   jurisdiction   in   this  way   is  
only  justified  if  all  of  the  breaches  to  which  Mr  Mason  refers  are  brought  within  the  ambit  of  






Given  the  direct  and  serious  consequences  of  offences  against  election  funding  laws,  it  is  
difficult   to   understand   why   the   Commission   ought   not   be   able   to   label   that   conduct  
‘corrupt’,  particularly  in  circumstances  where  the  legislature  regards  some  breaches  as  so  
serious  that  they  warrant  penalties  of  imprisonment.  
For  the  reasons  given  in  the  Commission's  submission,  the  Commission  submits  that  any  
legislative   change   to   enable   the   Commission   to   make   corrupt   conduct   findings   with  
respect   to   conduct   involving   election   funding   offences   should   be   given   retrospective  
operation  so  that  the  Commission  can  complete  its  Operation  Spicer  public  report.  
The  Commission  notes  Mr  Mason's  concern   that  any  changes   to   the   ICAC  Act  preserve  
and  maintain   the  Commission's   capacity   to   keep   the   Electoral   Commission   informed   of  
relevant  matters  in  a  timely  manner.  The  Commission  considers  that  current  provisions  of  
the  ICAC  Act  enable  the  Commission  to  meet  this  concern  and  no  additional  provision  is  
required.  
8.5.3   The  issues  which  arise  are:  
•   Whether  the  ICAC  should  be  given  power  to  investigate,  and  make  findings  as  
to,  breaches  of  the  EFED  Act,  the  PE&E  Act  and  the  LOGO  Act.  
•   If  so,  what  form  that  grant  of  power  should  take  and,  specifically,  whether  (as  
the   ICAC   suggests)   such   breaches   should   be   brought   within   the   ambit   of  
corrupt  conduct.  
8.5.4   The   Act   is   premised   on   a   distinction   between   corruption   in   or   around   public  
administration  and  other  corruption.  Thus,  both  subsections  (1)  and  (2)  of  section  8  
(whichever   of   the   competing   constructions   under   consideration   in   Cunneen   had  
been  adopted)  require  an  impact  on  public  administration,  whether  the  impact  be  on  
probity  or  efficacy.  A  policy  choice  was  made   in  1988   that   the  Act  would  not  deal  
with   corruption   generally,   but   only   with   corruption   connected   to   public  
administration.    
8.5.5   While  the  Panel  does  not  take  a  final  position  on  this  matter  –  it  is  uniquely  one  for  
Parliament  –  there  is  a  case  to  be  made  that  the  ICAC  should  be  given  jurisdiction  
to   investigate  and  make  findings  in  such  matters.  Many  but  not  all  breaches  of  the  
legislation   referred   to   above   strike   at   the   heart   of   the   democratic   process   and   for  
that   reason  have  a  connection  with  public  administration   that  may  be   regarded  as  
warranting  special   treatment.  The  Panel  suggests  a  method  of   investing   the   ICAC  
with   such   power   that   is   different   both   from   that   suggested   by   the   Electoral  
Commission  and   from   that  suggested  by   the   ICAC.  However,  while   the  Panel  has  
had   the  benefit  of   the  views  of   the   ICAC  and   the  Electoral  Commission,   there  are  
other   important   stakeholders   whose   views   would   also   need   to   be   taken   into  
account.  This  issue  only  arose  because  the  Cunneen  decision  came  down  at  a  time  
when   the   ICAC   was   in   the   course   of   a   particular   investigation   and   was   not  
addressed  by  most  of  those  with  whom  the  Panel  consulted.  
8.5.6   An  apparently  strong  reason  for  giving  the  ICAC  power  to  investigate  electoral  and  
lobbying   misconduct   is   that,   as   Mr   Mason   points   out,   it   presently   has   both   the  
resources   and   the   willingness   to   undertake   this   task.   To   that   may   be   added   the  
ICAC’s  operational  experience.    
8.5.7   In   addition,   as   is   noted   above,   the   powers   the   ICAC   already   has   to   carry   out  





be   to   increase   the   resources   of   the   Electoral   Commission   and   to   give   it   more  
extensive  powers  to  investigate.    
8.5.8   The  question  would  then  become  whether,  if  such  power  is  granted,  it  should,  as  the  
ICAC  suggests,  be  brought  within  the  ambit  of  section  8  as  corrupt  conduct.  In  the  
Panel’s   view,   it   should   not.   Many   electoral   offences   may   well   constitute   corrupt  
conduct   within   the   present  meaning   of   section   8   of   the   Act.   An   obvious   example  
would   be   a   Minister   who   solicits   a   donation   to   his   campaign   for   an   upcoming  
election   in   return   for   favourable   consideration   of   some   application   made   by   a  
prospective   donor.   On   the   other   hand,   many   types   of   conduct   amounting   to  
breaches   of   the   electoral   and   lobbying   laws   are   very   far   away   from   what   would  
ordinarily   be   regarded   as   corrupt   conduct   and   which   do   not   involve   any   moral  
turpitude.   There   are,   for   example,   offences   where   it   is   unnecessary   to   prove   a  
mental  element  to  establish  breach.  Between  the  two  extremes  there  is  a  range  of  
conduct.  
8.5.9   The  Panel  has  already   indicated   that   it  does  not  accept   that  any  misleading  of  an  
official   in   filling   in  a   form,   failing   to  make  a   return  or   failing   to  keep   records  ought  
automatically   be   regarded   as   corrupt   conduct.   In   addition,   findings   of   corrupt  
conduct   which   are   distant   from   the   ordinary   conception   of   corruption   would  
ultimately  have  the  effect  of  damaging  public  confidence  in  the  ICAC.  
8.5.10   The   Panel   does   not   consider   that   the   ICAC’s   position   on   this   issue,   that   is,   to  
include  these  matters  within  the  definition  of  “corrupt  conduct”   is  one  which  should  
commend   itself   to   Parliament.   The   idea   that   the   ICAC   should   only   investigate  
matters  which  will   or  may  conclude  with  a   finding  of   corrupt  conduct   is  one  which  
the   Panel   rejects.   Labelling   conduct   as   corrupt   ought   not   to   be   regarded   as   the  
definitive  function  of  the  ICAC,  especially  when  the  label  is  artificial.  The  Act  confers  
important   powers   of   investigation   which   can   be   exercised   in   the   public   interest  
without   the   need   for   the   investigation   to   culminate   in   a   public   denunciation.   The  
Panel  does  not  support   the   ICAC’s  suggested   inclusion  of  all   these  matters  within  
the  definition  of  corrupt  conduct.  
8.5.11   If   Parliament   wishes   to   give   the   ICAC   jurisdiction,   it   could   do   so   by   inserting   a  
subsection  in  section  13(1)  to  the  following  effect:  
  (ba)     to   investigate   any  allegation  or   complaint   that,   or   any   circumstances  which   in   the  
Commission’s   opinion   imply   that   there   has   been   a   breach   of   the   Parliamentary  
Electorates   and   Elections   Act   1912,   the   Election   Funding,   Expenditure   and  
Disclosures  Act  1981  or  the  Lobbying  of  Government  Officials  Act  2011.  
8.5.12   The  effect  of  adopting  this  mechanism  would  be  to  enable   the  ICAC  to   investigate  
allegations  or  complaints  about  breach  of   the   legislation  referred  to,  make  findings  
of   fact   under   subsections   (2)   and   (3)   of   section   13   of   the   Act,   and   formulate  
recommendations   for   appropriate   action,   including   consideration   of   prosecution.   It  
would   not,   of   itself,   enable   a   finding   of   corrupt   conduct   to   be   made   unless   the  
conduct  in  question  otherwise  came  within  subsection  (1),  (2)  or  the  proposed  (2A)  
of   section   8.   This   in   turn   would   mean   that   the   reporting   obligations   imposed   by  
section   11   of   the   Act   would   not   apply.   Those   obligations   would   be   very   onerous  
because  they  would  require  every  breach  of  the  electoral  laws,  no  matter  how  trivial,  






8.5.13   The  Panel  makes  no  recommendation  about  whether  this  amendment,  if  Parliament  
sees  fit  to  make  it,  should  be  retrospective.  
8.5.14   An  amendment  of  the  kind  proposed  would  require  a  consequential  amendment  to  
section  12A   to   reflect   the   fact   that   the   ICAC  would  have  a   function  not   tied   to   the  
concept  of  corrupt  conduct.  





Chapter  9  –  Powers  of  the  ICAC  
9.1   Introduction  
9.1.1.   The   terms   of   reference   require   the   Panel   to   consider   the  Report   of   the   Inspector  
which  includes  consideration  of  “whether  the  ICAC’s  powers,  and  its  exercise  of  its  
powers  are  consistent  with  principles  of  justice  and  fairness”.  
9.1.2.   The  Inspector  deals  with  this  aspect  of  the  terms  of  reference  at  pages  7-­12  of  his  
18  June  2015  Report.  He  notes  a  number  of  matters,  including  that:  
•   The   ICAC   is   an   inquisitorial   body,   not   an   adversarial   one,   a   distinction   that  
many   people,   including  members   of   the   legal   profession,   do   not   appreciate.  
He  refers  to  section  17  of  the  Act.  
•   He   had   received   a   large   number   of   communications   relating   to   Operations  
Jasper   and  Acacia   (which   have   been   the   subject   of   published   reports)   and  
Spicer   and  Credo   (which   have   not   for   the   reasons  mentioned   in   Chapter   8  
above).  
•   Because  of   the  bulk  of   the  material   received,  he  had  been  unable   to  resolve  
the  complaints  he  had  received  in  relation  to  those  matters.  
•   As  a  result  he  could  deal  only  with  what  others  perceive  as  the  exercise  by  the  
ICAC  of  its  powers  and  its  alleged  lack  of  justice  and  fairness.  
•   The  communications  he  had  received  conveyed  a  number  of  “themes”,  that  is,  
concerns  as  to  the  unfairly  damaging  effect  of  public  hearings  and  the  conduct  
of  some  people  engaged  in  them,  media  coverage  of  public  hearings  and  the  
possibility   that   the   ICAC  was  “leaking”   to   the  press,  objections   to   findings  by  
various  Commissioners  that  conduct  had  been  corrupt,  concerns  that  hearings  
had  not  been  conducted  fairly,  restrictions  on  the  type  of  evidence  counsel  for  
witnesses  were  permitted  to  elicit  on  behalf  of  their  clients,  concerns  about  a  
supposed   communication   between   a   former   Commissioner   and   former  
Premier   (while   in   office)   about   the   subject   matter   of   an   investigation,   and  
concerns  that  the  ICAC  has  not  finalised  its  reports  in  Operations  Spicer  and  
Credo.  
•   In  addition,   the  Inspector   indicates  that  he  had  received  complaints  made  by  
Nippon  Gas  Co  Limited  about  Jasper  and  Acacia,  from  private  shareholders  in  
Cascade   Coal   Pty   Ltd   (about   Jasper)   and   from   Nucoal   Resources   Ltd.   He  
notes   a   call   for   judicial   inquiry   into   Jasper   and   Acacia   made   by   Mr   John  
McGuigan   as   well   as   (apparently)   a   reference   to   him   by   the   DPP   of   a  
complaint  concerning  the  Press  Release  issued  by  the  ICAC  on  27  May  2015  






9.2   The  ICAC’s  powers  
9.2.1   Under  the  Act,  the  ICAC  has  power  to:  
•   obtain   information   from   a   public   authority   or   public   official   by   notice   in  
writing;;84  
•   obtain   documents   by   notice   in   writing   (whether   or   not   a   public   authority   or  
public  official);;85  
•   enter   and   inspect   any   premises   occupied   or   used   by   a   public   authority   or  
public   official   in   that   capacity,   to   inspect   any   document   or   thing   on   the  
premises  and  take  copies  thereof;;86  
•   conduct  compulsory  examinations;;87  
•   conduct  a  public  inquiry;;88  
•   summons  a  witness  to  attend  and  give  evidence  and/or  produce  documents  or  
other  things  at  a  compulsory  examination  or  public  inquiry;;89  
•   arrest  a  witness  who  fails  to  attend  in  answer  to  a  summons  or  who  is  unlikely  
to  comply  with  a  summons;;90  
•   issue  or  apply  for  the  issue  of  a  search  warrant;;91  
•   prepare  reports  as  to  its  investigations.92  
9.2.2   In   addition,   while   section   13   describes   the   principal   functions   of   the   ICAC,   it  
operates  as  a  grant  of  power.  Examples  are  the  powers  to  investigate  contained  in  
section  13(1)(a)  and  (b)  and  section  13(3):  
(3)  The  principal  functions  of  the  Commission  also  include:  
(a)   the  power  to  make  findings  and  form  opinions,  on  the  basis  of  the  results  of  
its   investigations,   in   respect   of   any   conduct,   circumstances   or   events   with  
which   its   investigations   are   concerned,   whether   or   not   the   findings   or  
opinions  relate  to  corrupt  conduct,  and    
(b)   the   power   to   formulate   recommendations   for   the   taking   of   action   that   the  
Commission  considers  should  be  taken  in  relation  to   its  findings  or  opinions  
or  the  results  of  its  investigations.  
Section  13(5)  provides  examples  of  findings  permissible  under  subsection  13(3):  
(5)     The   following   are   examples   of   the   findings   and   opinions   permissible   under  
subsection  (3)  but  do  not   limit   the  Commission’s  power  to  make  findings  and  form  
opinions:  
(a)   findings  that  particular  persons  have  engaged,  are  engaged  or  are  about   to  
engage  in  corrupt  conduct,    































































84     ICAC  Act  section  21.  
85     Ibid  section  22.  
86     Ibid  section  23.  
87     Ibid  section  30.  
88     Ibid  section  31.  
89     Ibid  section  35.  
90     Ibid  section  36.  
91     Ibid  section  40.  





(i)   whether   the   advice   of   the  Director   of   Public   Prosecutions   should   be  
sought   in   relation   to   the   commencement   of   proceedings   against  
particular  persons  for  criminal  offences  against  laws  of  the  State,  or    
(ii)   whether  consideration  should  or  should  not  be  given   to   the   taking  of  
other  action  against  particular  persons,    
(c)   findings  of  fact.  
9.2.3   The  ICAC  can  also:  
•   apply   for  warrants   to   use   the   various   surveillance   devices   referred   to   in   the  
Surveillance  Devices  Act  2007  to  a  Supreme  Court  Judge;;93  
•   apply   for   a   telecommunications   interception   warrant   under   the  
Telecommunications   (Interception  and  Access)  Act  1979   (Cth),   to  a  member  
of  the  Administrative  Appeals  Tribunal;;  
•   obtain  approval  for  the  conduct  of  operations  that  would  otherwise  be  unlawful  
under  the  Law  Enforcement  (Controlled  Operations)  Act  1997.  Such  approval  
is  granted  by  the  Commissioner;;94  
•   obtain   approval   to   use   false   identities   under   the   Law   Enforcement   and  
National  Security  (Assumed  Identities)  Act  2010.  That  approval  is  also  granted  
by  the  Commissioner.95  
9.2.4   ICAC  officers  also  have  power   to  commence  criminal  proceedings,  at   least  where  
the  offence  in  question  is  a  statutory  offence.  This  is  a  result  of  the  combined  effect  
of   sections   14,   48   and   173   of   the  Criminal   Procedure   Act   1986,   the   definition   of  
“public  officer”  in  section  3(1)  of  that  Act,  and  clause  101  of  the  Criminal  Procedure  
Regulation  2010.  The  position  is  less  clear  in  relation  to  common  law  offences  and  
the  Panel  has  been   informed   that   the  Local  Court  has   recently  held   that  an   ICAC  
officer   does   not   have   power   to   commence   proceedings   to   prosecute   such   an  
offence.  In  practice,  what  occurs  is  that  proceedings  are  commenced  in  the  name  of  
an  ICAC  officer  but  are  actually  conducted  by  the  DPP.  
9.2.5   The   ICAC   has   informed   the   Panel   that   the   powers   referred   to   in   the   table   below  
have  been  used  on  the  specified  number  of  occasions:  
Power   1/7/13  to  30/6/14   1/7/14  to  30/6/15  
Notice  to  produce  a  statement  (s  21)   18   16  
Notice  to  produce  a  document  or  thing  (s  22)   609   879  
Notice  authorising  entry  to  public  premises  (s  23)   0   3  
Summons  (s  35)   448   308  
Arrest  warrant  (s  36)   0   0  































































93     Ibid  section  19.  
94     Law  Enforcement  (Controlled  Operations)  Act  1997,  sections  5  and  6.  





Search  warrant  (s  40)   33*   17*  
Assumed  identity  approvals   3   0  
Controlled  operation  approvals   0   0  
Surveillance  device  warrants   4   1  
Telephone  interception  warrants   21   5  
Stored  communications  warrants   3   0  
Number  of  compulsory  examinations   203   143  
Number  of  public  inquiries   9   7**  
Number  of  public  inquiry  days   84   77  
Investigation  reports   12   4***  
*     All  search  warrants  were  issued  by  an  external  authority.  
**     Operations  Verdi,  Spicer,  Jarah,  Misto,  Tunic,  Vika  and  Yancey.  
***     Operations  Spector,  Verdi,  Jarah  and  Misto.  Completion  of  reports  for  operations  Credo  
and  Spicer  has  been  delayed  due  to  the  High  Court  decision  in  Cunneen.  
9.3   The  2005  Report  
9.3.1   The   extent   to   which   the   ICAC’s   powers   were   appropriate   was   the   subject   of   a  
consideration  in  the  2005  Report  (Chapter  6).  At  that  time,  the  issues  were  whether  
the  ICAC’s  powers  should  be  reduced  or  increased  and  the  extent  of  such  reduction  
or  increase.  
9.3.2   The   respects   in   which   it   had   been   suggested   that   the   ICAC’s   powers   should   be  
lessened  or  controlled  were:96  
•   repeal  of  the  ICAC’s  power  to  issue  its  own  search  warrants;;  
•   restrict  certain  of  the  ICAC’s  powers  so  that  they  could  only  be  exercised  with  
the  concurrence  of  a  majority  of  three  judges;;  
•   a  specific  matter  concerning  an  alleged  breach  of  parliamentary  privilege  and,  
specifically,  of  the  immunities  of  the  Legislative  Council.  This  arose  out  of  the  
execution  of  a  search  warrant  on  the  parliamentary  offices  of  a  Member  of  the  
Legislative  Council.  
9.3.3   The  areas   in  which   it  had  been  suggested   the   ICAC’s  powers  be  extended  (all  by  
the  ICAC  itself)  were:97  
•   to  confer  certain  police  powers  on  civilian   ICAC  officers   (who  had  previously  































































96     2005  Report,  above  n  6,  Chapter  6.2.  





•   to  grant  power  to  the  ICAC  to  obtain  by  telephone  an  urgent   listening  device  
warrant  under  the  (now-­repealed)  Listening  Devices  Act  1984;;  
•   to   grant   power   to   the   ICAC   to   dispose  of   unclaimed  property   in   accordance  
with  the  directions  of  a  court;;  
•   to  extend  to  non-­public  officials  the  ICAC’s  powers  to  require  public  officials  to  
provide  information  by  written  notice;;  
•   to   remove   certain   restrictions   on   the   ICAC’s   powers   to   enter   and   inspect  
premises  under  sections  23  and  25  of  the  Act.  
9.3.4   The  conclusion  reached  by  the  2005  Review  was  in  the  following  terms:  
6.4          Coercive  Powers  –  Conclusion  
6.4.1   The  potential  for  misuse  of  the  coercive  powers  granted  to  ICAC  under  the  Act  was  
a   major   focus   of   the   Parliamentary   debates   on   the   establishment   of   ICAC.171   In  
1993,  the  Parliamentary  Committee  concluded  that:  
‘It  is  generally  accepted  that  the  grave  concerns  about  ICAC’s  possible  misuse  of  its  
coercive  powers  have  been  proved  to  be  groundless.’172  
6.4.2   Little   appears   to   have  occurred   in   the   eleven   years   that   have  elapsed   that  would  
warrant   a   revision   of   the   Parliamentary   Committee’s   conclusion.   Relatively   few  
submissions   to   the   review   complained   about   misuse   of   investigative   powers   by  
ICAC.  I  am  satisfied  that  ICAC’s  powers  are  appropriate  to  meet  its  objectives.  
6.4.3   However,   should   there   have   been   undetected  misuses   of   power   in   the   past,   the  
establishment   of   an   Inspectorate   as   proposed   in   Chapter   7,   should   significantly  
reduce  the  possibility  of  such  misuse  not  being  detected  in  the  future.  
171     See,  for  example,  Hansard  Legislative  Assembly  31  May  1998  at  page  822.  
172     Review  of  ICAC  Act,  Parliamentary  Committee,  May  1993  at  paragraph  5.1.3  
9.3.5   Three  further  aspects  of   the  2005  Report  are  relevant  for  consideration  of  whether  
the  ICAC’s  powers  and  its  exercise  of  those  powers  are  consistent  with  principles  of  
justice   and   fairness.   The   first   is   the   concern   that   led   to   the   recommendation   to  
include  what  became  section  12A  in  the  Act,  which  was  expressed  in  the  following  
terms:  
2.8     Serious  corruption  
2.8.1   Many  submissions  to  the  review  emphasised  the  importance  of  ICAC  directing  its  
attention   to   investigating  serious  and  systemic  corruption.   ICAC  itself   recognised  
that  it  has  responsibility  for:  
‘targeting   serious   and   systemic   corruption   and   corruption   opportunities   in   the  
NSW  public  sector.’19  
2.8.2   The   Act   does   not   explicitly   confer   on   ICAC   responsibility   for   targeting   the  
investigation   of   serious   and   systemic   corruption,   although   this   is   implicit   in   the  
regime  established  by  the  Act.  
2.8.3   The   Act   gives   ICAC   a   broad   discretion   to   conduct   an   investigation   on   its   own  
initiative  or  on  complaint,  report  or  reference  made  to   it.20   In  deciding  whether  or  
not  to  investigate  a  matter,  ICAC  may  have  regard  to  such  matters  as  it  thinks  fit,  
including  whether  or  not:  





§   The   conduct   concerned   occurred   at   too   remote   a   time   to   justify  
investigation;;  or  
§   The  complaint  was  frivolous,  vexations  or  not  in  good  faith.21  
2.8.4   The   purpose   of   the   investigation   is   to   ascertain   the   truth   of   the   allegations   of  
corruption   and   make   recommendations   for   systemic   reform.   The   investigative  
function  of  ICAC  is  essentially  inquisitorial,  not  adjudicative.  
2.8.5   In  exercising   its   functions,   ICAC   is   to   regard   the  protection  of   the  public   interest  
and  the  prevention  of  breaches  of  public  trust  as  its  paramount  concerns.22  
2.8.6   Under  Part  5  of  the  Act,  ICAC  may  at  any  time  refer  a  matter  for  investigation  by  
another   person   or   body.   ICAC   is   able   to   monitor   and   control   the   investigation  
conducted  by  the  other  person  or  body.  ICAC  conducts  its  investigation  function  in  
co-­operation  with  law  enforcement  agencies  and  oversight  bodies.23  
2.8.7   As  ICAC  complements,  rather  than  replaces,  the  role  performed  by  criminal  justice  
institutions,   oversight   bodies,   and   agencies,   its   particular   focus   should   be   the  
matters  for  which  there  is  no  other  remedy  –  where  there  are  serious  allegations  
of   corruption   that   may   not   be   amendable   to   ordinary   policing   methods,   where  
there  are  systemic  corruption  risks,  or  where  public  officials  or  bodies  are  unwilling  
or   unable   to   investigate   corruption   allegations   or   implement   anti-­corruption  
strategies.  
2.8.8   In  my  view,  the  policy  objectives  to  be  achieved  by  the  Act  could  be  strengthened  
by   providing   guidance   to   ICAC   in   the   exercise   of   its   functions.   This   guidance  
would  not  seek  to  limit  the  jurisdiction  of  ICAC  to  investigate  corrupt  conduct,  nor  
would  it  undermine  the  primary  responsibility  of  ICAC  to  have  regard  to  the  public  
interest  in  the  exercise  of  its  functions.  A  statement  of  principles  to  be  applied  by  
ICAC  in  the  exercise  of  its  functions  may  assist  ICAC  to  explain  its  decisions  as  to  
whether   or   not   it   will   investigate   particular   conduct,   especially   when   subject   to  
pressure  from  complainants,  the  media  or  high  profile  personalities.  
2.8.9   The   principles   to   be   applied   by   ICAC   might   include   an   acknowledgement   that  
public   authorities   have,   with   the   assistance   of   ICAC,   a   responsibility   to   deal  
effectively  and  appropriately  with  corruption,  and  that  ICAC’s  investigation  powers  
should,  as  far  as  practicable,  be  directed  towards  serious  and  systemic  corruption.  
2.8.10   In   submissions   to   the   review   there   was   widespread   support   for   including   these  
principles  in  the  Act.  
Recommendation  R2.2.  That   the  Act  be  amended   to  provide   that,   in  exercising  
its  functions,  ICAC  is  to:  
§   direct   its  attention,  so  far  as  practicable,  towards  corruption  that   is  serious  
or  systemic;;  and  
§   have   regard   to   the   responsibility   that  public  authorities  and  public  officials  
have,   with   the   assistance   of   ICAC,   to   prevent   and   deal   effectively   with  
corruption.  
19     ICAC  Strategic  Plan  2003-­2007.  
20     Section  20(1)  of  the  Act.  
21     Section  20(3)  of  the  Act.  
22     Section  12  of  the  Act.  
23     Section  16(1)  of  the  Act.  
9.3.6   The   second   aspect   of   the   2005   Report   referred   to   above   which   is   now   relevant  
involved  criminal  prosecution.  Two  matters  were  then  (and  remain)  of  concern.  The  





investigations.  The  second  was  the  perception  that  the  rate  of  conviction  of  persons  
against  whom  a  finding  of  corrupt  conduct  had  been  made  was  low.  
9.3.7   The  2005  Report  made  recommendations  intended  to  deal  with  the  issue  of  delay.98  
9.3.8   As   to   the   rate  of  conviction,   the  2005  Report  agreed  with  a  submission  put  by   the  
ICAC   that   “there   is  no   justification   to  change  or  modify   its  principal   functions  as  a  
fact-­finding   investigative   body   to   one   where   its   primary   or   principal   functions   are  
directed  more  to  securing  criminal  convictions”.99  
9.3.9   The   third   aspect   is   the   recommendation   which   resulted   in   the   creation   of   the  
Inspector.100  
9.4   Public  inquiries  
9.4.1   As  noted   in  paragraph  9.2.1  above,  a  significant  power  granted  to   the   ICAC  is   the  
power   to   continue  or   conduct   its   investigations   in   public   by   a   public   inquiry   under  
section  31  of  the  Act.  
9.4.2   It   is   apparent   from   the   submissions   to   the  Panel   and   the   complaints  made   to   the  
Inspector  (as  stated  in  his  Report)  that  there  are  two  general  concerns:  
•   That  a  decision  to  hold  a  public  inquiry  may  be  wrong  or  inappropriate.  
•   That  the  conduct  of  some  public  inquiries  may  be  unfair  or  unjust.  
These  issues  will  be  addressed  separately.  In  doing  so,  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  
that  the  Panel’s  terms  of  reference  direct  attention  to  the  adequacy  of  the  legislation  
rather  than  to  the  conduct  of  any  particular  ICAC  investigation  or  public  inquiry.  
Decision  to  hold  a  public  inquiry  
9.4.3   This   issue  was   live   at   the   time   of   the   2005  Review.  At   that   time   the   issues  were  
whether   to   remove   the   power   to   hold   public   inquiries,  whether,   if   the   power  were  
retained,   the   circumstances   in   which   a   public   inquiry   might   be   held   should   be  
defined   and   whether   the   term   previously   in   use   –   “public   hearing”   –   should   be  
changed   to   “public   inquiry”   to   emphasise   the   investigative,   as   distinct   from  
adversarial,  nature  of  such  an  inquiry.  
9.4.4   This  issue  was  dealt  with  in  the  2005  Report  in  the  following  manner:  
6.5.25   I  do  not  agree,  as  some  have  argued,   that  public  hearings  are  unnecessary  or  
that   the   power   to   hold   them   should   be   removed.   Quite   the   contrary,   in   my  
opinion,   public   investigations   are   indispensable   to   the   proper   functioning   of  
ICAC.   This   is   not   only   for   the   purpose   of   exposing   reasons   why   findings   are  
made,  but  also  to  vindicate  the  reputations  of  people,  if  that  is  appropriate,  who  
have   been   damaged   by   allegations   of   corruption   that   have   not   been  
substantiated.  Moreover,   if   issues   of   credibility   arise,   it   is,   generally   speaking,  
preferable  that  those  issues  are  publicly  determined.  
6.5.26   Rather   than   the   power   to   hold   a   public   hearing,   it   may   be   more   accurate   to  
empower  ICAC  to  hold  a  ‘public  inquiry’.  At  one  level  this  is  merely  a  change  of  
































































98     Ibid  Recommendation  R3.4  and  [3.4.34]-­[3.4.63].  
99     Ibid  [3.4.25]-­[3.4.26].  





6.5.27   It  is  hoped,  however,  that  the  change  will  achieve  more  than  that.  The  change  in  
nomenclature   emphasises   the   inquisitorial   nature   of   the   investigation.   It   may,  
over  time,  encourage  those  involved  in  such  inquiries,  such  as  counsel  assisting  
and   other   legal   practitioners,   to   discard   inappropriate   adversarial   tactics   and  
techniques.  
6.5.28   The  hearing  is  the  culmination  of  the  investigation.  The  presiding  Commissioner  
is   the  chief   investigator.  The  point  being   to  determine  whether  corrupt  conduct  
has  occurred  and,  if  so,  what  needs  to  be  done  about  it,  not  whether  ICAC  can  
prove  beyond  reasonable  doubt  that  a  person  is  guilty  of  a  corruption  offence.  
6.5.29   If   it   is   accepted   that   ICAC’s   powers   to   conduct   public   and   private   hearings  
should   be   replaced   with   the   power   to   conduct   public   inquiries   and   private  
examinations,   consideration   needs   to   be   given   to   the   circumstances   in   which  
these  powers  may  be  exercised.  
6.5.30   Consistent   with   the   provisions   applying   to   private   hearings,   ICAC   might   be  
empowered   to  hold  a  private  examination   for   the  purposes  of   an   investigation  
and  when  it  is  in  the  public  interest  to  do  so.  
6.5.31   I   have   given   careful   consideration   to   whether   the   Act   should   define   the  
circumstances  in  which  a  public  inquiry  might  be  held.  Undoubtedly,  this  is  one  
of   the  most  controversial  decisions   that   ICAC  may  make.  Once   ICAC  holds   its  
investigation  in  public,  it  must  prepare  a  report  to  Parliament  on  the  matter.178  
6.5.32   Once   the  power   to  conduct  a  private   interview   is  separated   from   the  power   to  
hold  a  public   inquiry,   it  may  be  appropriate   for   the  Act   to  provide  guidance  on  
when   a   public   inquiry   may   be   held.   This   will   avoid   creating   a   return   to   the  
presumption  that  all  investigations  should  be  conducted  in  public.  
6.5.33   I  do  not  recommend  that  an  exhaustive  list  of  considerations  be  included  in  the  
Act  on  the  basis  that  this  would  be  an  unnecessary  fetter  on  ICAC’s  discretion.  
Such   a   prescriptive   list  may   prove   inadequate   and  may   invite   litigation   (which  
would  be  undesirable  given  the  purpose  and  role  of  the  hearings).  
6.5.34   In   my   view,   public   inquiries   should   only   be   held   for   the   purpose   of   an  
investigation  where  ICAC  is  satisfied  that  it  would  be  in  the  public  interest  to  do  
so,   having   weighed   the   benefits   of   public   exposure   and   public   awareness  
against   the   potential   for   prejudice   or   privacy   infringements.   This   is   in   general  
agreement  with  what  I  understand  to  be  ICAC’s  current  practice  in  holding  public  
hearings,  and  reflects  similar  provisions  that  apply  to  the  Corruption  and  Crime  
Commission  in  Western  Australia.  
178     See  section  74  of  the  Act.  
9.4.5   As  a  consequence  of   this   recommendation,   the  previous  section  31  was   repealed  
and  a  new  section  31,  substantially   in   its  current   form,  was   inserted.  The   relevant  
controls  are  contained  in  section  31(1)  and  (2):  
31          Public  inquiries    
(1)   For  the  purposes  of  an  investigation,  the  Commission  may,  if  it  is  satisfied  that  it  is  
in  the  public  interest  to  do  so,  conduct  a  public  inquiry.  
(2)   Without   limiting  the  factors  that   it  may  take   into  account   in  determining  whether  or  
not   it   is   in   the   public   interest   to   conduct   a   public   inquiry,   the   Commission   is   to  
consider  the  following:    
(a)   the  benefit  of  exposing  to  the  public,  and  making  it  aware,  of  corrupt  conduct,  
(b)   the  seriousness  of  the  allegation  or  complaint  being  investigated,  





might  arise  from  not  holding  an  inquiry),  
(d)   whether  the  public  interest  in  exposing  the  matter  is  outweighed  by  the  public  
interest  in  preserving  the  privacy  of  the  persons  concerned.  
9.4.6   The  views  expressed  in  paragraph  9.4.4  above  are  the  views  of  the  current  Panel.  
In   particular,   the  Panel   accepts   that   public   inquiries,   properly   controlled,   serve   an  
important  role  in  the  disclosure  of  corrupt  conduct.  They  also  have  an  important  role  
in  disclosing   the   ICAC’s   investigative  processes.  The  Panel   is  not  attracted   to   the  
idea  that  the  powers  of  the  ICAC  should  all  be  exercised  in  private.  Should  there  be  
any  different  or  additional   requirements  which   it   is  necessary   to   satisfy  before   the  
ICAC   makes   a   decision   to   hold   a   public   inquiry?   The   New   South   Wales   Bar  
Association  suggests  “the  establishment  of  a  scheme  under  which  an  independent  
(perhaps  ad  hoc)  body  could  review  a  decision  by  ICAC  to  hold  a  public  hearing  in  
any  given  matter,  guided  by  well  defined  criteria”.  Its  submission  is   in  the  following  
terms:  
Whether   there   should   be   an   oversight   body   that   can   review   a   decision   to   hold   a  
public  inquiry  
16.   The  Bar  Association  submits  that  there  should  be  such  an  oversight  body.  
17.   Particularly   in   recent   times,   ICAC   hearings   have   sometimes   seemed   to   be   like  
‘show   trials’   and   to   involve   ‘trial   by  media’.   By   reason   of   questions   and   answers  
given,  and  comments  made,  at  public  hearings,  often  parties  and  witnesses’  names  
and  reputations  are  irreparably  harmed  by  the  inevitable  ensuing  media  coverage.  
18.   In   the   Bar   Association’s   submission,   given   ICAC’s   extensive   investigative   and  
evidence-­gathering   powers   and   its   extensive   powers   in   respect   of   conducting  
private  hearings,  the  gathering  or  obtaining  of  evidence  at  public  hearings  is  not  as  
important  as  in  other  forms  of  inquiry  or  judicial  proceedings.  
19.   It   is   true   that  public  hearings  do  contain  elements  which  are   for   the  public  benefit.  
First,   the  public  exposure  of  evidence  of  malpractice  and   the  subsequent   ‘naming  
and  shaming’  in  the  media  may  act  as  a  significant  deterrent  to  others  who  might  be  
tempted   to   engage   in   corrupt   conduct   in   the   future.   Secondly,   and   at   least   as  
importantly,  public  dissemination  of  what  occurs  at  ICAC  hearings  may  enable  other  
potential   witnesses   to   come   forward   to   confirm   allegations   of   corruption   or   to  
provide   information   about   further   instances   of   such   corrupt   conduct   (although  we  
have  no  information  about  how  often,  or  how  usefully,  this  occurs).  
20.   These   undoubted   public   benefits   must   be   balanced   against   the   public   benefit   in  
fairness.  Unlike  a  court  of   law,  suggestions  of  corruption  or  malpractice  in  a  public  
hearing   in   ICAC  may  be  based  upon  questions  which  would  not  be  permissible  or  
upon   evidence   which   would   not   be   admissible   in   a   court   of   law.   There   is   no  
presumption  of   innocence  or  right  of  silence  in  ICAC,  nor  do  the  rules  of  evidence  
(including   various   privileges)   apply   automatically   there.   People   giving   evidence,  
therefore,  in  a  public  hearing  at  ICAC  may  be  subject  to  a  whole  series  of  leading  or  
provocative  questions  which  can  be  just  as  damaging  as  the  answers  themselves.  
Moreover,  the  answers  themselves  are  often  ones  which  cannot  be  used  in  a  court  
of  law  and  which  have  been  obtained  by  use  of  powers  not  available  in  connection  
with  a  criminal  prosecution.  
21.   A   question  would   arise   as   to   the   criteria  which   the   oversight   body  must   take   into  
account   in   determining   whether   to   review   a   decision   to   hold   a   public   inquiry.   A  
further   question   may   arise   as   to   the   timing   of   any   such   a   review.   Finally,   the  





22.   So   far  as   the  criteria  which   the  oversight  body  should  consider   is  concerned,   the  
Bar  Association  suggests  a  broad  ’in  the  public  interest’  approach,  analogous  to  the  
discretion   often   afforded   to   a   court   to   re-­open   a   case   ‘in   the   interests   of   justice’,  
would  be  appropriate.  The  potential  circumstances  in  which  it  may  be  appropriate  or  
inappropriate   to   review  a  decision   to  hold  a  public  hearing  are  so  diverse   that   the  
Bar  Association  does  not  consider   it  easy  to  circumscribe  further,  or  more  closely,  
the  discretion  of  the  oversight  body.  
23.   So   far   as   the   timing   of   the   review   is   concerned,   it   is   obvious   that   mechanisms  
should   be   put   in   place   which   enable   a   prompt,   efficient   and   fair   review   of   the  
decision   to   hold   a   public   hearing  as   soon  as  possible   after   that   decision   is  made  
and   before   the   intention   to   hold   such   a   public   hearing   in   respect   of   a   particular  
individual  is  made  public.  
24.   The   Bar   Association   considers   that   ICAC   should   ordinarily   be   required   to   notify  
affected  parties  promptly  of  a  decision  or  a  proposal  to  have  a  public  inquiry  so  as  
to   allow   those   parties   adequate   opportunity   to   initiate   the   review   process.   The  
period   given   to   such   parties   to   make   such   an   application   should,   however,   be  
necessarily   short   (as   should   be   the   time   for   the   oversight   body   to   review   the  
decision)  so  as  not   to  delay  unduly,  or   interfere  with,   the   ICAC’s   investigation  and  
report.  
25.   So   far  as   the  composition  of   the  oversight  body   is   concerned,   it   should   represent  
the  spectrum  of  typical  stakeholders.  It  should  be  a  small  body.  The  Bar  Association  
recommends   that   it   be   comprised   of   three   reputable   and   reliable   individuals,  
nominated   by   independent   figures   or   bodies   in   the   community   who   are   not  
associated   with   the   executive   or   legislative   arms   of   government.   One   such   body  
might  be  the  St.  James’  Ethics  Centre.    
26.   Moreover,   once   more   there   are   numerous   ancillary   issues   to   consider   if   such   a  
review   is   to   be   provided.   For   instance,   there   will   be   a   need   to   put   in   place   a  
procedure  for  ICAC  to  provide  confidential  material  to  the  oversight  body  relevant  to  
the  case  for  or  against  the  desirability  of  such  a  public  hearing.  It  may  well  be  that  
such  material  needs  to  be  kept  confidential  from  affected  parties  even  in  respect  of  
such  an  application  for  a  review.  The  Bar  Association  refrains  from  making  specific  
submissions   to   the   Independent  Panel  as   to   the  nature  and   form  of  such  ancillary  
measures,  but  would  be  happy  to  do  so  if  requested.  
9.4.7   The  ICAC’s  response  to  the  Bar  Association’s  proposal  was  as  follows:  
The  NSW  Bar  Association  has  also  submitted   there  should  be  an  oversight  body  able   to  
review  a  decision  to  hold  a  public  inquiry.    
For  the  reasons  set  out  in  its  submission,  the  Commission  does  not  support  the  creation  of  
another  oversight  body.    
The  Bar  Association  has  suggested  the  oversight  body  should  consider  whether  it  is  in  the  
public   interest   to   hold   a   public   inquiry.   This   is   the   test  which   the   ICAC  Act   requires   the  
Commission  to  apply.  The  Commission  must  be  satisfied  that  it  is  in  the  public  interest  to  
conduct   a   public   inquiry.   The   factors   that  must   be   taken   into   account  when  determining  
whether   or   not   to   conduct   a   public   inquiry   are   set   out   in   s   31   of   the   ICAC   Act.   The  
considerations   taken   into  account  by   the  Commission   in  applying   the  criteria  under  s  31  
are   set   out   at   page   12   of   the   Commission’s   submission.   The   decision   to   hold   a   public  
inquiry   is   one   made   by   the   Commissioner   (unless   the   Commissioner   has   a   conflict   of  
interest,  in  which  case  the  decision  may  be  made  by  an  Assistant  Commissioner).    
The  decision  whether   to  conduct  a  public   inquiry   is  an  operational  decision  made  for   the  
purposes  of   the  particular   investigation.   It   is  a  decision  best  made  by   the  Commissioner  
who   is   apprised   of   all   the   relevant   facts   and   in   the   best   position   to   weigh   the   public  





oversight  body  should  be  able  to  substitute  its  decision  for  that  of  the  Commissioner.  This  
would  be  an  unjustified  interference  with  the  Commissioner’s  discretion.  It  would  interfere  
with  an  operational  decision  and  could  prejudice  the  effective  conduct  of  the  investigation.  
9.4.8   There   has,   in   fact,   been   little   criticism   brought   to   the   Panel’s   attention   (with   one  
exception)   of   the   ICAC’s   decisions   to   hold   public   inquiries,   as   distinct   from   the  
manner  in  which  such  inquiries  are  conducted.    
9.4.9   The  exception  is,  of  course,  the  decision  to  hold  the  public  inquiry  in  Cunneen.  That  
is  an  insufficient  basis  to  recommend  a  change.  
9.4.10   Both  because  it  is  impractical  to  introduce  a  single  purpose  oversight  body  at  a  point  
where   an   investigation   is   sufficiently   advanced   that   a   public   inquiry   is   under  
consideration,  and  because  the  present  scheme  and  the  requirements  of  section  31  
of   the  Act  appear  adequate,   the  Panel  does  not  consider  any  change  to  or   further  
restrictions  upon  the  ICAC’s  powers  to  hold  a  public  inquiry  should  be  introduced.    
Conduct  of  public  inquiries  
9.4.11   It  is  widely  known  that  there  have  been  complaints  made  about  the  conduct  of  both  
private  examinations  and  public   inquiries.  Such  complaints  have  been  received  by  
the  Panel  and  it  is  apparent  from  his  Report  that  many  such  complaints  have  been  
made  to  and  are  being  investigated  by  the  Inspector.  Criticism  has  also  been  made  
publicly  of  the  conduct  of  inquiries.  
9.4.12   Submissions   received   by   the   Panel   have   raised   a   number   of   matters   concerning  
private   examinations   and   public   inquiries,   frequently   in   forceful   terms.   Examples  
include   a   requirement   in   one   inquiry   that   each   member   of   a   particular   board   of  
directors  have  separate  legal  representation,  with  a  resulting  significant  increase  in  
legal  costs.  A  further  expressed  concern  is  the  ICAC’s  practice  of  routinely  making  a  
suppression   order   under   section   112   of   the   Act   in   respect   of   written   submissions  
both  of  counsel  assisting  and  of  witnesses,  including  those  against  whom  a  finding  
of   corrupt   conduct   is   a   possibility.   One   submission   in   particular   raised   issues  
concerning  the  failure  on  the  part  of  the  ICAC  (and  counsel  assisting)  to  deal  fairly  
with   exculpatory  material,   failure   to   give   fair   notice   of   the   allegations   to   be   put   to  
witnesses,   failure   to   supply   individual   witnesses   with   transcripts   of   that   witness’s  
private   examination   and   failure   to   apply   fairly   and   consistently   the   ICAC’s   policy  
concerning   annunciating   an   affirmative   case   before   being   permitted   to   cross-­
examine.   The   Panel   sought   the   ICAC’s   response   to   these  matters   and   the   ICAC  
disputes  each  of  these  allegations.  
9.4.13   The  merits  of  a  number  of  such  complaints  are  being  investigated  by  the  Inspector.  
The   concern   of   the  Panel   is   the   adequacy   of   the   legislation.   It   is  material   for   the  
Panel   to  be  aware  of   the  nature  of   the  complaints   that  are  being  made   in  order   to  
consider   the   adequacy   of   the   legislation,   but   the   Panel   has   not   undertaken   to  
assume  the  role  of  the  Inspector.  
9.4.14   It  is  important  to  keep  in  mind  the  role  of  the  Inspector  and  the  functions  and  powers  
granted  by  Part  5A  of  the  Act.  Misconduct  in  the  conduct  of  a  public  inquiry  could,  if  
sufficiently   serious   to   be   “unreasonable,   unjust,   oppressive   or   improperly  






9.4.15   The   practice   at   public   inquiries   is   for   counsel   assisting   to   open   by   stating,  
sometimes  in  terms  that  attract  extensive  publicity,  the  allegations  the  subject  of  the  
investigation.   The   responses   which   are   contained   in   the   written   submissions   on  
behalf  of  persons  whose  conduct  is  in  question  are  made  the  subject  of  suppression  
orders.  Their  counsel  do  not  ordinarily  have  an  opportunity  to  make  oral  responses  
to  the  opening  address  of  counsel  assisting.  The  result  is  an  imbalance  which  may  
be  both  unfair  and  inconsistent  with  the  public  nature  of  the  hearings.  This  does  not  
appear   to   the  Panel   to  be  a  matter   to  be  dealt  with  by   legislation,   but   the   ICAC’s  
practices   in   relation   to   suppression   orders   are   worthy   of   reconsideration   by   the  
Commission.  
9.4.16   Further,  there  is  judicial  review,  considered  in  paragraph  3.4  above.  If  the  conduct  of  
a  hearing  was  such  as   to  amount   to  a  denial  of  procedural   fairness,   the  Supreme  
Court  could  intervene.  
9.4.17   The  Panel  has  considered   the  provisions  of   the   legislation  concerning   the  conduct  
of  public  inquiries  in  the  light  of  the  kinds  of  complaint  that  are  made  and  does  not  
conclude  that  there  is  a  case  for  legislative  change.  There  is  a  limit  to  the  extent  to  
which   legislation   can   provide   the   solution   to   criticisms   of   the   kind   that   have   been  
made  of  the  procedures  of  the  ICAC.  The  very  fact  that  inquiries  are  held  in  public  
with  the  obvious  potential  for  reputational  damage  arising  not  only  from  considered  
findings  at  the  end  of  an  inquiry,  but  also  from  publicity  associated  with  the  course  
of  the  inquiry,  creates  a  risk  of  serious  unfairness.  At  the  same  time,  publicity  itself  
is  a  source  of  protection  against  administrative  excess.  
9.4.18   It  has  been  suggested  that  the  Act  be  amended  to  provide  that  counsel  assisting  be  
included  within  the  definition  of  “officer  of  the  Commission”  within  section  3.  Counsel  
assisting  may  be  appointed  by  the  Commissioner  under  section  106  of  the  Act  and,  
at   present,   are   not   relevantly   officers   of   the   ICAC.   The   consequence   of   such   an  
amendment  would  be  to  render  counsel’s  conduct   the  subject  of  section  57B(1)(b)  
so   that   the   Inspector   has   power   to   deal   with   complaints   of   abuse   of   power,  
impropriety   and   other   forms   of   misconduct   on   the   part   of   counsel.   The   implicit  
suggestion   is   that   the   Inspector’s  powers  are  presently   inadequate   in   this   respect.  
Another  proposal  is  that  counsel  assisting  be  a  statutory  appointment.  
9.4.19   It   is   plain   that   the   responsibilities   of   the   ICAC   and   of   the   Commissioner   include  
appropriate  supervision  and  control  of  any  person  engaged  by  the  ICAC  to  assist  its  
investigations.   That   responsibility   extends   to   supervision   of   counsel   assisting  
generally  and  during  the  conduct  of  any  public  inquiry.  It  follows  that  the  role  of  the  
Inspector   in   an   appropriate   case   extends   to   examining   complaints   about   alleged  
shortcomings  in  the  ICAC’s  or  the  Commissioner’s  discharge  of  its  responsibility  for  
the  management   of   all   aspects   of   its   investigation.   It   should   also   be   kept   in  mind  
that  counsel  are  subject   to  professional   rules  and  oversight.  The  Panel  has  noted  
the  provisions  of  the  Legal  Profession  Uniform  Conduct  (Barristers)  Rules  2015,  and  
in  particular  rules  96-­100,  which  came  into  force  on  1  July  2015.  
9.5   A  further  issue  concerning  public  inquiries  
9.5.1   A   number   of   submissions   have   raised   a   specific   concern   about   public   and  media  
perceptions  regarding  the  nature  of  public  inquiries.  That  concern  is  expressed  in  a  





In  exercising  its  power,  ICAC  appears  to  be  a  court.  
The  setting   very  much   resembles  a   court   and  a   judge  usually  presides.  But   it   is   not.   Its  
powers  far  exceed  any  court  and  it  provides  none  of  the  normal  protections  provided  by  a  
court  to  witnesses.  The  fact  that  a  judge  may  preside  does  not  make  it  a  court  nor  that  it  
will  act  like  a  court.  It  is  part  of  the  executive,  not  part  of  the  judiciary.  
But  the  media  and  public  naturally  treat  ICAC  as  a  court  and  the  allegations  made  by  ICAC  
as  true,  and  the  findings,  and  recommendations  made  by  ICAC  as  true  …  whereas  all  they  
are  is  the  product  of  a  one-­sided  executive  investigation.  
Public  examinations  by  ICAC  have  become  a  major  media  event  in  which  ICAC  is  the  star  
and  the  witnesses  the  villains.  Media  grabs  from  the  examinations  have  been  the  order  of  
the   day.   Examinations   have   become   the  modern   day   equivalent   of   watching   Christians  
being  thrown  to  the  lions.  
9.5.2   A   consequence   of   constituting   a   body   like   the   ICAC,   that   is,   a   standing   royal  
commission,   empowered   to   conduct   public   hearings   and   to   make   findings   that  
corrupt   conduct   has   occurred,   is   the   danger   that   such   proceedings   will   be  
misunderstood   and   misrepresented   as   if   they   were   in   the   nature   of   judicial  
proceedings.  
9.5.3   In   truth,   they  are  not.  The   ICAC   is  an  arm  of   the  Executive  created   to   investigate  
certain   kinds   of   conduct.   Its   findings,   although   capable   of   doing   enormous   harm,  
have   no   effect   on   the   legal   rights   and   liberties   of   any   person.   One   submission  
received  by  the  Panel  was  that  the  “normal”  rules  of  evidence  should  apply  to  ICAC  
hearings   and   that   questioning   should   not   be   conducted   or   limited   in   a   manner  
different   from   a   normal   court.   Investigation   proceedings   before   the   ICAC,   both   in  
private  and  in  public,  are  not  court  proceedings  of  any  kind  and  it   is  fundamentally  
wrong  to  think  of  them  as  some  kind  of  abnormal  judicial  process.  
9.5.4   This  was  a  concern  at  the  time  of  the  2005  Review  and  led  to  the  recommendations  
which  were  adopted  by  Parliament   to  amend  sections  30  and  31  to  make  as  clear  
as   possible   that   both   “compulsory   examinations”   and   “public   inquiries”   were   an  
aspect  of  an  investigation  not  a  hearing  at  the  culmination  of  a  judicial  process.  
9.5.5   It   is   regrettable   that   this   misperception   and   misunderstanding   still   appears  
widespread.   That   said,   the   Panel   does   not   believe   it   is   amenable   to   further  
legislative  change.  
9.6   The  power  to  make  findings  of  corrupt  conduct  
9.6.1   A  significant  aspect  of  the  2005  Review  was  the  introduction  of  what  is  now  section  
12A  of  the  Act:  
12A  Serious  corrupt  conduct  and  systemic  corrupt  conduct    
In  exercising  its  functions,  the  Commission  is,  as  far  as  practicable,  to  direct  its  attention  to  
serious   corrupt   conduct   and   systemic   corrupt   conduct   and   is   to   take   into   account   the  
responsibility  and  role  other  public  authorities  and  public  officials  have  in  the  prevention  of  
corrupt  conduct.  
The  reasoning  behind  the  recommendation  that  this  provision  be  included  in  the  Act  
is  set  out  in  paragraphs  2.8.7-­2.8.8  of  the  2005  Report:  
2.8.7   As   ICAC   complements,   rather   than   replaces,   the   role   performed   by   criminal  





the   matters   for   which   there   is   no   other   remedy   –   where   there   are   serious  
allegations  of  corruption  that  may  not  be  amenable  to  ordinary  policing  methods,  
where  there  are  systemic  corruption  risks,  or  where  public  officials  or  bodies  are  
unwilling   or   unable   to   investigate   corruption   allegations   or   implement   anti-­
corruption  strategies.  
2.8.8   In   my   view,   the   policy   objectives   to   be   achieved   by   the   Act   could   be  
strengthened  by  providing  guidance  to  ICAC  in  the  exercise  of  its  functions.  This  
guidance  would  not   seek   to   limit   the   jurisdiction  of   ICAC   to   investigate   corrupt  
conduct,   nor   would   it   undermine   the   primary   responsibility   of   ICAC   to   have  
regard   to   the   public   interest   in   the   exercise   of   its   functions.   A   statement   of  
principles  to  be  applied  by  ICAC  in  the  exercise  of  its  functions  may  assist  ICAC  
to  explain  its  decisions  as  to  whether  or  not  it  will  investigate  particular  conduct,  
especially  when  subject  to  pressure  from  complainants,  the  media  or  high  profile  
personalities.  
9.6.2   A  further  recommendation  (which  was  not  adopted)  was  that  consideration  be  given  
to   establishment   of   a   Parliamentary   investigator   or   Parliamentary   Committee   to  
investigate  minor  matters  involving  Members  of  Parliament  so  as  to  permit  the  ICAC  
to  focus  on  allegations  of  serious  and  systemic  corruption.  
9.6.3   As   is   outlined   in   paragraph   2.8.8   of   the   2005   Report   extracted   above,   the  
recommendation   that   led   to   the   inclusion   of   section   12A   in   the   Act,   and   the  
instruction   to   the   ICAC   to   focus   on   serious   corrupt   conduct   and   systemic   corrupt  
conduct,  was  not  intended  to  limit  the  jurisdiction  of  the  ICAC  to  investigate  corrupt  
conduct,  nor   to   limit   its  powers   to  make   findings  of   corrupt  conduct,  but  merely   to  
give  guidance  as  to  how  these  powers  should  be  exercised.  
9.6.4   The  question  which  now  arises   is  whether  any  aspect  of   the   ICAC’s  power  should  
be  limited  so  that  it  can  only  be  exercised  in  circumstances  where,  objectively,  there  
has  been  serious  or  systemic  corrupt  conduct.  
9.6.5   The  Panel  does  not  believe   it   is  appropriate   to   limit   the   ICAC’s  general  powers   to  
investigate,   or   the   particular   power   to   hold   public   inquiries,   in   this   manner   –   the  
purpose  of  an  investigation,  and  the  public  inquiry  which  is  part  of  the  investigation,  
is  to  determine  what  happened  and  it  would  be  wrong  to  impose  any  form  of  a  priori  
restraint  on  the  power  to  investigate.  
9.6.6   On  the  other  hand,  the  Panel  considers  that   the  ICAC’s  power  to  make  findings  of  
corrupt   conduct   should   be   so   limited.   The   Panel   recommends   that   the   Act   be  
amended  so  that  the  Commission’s  power  to  make  findings  of  corrupt  conduct  may  
be  exercised  only  in  the  case  of  serious  corrupt  conduct.  This  could  be  achieved  by  
the   insertion   of   a   new   section   74B(1A)   to   that   effect.   (A   number   of   other  
corresponding  amendments  would  need   to  be  made   to  section  74B   to  conform   to  
the  proposed  new  subsection.)  
9.6.7   If  the  conduct  investigated  ultimately  is  found  to  be  other  than  serious  it  should  not  
be   stigmatised   as   corrupt.   A   power   which   has   such   obvious   capacity   to   harm  






9.6.8   The  ICAC  resists  this  proposal:  
4.   Whether  power  to  make  a  corrupt  conduct  finding  should  be  limited  to  where  
the  conduct  is  serious  or  systemic    
As   the  Commission  has  noted   in   the  course  of   its   submissions,   s  12A  directs   the  
Commission   to  exercise   its   functions  under   the  Act   in  pursuit  of   the  exposure  and  
prevention   of   serious   or   systemic   corrupt   conduct.   Section   13(3)   allows   the  
Commission  to  make  findings  and  form  opinions  in  respect  of  any  conduct,  whether  
or  not  the  findings  relate  to  corrupt  conduct.  These  provisions  recognise  that  there  
is  a  broad  range  of  behaviour  that  contributes  to  the  existence  of  corrupt  practices.  
The  qualification  of  conduct  as   ‘serious’  occurs   in  a  range  of  statutory  contexts.   In  
the   criminal   law   (a   serious   indictable   offence),   employment   law   (serious  
misconduct)  and  discrimination   law   (serious   racial  vilification),   there  are   legislative  
criteria,   either   by   reference   to   maximum   penalties   or   objective   features   of   the  
conduct.  These  are  findings  that  have  a  legal  effect  in  the  respective  jurisdiction.  
The  Commission’s  findings  have  no  legal  effect.  The  principal  complaint  is  that  the  
Commission’s   findings   may   give   rise   to   reputational   damage.   However,   the  
Commission  doubts   that  a   finding   to   the  effect   that  a  person’s   conduct   is   corrupt,  
albeit  not  seriously  corrupt,   is   less  productive  of   reputational  damage.  There  have  
been   debates   in   the   past   that   have   canvassed   the   nomenclature   of   corruption.  
Whether   the   labels   ‘misconduct’,   ‘impropriety’,   ‘corrupt  conduct’  or   ‘serious  corrupt  
conduct’   are   applied,   they   are   all   simply   gradations   of   corrupt   behaviour.   One   is  
either  corrupt  or  not  corrupt.  The  Commission  ought   to  be  able   to  make  a   finding  
either  way.    
The  restriction  of  the  Commission’s  findings  to  serious  instances  of  corrupt  conduct  
would  damage   the  public’s   confidence   in   the  ability   of   the  Commission   to  expose  
and   address   corruption   in   all   its   forms.   An   investigation   into   a   number   of   public  
officials   who   were   all   engaged   in   a   corrupt   scheme   to   secure   ‘kickbacks’   from  
government   contractors   could   well   result   in   findings   of   serious   corrupt   conduct  
against   some,   but   not   all   participants,   depending   on   the   duration   of   their  
participation   and   the   amounts   of   money   involved.   From   the   public’s   perspective,  
that  would  be  a  highly  undesirable  and  illogical  outcome.  
Most   importantly,   this   proposal   would   encourage   a   form   of   merits   review   of   the  
Commission’s  findings.  The  Commission’s  findings  of  fact  and  the  inferences  drawn  
from   them   towards   a   finding   of   ‘serious   corrupt   conduct’   would   necessarily   be  
scrutinised   in   the  course  of   judicial   review.  Even  where   the  evidence  supports  an  
inference  of  corrupt  conduct,  the  construction  of  the  term  ‘serious’  in  the  context  of  
corruption   is   potentially   so  wide   that   it   would   invite   judicial   review   in   a   significant  
number  of  cases.  
I  appreciate  that  the  Panel  has  considered  the  formulation  of  a  number  of  objective  
criteria   that   would   inform   the   meaning   of   ‘serious’.   However,   the   difficulty   lies   in  
determining   at   what   point   and   in   what   context   does   corrupt   conduct   qualify   as  
‘serious’.  The  satisfaction  of  one  criterion  may  not  be  sufficient,  yet  the  satisfaction  
of  every  criteria  will  exclude  too  much.  Any  formulation  that  fixes  upon  an  arbitrary  
number  of  criteria  will  also  exclude  instances  of  serious  corrupt  conduct.  
The   Commission   accepts   there  may   be   limited   occasions   during   an   investigation  
where   the   conduct   of   a   particular   individual   might   technically   come   within   the  
definition  of  corrupt  conduct  but  might  not  warrant  a  corrupt  conduct  finding,  either  
because  the  conduct  itself  might  not  be  considered  particularly  serious  or  because  
there  are  mitigating  circumstances  against  making  a  finding.  In  these  circumstances  





13(2A)),  and  has  done  so  in  the  past.  Whether  a  corrupt  conduct  finding  should  be  
made  is  a  matter  that  should  be  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  Commission.  
9.6.9   The   Panel   does   not   find   these   arguments   convincing.   For   example,   in   the  
“kickbacks”   illustration   given,   there   is   no   reason   why   findings   of   corrupt   conduct  
should   be   made   against   some   but   not   all   participants   in   the   scheme   if   the   facts  
warranted  it.  
9.6.10   The  complaint  of   the   ICAC  that  construction  of   the  word  “serious”   is  so  wide  as   to  
invite   judicial   review,   and   so   encourage   challenges   to   its   decisions,   is   also  
unconvincing.  First,  there  is  nothing  inherently  objectionable  if  a  citizen  questions  a  
questionable   decision.   Secondly,   the   problem  will   only   arise   if   the   ICAC  makes   a  
finding   of   corrupt   conduct   in   a   case   of   doubtful   seriousness.   If   it   does,   the   ICAC  
itself   should   not   have   exclusive   capacity   to   resolve   the   doubt.   That   is   what   lies  
behind  the  principles  of  judicial  review  applied  by  the  Supreme  Court  and  mentioned  
above.   Put   another   way,   a   person   who   has   been   the   subject   of   such   a   finding  
should  have   the   right   to  argue   that   it   should  not   have  been  made,   because   there  
was  not,  viewed  objectively,  serious  corrupt  conduct.  
9.6.11   The   Panel   is   not   unaware   of   the   possibility   that   the   proposed   restriction   might  
influence   decisions   of   the   ICAC   which   precede   a   decision   to   make   a   finding   of  
corrupt  conduct  such  as  the  decision  to  hold  a  public  inquiry  under  section  31.  The  
Panel   does   not   regard   that   as   any   bad   thing   nor   any   impediment   to   the   proper  
performance   of   the   ICAC’s   functions.   Indeed,   the   ICAC   is   already   required   to  
consider   the   seriousness   of   the   allegation   of   corruption   or   complaint   being  
investigated  before  deciding  to  conduct  a  public  inquiry.101    
9.6.12   The  recommendation  is  confined  to  serious  conduct.  Systemic  conduct  may  warrant  
investigation  but  if  an  individual  is  caught  up  in  it  what  matters  for  the  purpose  of  a  
finding  is  whether  the  individual’s  conduct  is  serious.  
9.6.13   On   this   point,   the   Panel   repeats   that   the   ICAC   is   capable   of   undertaking   very  
valuable   and   important   work,   even   when   it   does   not   make   findings   of   corrupt  
conduct.  The  power  to  investigate,  and  the  power  to  describe  and  reveal  the  results  
of   that   investigation   by   making   findings   of   fact   and   recommendations   for   taking  
action  as  a  result  of  such  findings  under  section  13(3)  of  the  Act   is  a  powerful  and  
beneficial   one,   not   necessarily   or   in   every   case   enhanced   by   an   additional  
declaration  that  a  particular  person  has  engaged  in  corrupt  conduct.  
9.7   Should  “serious  corrupt  conduct”  be  defined?  
9.7.1   The  question  arises  whether  such  conduct  should  be  defined.  The  Panel  does  not  
consider  it  should  be  the  subject  of  definition  where  used  in  the  existing  section  12A  
and  in  the  proposed  section  74B(1A).  
9.7.2   The  Inspector  suggests  that   it  would  be  a  desirable  outcome  of  the  Panel’s  review  
that   the   definition   of   “serious   corrupt   conduct”   and   “systemic   corrupt   conduct”   be  





































































The  degree  of  seriousness  of  conduct  or  whether  it  raises  systemic  issues  will  not  always  
be   apparent   from   the   information   initially   provided   to   the   Commission.   Only   further  
investigation   may   establish   the   degree   of   seriousness   and   whether   the   conduct   raises  
systemic  issues.  In  many  cases,  the  full  extent  of  the  conduct  under  investigation  may  be  
established  only  during  a  public  inquiry  (which  is  part  of  the  investigation).  
…     
Any  attempt  to  provide  a  prescriptive  definition  of  these  terms  is  likely  to  lead  to  claims  at  
an  early  stage  by  those  involved  in  investigations  that  their  conduct  does  not  come  within  
the  relevant  definitions.  This  will  encourage  challenges  to  the  Commission’s  exercise  of  its  
powers,  which  will   undermine   the  Commission’s   ability   to   effectively   investigate,   expose  
and  prevent  corrupt  conduct.  
9.7.3   The  Panel  considers  the  term  should  not  be  defined.  It   is  unnecessary  and,  as  the  
ICAC   points   out,   and   as   indicated   above,   it   is   undesirable   to   impose   an   a   priori  
restraint  on  the  ability  to  investigate.  Many  matters  may  change  and  develop  as  the  
investigation   develops   and   appear   very   much   more   (or   less)   serious   as   more   is  
learned.  
9.7.4   One   suggestion   considered   by   the   Panel   is   that   the   seriousness   of   the   conduct  
should  be  determined  by  reference  to  the  penalty  imposed  for  the  crime  in  question.  
It  has  been  suggested:  
…Usually   the   control   is   specify   particular   criminal   offences  which,   if   proved,   provide   the  
basis  for  the  exercise  of  power:  
•   This   leads   back   to   the   problem   of   maintaining   an   extended   jurisdiction   only   in  
respect   of   serious   corruption,   because   some   offences   can   involve   trivial  
circumstances  and  attract  trivial  penalties;;  
•   One  means   of   doing   this   would   be   by   specifying   that   ICAC   could   only   look   at   a  
matter  if  the  offence  carried  a  maximum  penalty  of  gaol  (say  two  or  five  years)  or  a  
heavy   fine   (say  $500,000).  You  would  need   to   include   the   fine   if  you  are  going   to  
catch  the  corporate  villains.  In  the  case  of  fraud  you  could  specify  a  sum  –  such  as  
$100,000.  
9.7.5   Definition  of  the  seriousness  of  the  corruption  involved  by  reference  to  the  penalties  
provided  for   it   is  common.  An  example   is  RICO.  Nevertheless,   the  Panel  does  not  
consider  it  appropriate  to  define  “serious  corrupt  conduct”  in  this  manner.  Maximum  
penalties  normally  address   the  worst   conduct   by   the  worst   offender  and  while,   as  
stated,  are  often  used  as  an  arbitrary  measure  of   the  seriousness  of   the  conduct,  
they   are   not   always   a   reliable   indicator.   Furthermore,   the   common   law   offence   of  
misconduct  in  public  office  does  not  have  a  maximum  penalty.  That  offence  is  at  the  
centre  of  the  ICAC’s  jurisdiction.  
9.8   The  power  to  make  recommendations  
9.8.1   Section   13(3)(b),   set   out   above,   includes   as   a   function   of   the   ICAC   the   power   to  
formulate   recommendations   for  action   in   relation   to   its   findings  or  opinions,  or   the  
results  of  its  investigations.  
9.8.2   One  of  the  submissions  made  to  the  Panel  complained  of  the  manner  in  which  that  
power  was  exercised  in  a  particular  case,  and  the  Panel  understands  that  complaint  
to   have   been   included   in   the  matters   that   are   before   the   Inspector.   The   relevant  





recommendation,   and   Parliament’s   response   to   it,   has   been   the   subject   of   public  
criticism.  That  does  not  affect  the  Panel’s  view  of  the  adequacy  of  the  legislation.  
9.8.3   From  the  point  of  view  of   the   terms  of   the   legislation,   the  Panel  does  not  consider  
that  amendment  or  qualification  is  required.  In  particular  cases  the  practical  content  
of   the   requirement   of   procedural   fairness   may   require   consideration,   both   by   the  
ICAC  and  by  the  person  or  body  to  whom  any  recommendations  are  made.  Just  as  
adverse   findings,   although   they   have   no   direct   legal   consequences,   may   have   a  
serious  effect  on   reputations,   recommendations  may  have   important  practical  and,  
perhaps,   political   consequences.   This   is   not,   however,   a   reason   for   modifying   or  
removing   the   power   to   make   recommendations,   but,   rather,   it   is   a   consideration  
which  goes  to  the  manner  in  which  the  power  is  exercised.  
9.9   Trivial  and  vexatious  complaints  
9.9.1   A  number  of  submissions  have  raised  the  perceived  problem  of   trivial  or  vexatious  
complaints.  
9.9.2   The  Panel  has  also  had  the  benefit  of  reading  Chapter  7  of  the  Review  of  the  Crime  
and   Misconduct   Act   and   Related   Matters   –   Report   of   the   Independent   Advisory  
Panel,  which  was  provided  on  28  March  2013.  That  Review  of  the  Queensland  Act  
was  conducted  by  the  Hon.  Ian  Callinan  AC  and  Professor  Nicholas  Aroney.  
9.9.3   Undoubtedly   an   agency   such   as   the   ICAC   will   receive   vexatious   and   trivial  
complaints   and   complaints   motivated   by   spite   or   desire   to   do   harm   or   create  
mischief.   The   Inspector   has   said   that,   numerically,   the   overwhelming   number   of  
complaints  he  receives  concern  the  ICAC’s  refusal  to  investigate  complaints.  
9.9.4   The  Panel  has  considered  whether  some   form  of   restriction  or  gateway  should  be  
imposed   on   the   complaints   process,   for   example,   by   requiring   complaints   to   be  
verified   on   oath   by   statutory   declaration.   The   Panel   does   not   consider   any   such  
mechanism  to  be  necessary.  The  legislation  provides  sufficient  power  to  reject  trivial  
and  vexatious  complaints,  and  the  figures  show  that  the  power  is  exercised  robustly.  





Chapter  10  –  Other  Agencies  
10.1   Introduction  
10.1.1.   The   terms   of   reference   require   the   Panel   to   take   account   of:   “The   jurisdiction,  
responsibilities   and   roles   of   other   public   authorities   and/or   public   officials   in   the  
prevention,   detection,   investigation,   determination,   exposure   and   prosecution   of  
corrupt  conduct”.  
10.1.2.   As  the  Panel  points  out  above,  NSW  is  by  no  means  undersupplied  with  agencies  
whose  responsibilities  include  dealing  with  conduct  which  might  be,  or  might  reveal  
aspects  of,  corrupt  conduct.  These  are  the  agencies  referred  to  in  paragraph  1.3.2  
above:  
•   the  Crime  Commission  
•   the  PIC  
•   the  NSW  Police  
•   the  DPP  
10.1.3.   By  section  12A  of  the  Act,  as  well  as  requiring  the  ICAC  to  direct  its  attention  as  far  
as   practicable   to   serious   corrupt   conduct   and   systemic   corrupt   conduct,102  
Parliament   also   directs   the   ICAC:   “to   take   into   account   the   responsibility   and   role  
other   public   authorities   and   public   officials   have   in   the   prevention   of   corrupt  
conduct”.  
10.1.4.   This   provision   resulted   from   the   2005   Report.   The   reasons   were   stated   at  
paragraph  2.8.7  which  is  set  out  at  paragraph  9.3.5  above:  
As   ICAC   complements,   rather   than   replaces,   the   role   performed   by   criminal   justice  
institutions,  oversight  bodies,  and  agencies,   its  particular   focus  should  be   the  matters   for  
which   there   is   no   other   remedy   –  where   there   are   serious   allegations   of   corruption   that  
may  not  be  amenable   to  ordinary  policing  methods,  where   there  are  systemic  corruption  
risks,  or  where  public  officials  or  bodies  are  unwilling  or  unable   to   investigate  corruption  
allegations  or  implement  anti-­corruption  strategies.  
10.1.5.   In  addition,  section  16  of  the  Act  provides:  
16  Co-­operation  with  other  agencies    
(1)   In   exercising   its   principal   functions   relating   to   the   investigation   of   conduct,   the  
Commission:    
(a)   shall,   as   far   as   practicable,   work   in   co-­operation   with   law   enforcement  
agencies,  and  
(b)   may   work   in   co-­operation   with   the   Auditor-­General,   the   Ombudsman,   the  
Australian  Crime  Commission,  the  Australian  Bureau  of  Criminal  Intelligence  
and  such  other  persons  and  bodies  as  the  Commission  thinks  appropriate.  
(2)   In   exercising   its   other   principal   functions,   the   Commission   shall,   as   far   as  
practicable,   work   in   co-­operation   with   the   Auditor-­General,   the   Ombudsman,  
educational   institutions,   management   consultants   and   such   other   persons   and  




































































(3)   The  Commission  may  consult  with  and  disseminate   intelligence  and   information  to  
law  enforcement  agencies,  the  Australian  Crime  Commission,  the  Australian  Bureau  
of  Criminal  Intelligence  and  such  other  persons  and  bodies  (including  any  task  force  
and  any  member  of  a  task  force)  as  the  Commission  thinks  appropriate.  
(4)   If  the  Commission  disseminates  information  to  a  person  or  body  under  this  section  
on   the   understanding   that   the   information   is   confidential,   the   person   or   body   is  
subject  to  the  secrecy  provisions  of  section  111  in  relation  to  the  information.  
(5)   In  this  section:  
law  enforcement  agency  means:    
(a)   the  NSW  Police  Force,  or  
(b)   a  police  force  of  another  State  or  Territory,  or  
(c)   the  Australian  Federal  Police,  or  
(d)   any  other  authority  or  person  responsible  for  the  enforcement  of  the  laws  of  
the  Commonwealth  or  of  the  State,  another  State  or  a  Territory.  
10.2   Role  of  the  ICAC  and  other  relevant  authorities  
10.2.1   Section  2A  of  the  Act  specifies  the  principal  objects  of  the  Act  and  includes  amongst  
those   objects   the   promotion   of   the   integrity   and   accountability   of   public  
administration  by  constituting  the  ICAC  as  an  independent  and  accountable  body  to  
investigate,   expose   and   prevent   corruption   involving   or   affecting   public   authorities  
and  public  officials,  and  the  conferral  on  the  ICAC  of  special  powers  to  inquire  into  
allegations  of  corruption.  
10.2.2   It   is   those  principal  objects  which  distinguish  both  the  Act  and  the  ICAC  itself   from  
the   legislation  which  constitutes  other  authorities,  such  as   the  Crime  Commission,  
and   those   authorities   themselves.   The   ICAC   is   a   special   purpose   corruption  
investigator  and  is  the  only  such  body  in  NSW.  While  other  authorities  inevitably  will  
come   across   evidence   of   corrupt   conduct,   its   discovery   and   exposure   is   only  
incidental  to  their  principal  functions.  
10.2.3   Thus,  each  of   the  bodies  mentioned   in  paragraph  1.3.2  has   functions  distinct   from  
the   ICAC.   The   Crime   Commission’s   mandate   is   to   reduce   the   incidence   of  
organised  and  other  serious  crime.  The  DPP  is  the  prosecuting  authority  for  NSW.  
The  NSW  Police  Force’s  functions  and  duties  are  obvious  and  well  known.  
10.2.4   The  PIC   is   in  a  different  position   from  the  agencies  so  far  mentioned.   Its  role   is   to  
investigate   “police   misconduct”   which   its   Act   defines   to   include   “corrupt   conduct  
within   the  meaning   of   the   Independent   Commission   Against   Corruption   Act   1988  
involving  a  police  officer”.103  The   Independent  Commission  Against  Corruption  Act  
includes  “a  member  of  the  NSW  Police  Force”  within  the  definition  of  “public  official”  
in  that  Act.104  
10.2.5   Section  129(1)  of  the  Police  Integrity  Commission  Act  provides  that  the  ICAC  cannot  
investigate  or  otherwise  deal  with  a  matter   involving   the  conduct  of  police  officers,  
Crime  Commission  officers  or  administrative  officers105   if   the  matter  does  not  also  































































103     PIC  Act  section  5.  
104     ICAC  Act  section  3(1),  definition  of  “public  official”,  paragraph  (k).  





129(2)   provides   that   the   ICAC  may   investigate   and   otherwise   deal   with   a   matter  
involving   the   conduct   of   such   persons   in   the   context   of   matters   that   also   involve  
public   officials   who   are   not   police   officers,   Crime   Commission   officers   or  
administrative  officers.  Section  131  empowers  the  respective  Commissioners  of  the  
PIC   and   the   ICAC   to   enter   into   arrangements   for   mutual   notification   of   matters  
within   the   jurisdiction   of   the   other   and   matters   where   there   may   be   coordinate  
jurisdiction.106  
10.2.6   The   PIC   and   the   ICAC   Commissioners   have   entered   into   a   Memorandum   of  
Understanding  dated  21  October  2008  which  deals  with   the  matters   referred   to   in  
section  131  of  the  Police  Integrity  Commission  Act.  
10.3   Relations  with  other  agencies  
10.3.1   The   Panel   has   received   written   submissions   from   the   PIC,   the   DPP   and   the  
Commissioner   of   Police   and   consulted   with   Mr   Peter   Hastings   QC,   the  
Commissioner  of  the  New  South  Wales  Crime  Commission.  
10.3.2   The   Commissioner   of   the   PIC   supports   the   continuation   of   the   current   legislative  
arrangements   for   demarcation  between   the  PIC  and   the   ICAC,  as  does   the   ICAC  
itself.   Nothing   in   the   submission   from   the   Commissioner   of   Police   or   the   Panel’s  
consultation  with  the  Commissioner  of  the  Crime  Commission  suggests  any  current  
problems   in   the  matters   the   subject   of   the   Panel’s   terms   of   reference.   There   are  
issues  in  the  relationship  between  the  ICAC  and  the  DPP  in  relation  to  prosecutions  
which  are  dealt  with  specifically  in  Chapter  12  below.  
10.3.3   The  Panel  makes  no  recommendation  of  legislative  change  in  respect  of  this  matter.  





































































Chapter  11  –  The  Report  of  the  Inspector  
11.1.1   The  office  of  Inspector  of  the  ICAC  was  created  following  recommendations  made  in  
the  2005  Report.  It  is  governed  by  Part  5A  of  the  Act  and  also  by  Division  2  of  Part  8  
and  Schedule  1A  to   the  Act.  The  principal   functions  of   the  Inspector  are  set  out   in  
section  57B(1)  as  follows:  
(1)  The  principal  functions  of  the  Inspector  are:  
(a)   to   audit   the   operations   of   the   Commission   for   the   purpose   of   monitoring  
compliance  with  the  law  of  the  State,  and  
(b)   to   deal  with   (by   reports   and   recommendations)   complaints   of   abuse  of   power,  
impropriety   and   other   forms   of   misconduct   on   the   part   of   the   Commission   or  
officers  of  the  Commission,  and  
(c)   to   deal   with   (by   reports   and   recommendations)   conduct   amounting   to  
maladministration   (including,   without   limitation,   delay   in   the   conduct   of  
investigations   and   unreasonable   invasions   of   privacy)   by   the   Commission   or  
officers  of  the  Commission,  and  
(d)   to  assess  the  effectiveness  and  appropriateness  of  the  procedures  of  the  
Commission  relating  to  the  legality  or  propriety  of  its  activities.  
11.1.2   The  Inspector  is  empowered  to  exercise  his  or  her  functions  on  the  Inspector’s  own  
initiative,  or  at  the  request  of  the  Minister  (the  Premier)  among  others.  
11.1.3   As   at   the   date   of   the  Panel’s   terms  of   reference,   as   appears   from   those   terms,   it  
was   foreseen   as   possible   that   there   may   be   available   a   completed   report   of   the  
Inspector  into  matters  of  the  kind  set  out  in  paragraphs  2  (a)  to  (d).  
11.1.4   The   Inspector,   the  Hon.  David  Levine  AO  RFD  QC,  made  a  Special  Report  dated  
18  June  2015  which  explains  that,  by  reason  of  the  volume  of  material  with  which  he  
had   to  deal,   he  had  not   yet   formed  any  conclusions  on   the  matters  which  he  has  
currently  under  consideration  and  which  raised  issues  of  the  kind  mentioned  in  the  
Panel’s  terms  of  reference.  
11.1.5   The  Panel,  at  a  meeting  with  the  Inspector,  confirmed  that  no  substantive  report  on  
such  issues  would  be  available  by  31  July  2015,  and  had  a  helpful  discussion  with  
the  Inspector  about  matters  of  the  kind  discussed  in  Chapter  7.  
11.1.6   Although,  naturally,  complaints  about  the  operations  of  the  ICAC  are  likely  to  come  
to  the  Inspector,  the  Inspector  does  not  function  as  some  kind  of  appellate  tribunal  
whose   role   is   to   reconsider   decisions   of   the   ICAC.   The   Special   Report   of  
18  June  2015   indicates   the   nature   of   the   task   on  which   the   Inspector   is   presently  
engaged,   as   well   as   the   magnitude   of   that   task,   and,   apart   from   the   analysis   of  
information  about  prosecutions,  does  not  bear  upon  the  Panel’s  terms  of  reference.  
11.1.7   The   Special   Report’s   concluding   reference   to   clarification   of   corrupt   conduct   is  
addressed   in  Chapter   7.  The   references   to   clarification  of   serious   corrupt   conduct  
and  systemic  corrupt  conduct  are  addressed  in  Chapter  9.    
11.1.8   The   Panel   notes   that   the   Inspector,   in   his   Special   Report,   indicates   that   he   will  






11.1.9  This  may  be  a  convenient  place   to  mention  an   issue   raised  by  both  Mr   Ipp  and   the  
ICAC   concerning   the   jurisdiction   of   the   Inspector.   They   suggest   that   there   is   an  
anomaly   in   Part   5A   of   the   Act   with   respect   to   the   Inspector’s   powers   under  
section  57C.   They   point   out   that   the   section   does   not   expressly   assert   that   the  
powers   there   stated   are   to   be   exercised   for   the   purposes   of   the   Inspector’s  
functions.  They  draw  a  contrast  with  section  57D  which  includes  a  reference  to  “for  
the   purposes   of   the   Inspector’s   functions”.   They   suggest   consideration   should   be  
given  to  amending  section  57C  to  make  clear  that  the  powers  can  only  be  exercised  
for   the   purpose   of   the   Inspector’s   functions.   The   Panel   does   not   consider   the  
suggested  changes  necessary.  It  appears  obvious  that  the  powers  of  the  Inspector  
under   section   57C   are   given   for   the   purpose   of   the   exercise   of   the   Inspector’s  
functions   under   the   Act.   It   is   difficult   to   envisage   what   might   be   the   competing  
possibility.  
11.1.10  The  Panel  received  a  submission  that  the  role  of  the  Inspector  should  be  expanded  
substantially   by   increasing   the   Inspector’s   budget   and   establishment,   and   by  
empowering  the  Inspector  to  conduct  public  and  private  hearings.  Under  the  Act,  the  
Inspector  has  important  and  extensive  powers,  and  the  adequacy  of  the  Inspector’s  
budget  and  establishment  at  any   time   is  a  subject   for  administrative   consideration  
rather   than   legislative   remedy.   The   Inspector   is   not   intended   to   act   as   a   general  
review   authority   with   a   function   of   reconsidering   all   operational   decisions   of   the  
Commissioner,   let  alone  all   findings  of   the  Commission.   If   that  were   the   legislative  
intention,   then   of   course   the   Inspector’s   present   establishment   would   be   totally  
inadequate.  The  reasons  behind  the  setting  up  of  the  office  of  Inspector  in  the  first  
place   appear   from   the   2005   Report,   and   they   have   not   been   overtaken   by  
subsequent  events.  One  submission  received  by  the  Panel  was  to  the  effect  that  a  
decision   to   conduct   a   public   inquiry   should   require   the   approval   of   the   Inspector.  
The   Panel   considers   that   this   would   be   an   inappropriate   involvement   of   the  
Inspector   in   operational   decision-­making   and   would   not   be   consistent   with   the  
statutory  functions  presently  exercised  by  the  Inspector.  





Chapter  12  –  Prosecution  and  Delay  
12.1   Introduction  
12.1.1.   The   terms   of   reference   require   the  Panel   to   consider   any   available  Report   of   the  
Inspector  which   includes  consideration  of   “the  extent   to  which   ICAC   investigations  
give  rise  to  prosecution  and  conviction”.  
12.1.2.   The   Inspector   appended   to   his   Special   Report   of   18   June   2015   an   analysis   of  
certain   information  relating   to  prosecutions,  which  was  prepared  by   the   ICAC.   It   is  
appropriate   that   the   Panel   deal   with   this   issue   and   the   related   issue   of   delay  
between  the  time  at  which  the  ICAC  makes  a  recommendation  pursuant  to  section  
74A(2)(a)  of  the  Act  that  consideration  should  be  given  to  obtaining  the  advice  of  the  
DPP  with  respect  to  the  prosecution  of  a  person  for  a  specified  criminal  offence,  the  
date   upon   which   such   advice   is   obtained   and   the   date   upon   which   criminal  
proceedings  (if  any)  are  actually  commenced.  
12.2     Extent  to  which  ICAC  investigations  give  rise  to  prosecutions  and  
convictions  
12.2.1   There   is   unquestionably   a   disparity   between   the   number   of   findings   of   corrupt  
conduct  made  by  the  ICAC  and  the  number  of  section  74A(2)(a)  recommendations  
on   the   one   hand   and   the   number   of   prosecutions   actually   commenced   and  
convictions  obtained  on  the  other.  
12.2.2   This  has  been  the  cause  of  concern  for  some  considerable  period  of  time.  It  was  a  
matter   considered   by   the   Parliamentary   Committee   in   2004.107   It   was   a   matter  
considered   in   some   detail   in   the   2005   Review.   More   recently,   in   2014   the  
Parliamentary   Committee   commenced   an   inquiry   into   the   following   matters,  
amongst  others:  
•   Whether   gathering   and   assembling   evidence   that   may   be   admissible   in   the  
prosecution  of  a  person  for  a  criminal  offence  should  be  a  principal  function  of  
the  ICAC.  
•   The   effectiveness   of   relevant   ICAC   and   DPP   processes   and   procedures,  
including  alternative  methods  of  brief  preparation.  
This   inquiry   had   not   been   completed   before   the   2015   State   election,   but   the  
Committee   did   publish   a   discussion   paper  Prosecutions  Arising   from   Independent  
Commission  Against  Corruption  Investigations  in  November  2014.  
12.2.3   Some   discrepancy   between   the   number   of   findings   of   corrupt   conduct   and   the  
number  of  successful  prosecutions   is  unavoidable.  There  are   two  reasons   for   this,  
one   general,   one   particular   to   the   ICAC   as   an   investigative   body.   The   general  
reason  is  inherent  in  the  criminal  justice  system  and  is  simply  that  some  people  who  































































107     See  Parliamentary  Committee  on  the  Independent  Commission  Against  Corruption,  Parliament  of  New  South  Wales,  





12.2.4   The  particular  reason  arises  from  the  ICAC’s  role  as  a  special  purpose  investigative  
body,  which  has  been  given  coercive  powers  to  enable  it  to  carry  out  that  purpose,  
that  is,  to  investigate  the  possibility  that  corrupt  conduct  may  have  occurred.  
12.2.5   Thus,  the  2005  Report  said:  
3.4.21   Some   submissions   to   the   review   have   expressed   concern   that   there   are  
insufficient  criminal  convictions  arising  from  findings  of  corrupt  conduct  by  ICAC.  
This   is   said   to   reflect   either   the   inappropriateness   of   ICAC’s   findings   and  
recommendations,   or   that   public   officials   are   not   being   properly   brought   to  
account  for  their  corrupt  activities.  
3.4.22   The  number  of  criminal  prosecutions   is,  however,  an   imperfect   indicator  of   the  
performance   of   ICAC.   The   principal   function   of   ICAC   is   to   investigate   and  
expose   corrupt   conduct,   not   to   obtain   criminal   convictions.   ICAC   was  
established   because   of   the   difficulties   with   obtaining   criminal   convictions   for  
corruption   offences.   Its   focus   generally   will,   and   should   be,   on   those   matters  
where  it  is  more  important  to  ascertain  what  happened  than  to  obtain  a  criminal  
conviction.  
3.4.23   The   exposure   of   corruption   by   ICAC   serves   an   important   deterrent   and  
educative  purpose.  Importantly,  ICAC’s  investigations  are  conducted  with  a  view  
to   ascertaining   whether   any   laws,   policies,   practices   or   procedures   require  
change   in   order   to  minimise   opportunities   for   corruption.   ICAC’s   investigations  
are   designed   to   modify   systems   as   well   as   behaviour.   For   this   reason,  
implementation   of   ICAC’s   corruption   resistance   strategies   and   corruption  
prevention   recommendations   may   be   considered   a   key   indicator   of   the  
performance  of  ICAC.  
3.4.24   ICAC  reports  that  the  majority  of  corruption  prevention  recommendations  made  
in   investigation   reports   have   been   implemented   in   some   form   by   the   public  
sector   organisations   concerned,   and   that   a   wide   range   of   public   sector  
organisations   have,   or   are,   implementing   a   range   of   corruption   resistance  
strategies  promoted  by  ICAC.  
3.4.25   ICAC  submitted  to  the  review  ‘that  there  is  no  justification  to  change  or  modify  its  
principal  functions  as  a  fact-­finding  investigative  body  to  one  where  its  primary  or  
principal  functions  are  directed  more  to  securing  criminal  convictions.’  
3.4.26   I  agree  with  ICAC’s  submission.  I  do  not  propose  to  recommend  any  changes  to  
the  Act  to  make  it  a  primary  function  of  ICAC  to  obtain  criminal  convictions.  
At   that   time,   enquiries   made   by   the   Parliamentary   Committee   indicated   that   only  
approximately  42%  of   the  persons  the  subject  of  a  finding  of  corrupt  conduct  were  
subsequently   convicted   while   58%  were   either   not   prosecuted   at   all   or   acquitted.  
The   Committee   noted   that   some   of   the   convictions   related   to   matters   that   arose  
during  the  ICAC  investigation  itself,  for  example,  false  swearing.108  
12.2.6   The  ICAC’s  position  is  set  out  in  its  submission  to  the  Panel:  
The   Commission’s   position   is   that   it   is   not   appropriate   to   regard   the   rate   of   criminal  
prosecutions  and  convictions  arising  from  Commission  investigations  as  a  measure  of  the  
Commission’s  performance.    
It   has   been   previously   suggested   by   some   commentators   that   the   rate   of   criminal  
convictions  following  Commission  investigations  should  be  the  measure  against  which  the  
Commission’s   success   should   be   assessed   and,   consequently,   that   the   Commission  




































































This   argument   appears   to   be   based   on   the   erroneous   belief   that   corrupt   conduct   is  
commensurate   with   criminal   conduct   and   that   a   finding   of   corrupt   conduct   without   a  
commensurate  conviction  for  a  criminal  offence  lacks  legitimacy  or  meaning.  
Advocating   the  use  of  prosecutions  and  conviction   rates   to  measure   the  effectiveness  of  
the  Commission  demonstrates  a  failure  to  understand  the  role  of  the  Commission.  In  this  
respect,  it  is  relevant  to  have  regard  to  the  principal  objects  of  the  ICAC  Act,  which  are  set  
out  in  s  2A  as  being:  
(a)   to  promote  the  integrity  and  accountability  of  public  administration  by  constituting  an  
Independent  Commission  Against  Corruption   as   an   independent   and   accountable  
body:  
(i)   to   investigate,   expose   and   prevent   corruption   involving   or   affecting   public  
authorities  and  public  officials,  and  
(ii)   to  educate  public  authorities,  public  officials  and  members  of  the  public  about  
corruption   and   its   detrimental   effects   on   public   administration   and   on   the  
community,  and  
(b)   to  confer  on  the  Commission  special  powers  to  inquire  into  allegations  of  corruption.  
The  gathering  of  admissible  evidence  for  the  prosecution  of  criminal  offences  is,  rightly,  a  
secondary   function   of   the   Commission.   The   Commission’s   primary   function   is   to  
investigate  and  expose  corrupt  conduct.  While  ample  evidence,  including  evidence  by  way  
of  admissions,  may  be  obtained   to  make   factual   and  corrupt   conduct   findings,   there  are  
many   factors   that   affect   whether   or   not   the   Commission   is   able   to   obtain   sufficient  
evidence  in  admissible  form  to  warrant  prosecution.    
The  Commission   has   extensive   powers   to   investigate   and   expose   corrupt   conduct.   The  
use  of  these  powers,  however,  does  not  necessarily  result  in  evidence  that  is  admissible  in  
a  criminal  prosecution.  For  example,  the  Commission  has  power  to  summons  a  witness  to  
give  evidence  or  produce  a  document  in  a  compulsory  examination  or  public  inquiry.  Such  
a  witness  is  required  to  answer  relevant  questions  and  produce  relevant  documents  even  
if  the  answer  or  document  may  incriminate  the  witness.  If  the  witness  objects,  the  effect  of  
the   objection   is   that   the   answer   or   document   is   not   admissible   in   evidence   against   the  
person   in   any   subsequent   criminal   prosecution   (except   for   a   prosecution   for   an   offence  
under  the  ICAC  Act).  Other  witnesses  may  give  evidence  about  a  person  but  not  agree  to  
provide  a   statement   in   admissible   form   for   the  purpose  of   a   criminal   prosecution  of   that  
person.    
There   are   many   cases   where   admissions   made   by   witnesses   provide   the   basis   for   a  
finding   of   corrupt   conduct.   As   the   admissions   are   made   under   objection,   they   are   not  
available  to  be  used  for  the  purpose  of  a  prosecution.  
The   Commission’s   investigative   processes   are   not   necessarily   concerned   with   the  
admissibility   of   evidence   in   judicial   proceedings   (deliberately   so).   It   is   imperative   to   the  
work  of   the  Commission   that   lines  of  enquiry  are  pursued  regardless  of   their  potential   to  
result  in  a  successful  prosecution.  A  change  of  emphasis,  which  required  the  Commission  
to   focus  on  prosecutions  by  assessing   the  potential  admissibility  of  evidence,  might  well  
influence   a   decision   to   follow   a   particular   line   of   enquiry   in   circumstances   where   the  
resources   of   the   Commission   have   to   be   allocated   in   accordance   with   its   principal  
functions.   Such   a   constraint   could   compromise   the   capacity   of   the   Commission   to   fully  
expose  corruption.  
The  Commission  considers  that  its  investigations,  and  findings  of  corrupt  conduct,  are  an  
important   deterrent   in   themselves   to   corrupt   conduct.   In   addition,   the   identification   of  
system  weaknesses   resulting   in   the  making  and   implementation  of  corruption  prevention  





effective  impact  on  reducing  corrupt  conduct  than  criminal  prosecutions,  which  necessarily  
focus  on  past  rather  than  prospective  conduct.  
12.2.7   There   is   force   in   this  submission.  Parliament  has  granted   the   ICAC  wide  coercive  
powers  so  as  to  enable   it   to  carry  out   its   functions.  A  consequence  of   the  grant  of  
such   coercive   powers   is   that   longstanding   and   valued   rights   which   most   people  
think   are   fundamental   to   our   society   and   to   the   operation   of   our   criminal   justice  
system,   such   as   the   privilege   against   self-­incrimination,   are,   to   some   extent,  
abrogated.  But  few  would  think  it  right  that  admissions  obtained  by  the  use  of  such  
coercive   powers   should   be   admissible   in   criminal   proceedings.   This   Panel   itself  
does  not.  
12.2.8   Thus,   section  37(2)   of   the  Act   abrogates   the  privilege  against   self-­incrimination   in  
respect   of   answers   to   questions   and   the   production   of   documents   at   compulsory  
examinations  and  public   inquiries.  Section  37(3)  prohibits  the  use  of  such  answers  
and  documents  in  any  civil,  criminal  or  disciplinary  proceedings  (subject  to  a  limited  
exception).109  
12.2.9   In   addition,   the   ICAC   is   not   bound   by   the   rules   of   evidence   –   see   section   17(1)  
which  provides:  “The  Commission  is  not  bound  by  the  rules  or  practice  of  evidence  
and   can   inform   itself   on   any  matter   in   such  manner   as   it   considers   appropriate”.  
Obviously,  criminal  trial  courts  are  bound  by  the  rules  of  evidence.  
12.2.10   The  result  of   the  matters  mentioned  in  paragraphs  12.2.8  and  12.2.9  above  is  that  
the  ICAC  may  well  be  making  its  findings,  including  those  of  corrupt  conduct  under  
section   13   of   the   Act,   on  material   different   from   that   which   will   be   available   to   a  
criminal   court   subsequently   determining   the   guilt   or   innocence   of   the   person   in  
question.  It  is  obvious  that  the  results  must,  in  some  circumstances,  be  different  and  
that  there  will  be  fewer  findings  of  guilt  than  there  will  be  of  corrupt  conduct.  
12.2.11   The   discrepancy   between   convictions   and   findings   of   corrupt   conduct,   in   fact,  
provides   an   eloquent   demonstration   of   the   fundamental   distinction   between   an  
ICAC  investigation  and  its  function  and  the  criminal   justice  system  and  its  purpose  
and   that   of   the   criminal   trial.   The   observations   in   paragraph   2.8.8   also   are   of  
relevance  to  this  point.  
12.2.12   The  Panel  does  not  recommend  any  legislative  change  in  relation  to  this  matter.  
12.3   Delay  
12.3.1   There  has  been  equally   longstanding  concern  over   the  delay  between   the   time  at  
which  the  ICAC  concludes  an  investigation  and  recommends  consideration  be  given  
to  seeking   the  DPP’s  advice  and   the   initiation  of  criminal  proceedings.  Such  delay  
as  there  has  been  results  from  two  separate  issues:  
•   Delay  between  consideration  of  the  ICAC  investigation  and  the  despatch  of  a  
brief  of  evidence  by  the  ICAC  to  the  Office  of  the  DPP  for  its  consideration.  
•   Delay  between  receipt  of  the  brief  and  decision  by  the  DPP  as  to  whether  or  




































































12.3.2   These   were   matters   of   concern   at   the   time   of   the   2005   Review.   It   had   been   a  
concern  of  the  Parliamentary  Committee:  
3.4.34   Both  ICAC  and  the  DPP  acknowledge  that  the  initiation  of  criminal  proceedings  
following  an  ICAC  investigation  has  been  adversely  affected  by  delay.  
3.4.35   Delay   between   the   commission   of   a   criminal   offence   and   its   prosecution   is   a  
significant   problem.   Convictions   may   be   more   difficult   to   obtain   as   witnesses  
disappear   and  memories   fade.   The   affected   person’s   reputation,   employment,  
and  family  suffer  while  awaiting  the  exercise  of  prosecutorial  discretion.  
   …  
3.4.37   The  Parliamentary  Committee  has  expressed  concern  about  the  delay  between  
the   provision   of   briefs   of   evidence   to   the   DPP   and   the   initiation   of   criminal  
proceedings.   Following   its   recent   examination   of   ICAC’s   2002-­2003   annual  
report,  the  Parliamentary  Committee  recommended  that:  
  ‘The   Commission   hold   discussions   with   the   DPP   to   examine   practical  
steps   to   remedy   inordinate  delays  between   the  date  briefs  are   received  
and   the   date   a   decision   is   made   on   whether   or   not   to   initiate  
proceedings.’54  
3.4.38   The   review   has   held   discussions   with   ICAC   and   the   DPP   about   the   issue   of  
delay.   Both   ICAC   and   the   DPP   acknowledge   that   there   have   been   delays  
associated   with   the   laying   of   charges   following   ICAC   investigations.   ICAC,   in  
particular,  asserts  that  it  is  striving  to  address  this  delay.  There  is  some  evidence  
of   this.   For   example,   criminal   proceedings   against   the   Honourable   JR   Face  
following   the   June   2004   investigation   report55   have   already   concluded,   and   in  
one  investigation  involving  a  former  correctional  services  officer,  the  officer  was  
convicted  of  corruption  offences  (uncovered  as  a  result  of  ICAC’s  investigation)  
prior  to  the  publication  of  ICAC’s  report.56  
54     Parliamentary  Committee  Report   on  Examination   of   the   2002-­2003  Annual  Report   of   the  
Independent   Commission   Against   Corruption   (September   2004)   recommendation   no   3  
page  xi.  
55     ICAC  Report  on  the  investigation  into  the  conduct  of  the  Hon  J  Richard  Face.  
56     ICAC   Report   on   investigation   into   the   introduction   of   contraband   into   the   Metropolitan  
Remand  and  Reception  Centre,  Silverwater.  
12.3.3   The   2005   Review  made   a   number   of   recommendations   to   address   this   problem.  
One   such   recommendation   was   that,   if   administrative   measures   did   not   prove  
effective   in   remedying   delay,   consideration   be   given   to   permitting   the   ICAC   to  
commence   criminal   proceedings   without   seeking   the   advice   of   the   DPP.110   That  
recommendation   was   not   adopted   by   Parliament   and   the   Panel   would   not   now  
support  it.  
12.3.4   The   Panel   has   examined   and   analysed   prosecution   timescales   for   outstanding  
matters   for   the   period   1   July   2012   to   30   June   2015   supplied   to   the  Panel   by   the  
ICAC.  
12.3.5   The  early  figures  set  out  in  the  prosecution  timescales  appear  less  than  satisfactory.  
One   case   involved  periods  of   between  1,669  days   (i.e.  more   than  4½  years)   and  
2,104  days   (i.e.  more   than  5½  years)   from   the  date   of   delivery   of   the  brief   to   the  
DPP  in  respect  of  a  particular  individual  to  the  date  of  the  final  DPP  advice.  




































































12.3.7   A  number  of  suggestions  were  made  to  the  Parliamentary  Committee  as  to  methods  
by  which   this   problem  might   be   addressed.   They   are   set   out   in   paragraphs   2.93-­
2.123  of  that  Committee’s  Discussion  Paper.    
12.3.8   Ultimately,   these   problems   cannot   be   solved   by   legislative   change.   They   involve  
questions   of   resources   and   institutional   willingness   (on   the   part   of   both   the   ICAC  
and  the  DPP)  to  take  steps  to  deal  with  the  issues  and  reduce  and  keep  delays  in  
prosecution  within  acceptable  limits.  To  the  extent  that  the  ICAC  does  not  do  so  it  is  
a  matter  within  the  functions  of  the  Inspector  under  section  57B  of  the  Act  and  as  to  
which  he  may  take  appropriate  action.  
12.3.9   The  Panel  makes  no  recommendation  as  to  legislative  change.  
12.4   Miscellaneous  
12.4.1   There   is   one   final   matter   relating   to   prosecution   which   Parliament   might   well  
consider  dealing  with  by  amendment  to  the  Act.  It  is  the  question  whether  the  ICAC  
should  be  given  express  power  to  commence  court  proceedings.  
12.4.2   The  position  is  accurately  stated  by  the  DPP,  Mr  Lloyd  Babb  SC,  in  his  submission  
to  the  Panel:  
Under   the   existing  MOU   between   the   ODPP   and   the   ICAC   regarding   potential   charges  
arising  out  of  the  ICAC  investigations,  the  ODPP  provides  advice  to  the  ICAC  in  relation  to  
appropriate   charges   to   lay   and  whether   a   prosecution   has   reasonable   prospects.   If   that  
advice  is  accepted  those  charges  are  commenced  by  the  ICAC  and  the  prosecution  of  the  
charges  is  taken  over  by  the  ODPP.  
An  officer  of  the  ICAC  acting  in  their  official  capacity   is  a  public  officer  for  the  purpose  of  
the  Criminal  Procedure  Act  1986:  s  3,  Criminal  Procedure  Act  1986  and  s  101(1),  Criminal  
Procedure   Regulation   2010.   As   a   consequence   an   officer   of   the   ICAC   has   power   to  
commence  proceedings  by   issuing  a  Court  Attendance  Notice   for  a  statutory  offence:  ss  
14  and  48,  Criminal  Procedure  Act  1986.  
However,  as  identified  by  Bruce  McClintock,  SC  in  the  2005  review  of  the  ICAC  Act  1988,  
‘The  current  statutory  regime  does  not  recognise,  in  an  open  and  transparent  manner,  the  
actual   position   in   relation   to   criminal   prosecutions   arising   from   ICAC   investigations.’  
Unfortunately   the   corresponding   recommendation   (R3.2)   has   not   subsequently   been  
adopted  in  amendments  to  the  ICAC  Act  1988.  
It  is  recommended  that  it  be  expressly  stated  within  the  ICAC  Act  1988  that  the  ICAC  may,  
after   considering   advice   of   the   ODPP,   institute   criminal   proceedings   arising   from   its  
investigations.  
12.4.3   There  is  force  in  the  DPP’s  recommendation.  If  Parliament  thought  it  appropriate  to  
make  such  a  change,   it  might  also  consider   it  appropriate   to   include  common   law  
offences  within  the  criminal  proceedings   in  respect  of  which  the  ICAC  can  institute  
proceedings  so  as  to  deal  with  the  problem  identified  in  paragraph  9.2.4  above.  
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Friday,  12  June  2015,  4:00pm  
9.   Mr  Laurence  Glanfield  AM,  Former  Director  
General  of  the  NSW  Department  of  
Attorney  General  and  Justice  and  former  
member  of  the  Independent  Commission  
Against  Corruption’s  Operations  Review  
Committee  
Thursday,  18  June  2015,  2:00pm  
10.   The  Hon.  Roger  Gyles  AO  QC,  Chair,  
Transparency  International  Australia  
Friday,  19  June  2015,  2:00pm  
11.   Mr  Peter  Hastings  QC,  Commissioner,  
New  South  Wales  Crime  Commission  
Friday,  19  June  2015,  3:00pm  





of  the  Supreme  Court  of  New  South  Wales  
13.   The  Hon.  David  Levine  AO  RFD  QC,  
Inspector  of  the  Independent  Commission  
Against  Corruption  
Ms  Susan  Raice,  Principal  Legal  Advisor,  
Office  of  the  Inspector  of  the  Independent  
Commission  Against  Corruption  and  the  
Police  Integrity  Commission  
Friday,  26  June  2015,  10:30am  
14.   Mr  Roy  Waldon,  Solicitor  to  the  
Independent  Commission  Against  
Corruption  
Friday,  26  June  2015,  2:00pm  
15.   The  Hon.  Megan  Latham,  Commissioner,  
Independent  Commission  Against  
Corruption  
Mr  Roy  Waldon,  Solicitor  to  the  
Independent  Commission  Against  
Corruption  
Wednesday,  1  July  2015,  2:15pm  
16.   Mr  Don  Colagiuri  SC,  Parliamentary  
Counsel  of  New  South  Wales  
Wednesday,  15  July  2015,  10:30am  
  
